State Department Briefing on Sudan

I love getting these State Department transcripts delivered to my inbox.  They are a great way to stay current on the myriad issues that are constantly percolating on the continent, and they are great to file away when you need to work up a background/issue paper.  As someone who doesn't know much on Sudan, I found it very helpful. 

Additionally, CFR has a great interactive crisis guide that takes you through the history of the conflict in Darfur in about an hour (they have them on a variety of other topics as well):

http://www.cfr.org/sudan/crisis-guide-darfur/p13129

Africa: Background Briefing En Route to Washington, D.C. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/06/166081.htm
Tue, 14 Jun 2011 05:51:04 -0500

Special Briefing

Senior State Department Official

Senior Official

En Route to Washington, DC

June 13, 2011

________________________________

MODERATOR: We have this evening a Senior State Department Official to discuss the Secretary’s meetings today with Prime Minister Meles and the meetings with representatives from North and South Sudan.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The Secretary came at a time when there were very high-level negotiations going on in Addis Ababa between North and South Sudan organized by –

MODERATOR: Hold on a sec; they can’t hear.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: -- organized by the Africa Union High-Level Panel. That’s the panel in charge of negotiations headed by former South African President Thabo Mbeki, but also hosted by Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. And the reason for this summit was because, as I think you all know, recently the –

MODERATOR: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: As you know, recently the Government of Sudan’s armed forces took over the contested region of Abyei and drove out not only the forces of South Sudan, but also the Ngok Dinka clan, and we have now close to 100,000 displaced from Abyei. That caused a crisis in itself, but very shortly afterwards, the government was sending forces down into the state of South Kordofan. South Kordofan had just had an election in which the governor was reelected, but the other candidate who represents the SPLA – SPLM North – and I’ll get back to that in a minute – did not recognize the results of the election.

So there was already a great deal of tension there, and the government troops said that they were there to disarm the SPLA troops who were in South Kordofan. You have to know that the troops in South Kordofan and Blue Nile are SPLA troops, but they’re not Southerners. They are indigenous to the Nuba Mountain area of South Kodofan and Blue Nile, but they fought with the SPLA in the civil war. But they’re Northerners.

Well, the idea that they might be forcibly disarmed has set off what has become a very, very serious armed conflict going on in South Kordofan state. Bombing has occurred, a lot of displacement – we now think up to 40,000 displaced – a shortage of food and water in many places, quite a bit of fighting from both sides.

Now, this summit was an attempt to bring this whole – both these situations back under control. On the Abyei side, the discussion was to get the Government of Sudan to withdraw from Abyei. To do that, one had to enhance the UN force that had been in Abyei. It was not effective up till now in keeping each side from introducing forces that were not by agreement to be there.

To enhance that, Ethiopia offered to provide troops, two or three battalions, but only on the condition that both President Bashir and Vice President – but President of the South – Salva Kiir – both requested it. He wasn’t going to go into that hot spot unless both sides wanted him to do so. And that has off a very complicated negotiation because the Government of Sudan in Khartoum says, well, I want to know what they’re going to do because I don’t like the way the UN has performed in the past. So that’s an awful long discussion.

In the meetings that were taking place when the Secretary arrived, they had not reached agreement. They were disagreeing over two things: the exact mandate under which the Ethiopian troops would operate, but also the Government of Sudan would say we also want to know what kind of administration of Abyei will take place when we withdraw because we didn’t like the last administration, we thought it was biased, and we want a new one that’s 50/50 between the Ngok Dinka and the Miseriya.

The SPLM said no, no, that’s not the way it works. Ngok Dinka – this is the land of the Ngok Dinka, the Miseriya are largely nomadic groups, we don’t see it 50/50. And that’s where the talks are deadlocked right now. Although President Bashir went back today to Khartoum, the two sides continue tomorrow to talk.

Now, in South Kordofan, fighting still goes on, and it’s very serious situation. The Secretary, arriving on her trip to Addis, met with Prime Minister Meles and had a briefing from him on the talks and the issues thereby. She then met with both – each side individually. She met with a special presidential advisor Nafie Ali Nafie accompanied by Sayed – and I can’t think of his last name, I apologize, but he’s an important figure in their North-South negotiations – and urged them very strongly to reach agreement on the security arrangements that would permit a withdrawal and said the U.S. would support the right kind of an agreement and urged them not get hung up, basically, on the administration issue, to get that resolved. And I think it was an important meeting.

Now, these were short meetings because, as you all know, we are running away from an ash cloud. So they weren’t as long as they had originally been scheduled, so we didn’t into a lot of bilateral issues and other things like that.

She then met with Salva Kiir, who, as you know, is the first vice president of the Government of National Unity but also the Government of South Sudan. And he was accompanied by his foreign minister, Deng Alor – he’s actually called minister of regional cooperation – and a lot of other people. And she again made this strong pitch to reach agreement on security arrangements for Abyei and a very strong (inaudible) pitch on cessation of hostilities in South Kordofan. And they voiced their opinion.

Basically, the two sides – I mean it’s a wonderful (inaudible) kind of situation. If you listen to one side, the other side violated all the protocols and they had instigated the violence. And then you listen to the other side, and it’s no, the other guys violated all the protocols and instigated the violence. And what it goes to is that these are two entities that really don’t trust each other. Each one thinks the other is conspiring against him. And because of that, on any issue of which is vital to them, whether it’s Abyei, which is emotionally important to both sides, or South Kordofan, which is a very complex situation, it’s easy when you’re thinking the other guy is always plotting against you to move either militarily or some other way.

So this negotiation really is very important; it isn’t over yet. To try and get the sides to sit down and say, okay, let’s pull back from these kind of military confrontations and get back to negotiating, we’re less than a month away from the South’s independence. The Secretary, I think, came at a very important time to indicate how important this was to the United States, how much we would lend support to any agreement they reach, and that we supported the CPA, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the idea of it of coming out with two viable states at the end of it.

QUESTION: Do you want to say a word about what’s to be gained if we can get peace and what’s to be lost if we can’t?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. I mean, for the two sides, these are two sides that don’t like each other, don’t trust each other, but have to live together. You know what people say: You can’t choose your neighbors. And they are so intertwined economically that they can hurt each other and hurt themselves very badly, whether it’s in oil or new currencies or trade on the border or whatever issues they have.

And so they risked by this outbreak of violence a peaceful separation of the South, one in which they’ve come to an agreement on oil wealth transfers, on border monitoring, on Abyei and other things. So they get off to a good start on cooperation. It is – it cast a pall over the negotiation of all these other issues.

For the North, for Sudan, as it will be after July 9th, they were on a path with the CPA and hopefully peace in Darfur to get back into good graces of the international community. They’re carrying a $38 billion debt, they’re going to lose 60 to 70 percent of their revenue from oil, they have major economic adjustments to make, so getting into debt relief, access to the World Bank, all those things, are there if they move through the CPA and things get better in Darfur. If you get into a military situation, if they violate UN Security Council resolutions for them to withdraw, let’s say, from Abyei, if they look like it’s more confrontational than negotiations, those processes can’t go on. It’s not just the United States; the Europeans have the same policies.

So the consequences for the North are very grave if they’re thinking two, three years ahead. If they’re thinking tomorrow, how do I get one up on the other side, that’s a different story. But if you look at it --

QUESTION: Is there any danger of the independence being delayed or anything?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, the South’s going to be independent on July 9th and the South takes the position we’re not going to respond – the South Kordofan, it’s a little different – we’re not going to respond to the takeover of Abyei, we’re not going to be lured into major military confrontation, because we want our independence on July 9th and we’re not going to let anything interfere with it. And I think that’s a foregone conclusion.

QUESTION: Did the North do this in a way as a bargaining chip, and is it the way theynegotiate? I mean, they used a pretext to get in there and try ahead of July 9th deadline to cut themselves a better deal.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That’s one theory. The other is – and there’s some truth to it as well – that after July 9th a lot of people in the government in Khartoum and elsewhere said, hey, we didn’t get anything for this, we thought the world would be at our doorstep. The Americans promised us things, but they all come after July. And we’re not getting anything and the South is not treating us well and they’re making a hard time in negotiations. And it built up what I called a sourness in the mood starting in March and April, and it made the military feel that they too were getting – they had to sit and watch the SPLA put people into Abyei and there were clashes. And so I think it also built up a sense of this frustration – we got to hit back because we’re not getting much out of this. So yes, some people think it’s a kind of a premeditated negotiating strategy, but I think it was also in the context – not necessarily justified – of hey, why did we do this, a buyer’s remorse. We did this and gave up a third of our country and most of our oil and we don’t have anything in return.

QUESTION: The question of, like, sanctions and state terrorism, did that come up?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: (Inaudible) always comes out, but it didn’t come up in these meetings –

QUESTION: I mean, like why – why (inaudible) now and when will this happen?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. Because they know what the roadmap is, but when they look at it closely, they say, hey, wait a minute, all the benefits are after July, debt relief takes two years, who knows if the Americans will change the goal posts. We keep raising Darfur. They say, oh, we didn’t think Darfur was part of it. But you have to read the roadmap. Darfur is part of it.

QUESTION: So it’s fair to say that her personal reassurance was important.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: It was – she’s made the point we’re serious about the roadmap and it’s there and if you adhere to it, those things are there. They don’t come overnight, but we’re serious about it. We mean it, it’s not a game, and I think in the – it registered.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think so.

QUESTION: I mean, you’ve been at this for a while. And given the fact they’re still at the state where they have this essential lack of mutual trust, what do you think that tells us about how the two entities are going to exist even after independence?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I think these are two entities that don’t necessarily like each other but have to learn to live with each other. I often tell them that you don’t have to kiss each other on the cheek, but you do have to shake hands, because they have so much that they need each other for. I’m sorry I don’t have the figure in my head, but there’s a very large percentage of the population between North and South that live on the border, and all that trade back and forth and migrations, et cetera, they can’t move away from that – and the oil.

QUESTION: Is there anything – any contact with Bashir himself? Have U.S. officials had any contact with Bashir (inaudible)?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We didn’t. No, we had no contact with him, and he was leaving anyway when we arrived.

QUESTION: Thank you.

PRN: 2011/T48-24

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'On Ending Piracy in Somalia' or 'Rebooting Max Boot' or 'It's time Kelly Rowland Got Hers'

 (This posting's title links to MAX BOOT's post today in commentary magazine)


Yesterday I posted my meandering commentary on the recent murders by the Somali pirates.  CFR retweeted a link to Max Boot's post on ending piracy ("Are we finally going to get serious about piracy? Here's what it would take: http://bit.ly/eapAAF").  I was excited and quickly clicked to read his article: Time to Stop Making Excuses When It Comes to Fighting Piracy.

And I must admit, that while I agree with his premise that the US needs to get serious about piracy off of the Somali coast, I find his 'solution' to be a superficial and short-sighted one.  


Before I go any further a DISCLAIMER:  

          Max Boot is WAY smarter than I am (he has impeccable credentials and has written of wealth of insightful and intelligent material that I have enjoyed)!  I, on the other hand, was an English major at the Naval Academy, graduated on the low end of the middle of my class and went on to fly helicopters in the Navy (admittedly not the smartest bunch, but always with the most beautiful wives) and have been published only here...on my blog.  So if Boot's article turns out to be a satirical one that went way above my head,  I withdraw my comments and will tuck my tail between my legs...but if not...then I must whole-heartedly disagree with the 'MaxBoot solution.'

Enough with the apologies now, on to my comments:

"We have sent our Navy to patrol the chaotic waters off Somalia but with such restrictive rules of engagement that apparently they can react only once a ship has actually been hijacked, and then use force only if Navy personnel or the hostages are directly threatened by the pirates."  The sheer and overwhelming numbers of merchant traffic off the coast of Somalia and around the Horn of Africa make it impossible for the US Navy to effectively patrol even 1/100 (that's generous) of the area.  I too would be curious to learn what the ROE is with regards to engaging the pirates...but so would the pirates.  Anyway, these pirates aren't stupid.  They hide their guns when they are out on the open waters.  The US Navy can't board every dhow out there.  What do you call a suspected pirate with a concealed weapon?  A Somali fishermen. 

"The result is that there is no effective deterrence to the predations of these ruthless outlaws of the seas, who have turned piracy into big business and are closely linked to the Islamist movement trying to take over Somalia."   Even if we boarded every suspected pirate vessel in the Indian Ocean this would never deter the pirates.  The deterrence of piracy begins ashore (and not just in Somalia, but in Kenya, and Dubai from what I have read in open source reporting) first and foremost with the money.  And then beyond that with the judicial and penal system in the affected countries.  If there aren't secure jails to house the pirates, there is no judge that is going to sentence someone and then have him get out and kill that same judge.  In the United States we often take a sound judicial and prison system for granted.  

   Finally, I'd be curious to see Max Boot's source that 'closely links the Islamist movement to these ruthless outlaws.'  I think any connection between radical islamists and Somali gang leaders is tenuous at best.  And more often this supposed 'link' is just an excuse to get funding...I have found that Al Qaeda loosely translates into 'funding' in Defense Speak.

"If we are serious about this threat, all we need to do is to authorize the Navy to sink any suspected pirate vessels that are sighted unless they surrender immediately;"  Surely you jest! Even with this authorization,we would need about 1000 more naval ships to prosecute and 'sink' suspected pirate vessels.  The time it would take to board every single little dhow or motorboat to see if they were pirates (and how do you legally determine this?) would be extend deployments for decades.  If you really want to go down this road, a more practical approach would be to get a fleet of armed UAVs and give a bunch of middle schoolers crushed up smarties to snort and let them have at it Ender's Game style.  
    Jokes aside, this type of  kill 'em all and let God sort out the rest mentality is one which underlies the our challenges in COIN and nation-building/helping.  If these 'suspected pirates' were Americans operating off the coast of Florida it would not be acceptable to shoot first.  As a military and as a nation we MUST value the lives of non-Americans as much as we would our own citizens!

"...and if they do surrender, to bring back the suspected pirates for trial in the U.S. even if they have not menaced a U.S.-flagged vessel."  This is the part of the article where I guffawed inadvertently.  Has Boot kayak.com'd flights from Mogadishu to NYC lately?  They aren't cheap.    So where would be try these pirates?  In what city?  In what court?  What would the charge be for the 'suspected pirates'?  The logistics of this are mind-boggling.    I agree that guilty pirates need to be prosecuted, but suspected ones? Really?  And we can't try everyone single one in the US regardless.  There needs to be a focus on the judicial systems in Somalia (one day) and the bordering countries (now).

 "All it requires is making more effective use of the force already in place and making use of legal authorities that have been in place for hundreds of years. "  There's a big different between legal authorities and legal abilities as I stated previously.

All this said, here's my .02 on how to end piracy in Somalia (if we are serious):

1.  Go after the money trails in Kenya and Dubai (and anywhere that we know it's happening) aggressively.  This means high profile press coverage in concert with international prosecution and embarrassment.  It also means proving the monetary connections.  In the press reports that I have read so far, I haven't seen any concrete evidence presented.  Ultimately, this means pressuring these governments.  It also means redoubling our efforts to help them build effective judicial and penal systems (the UNODC has already has some success in Kenya with this). 

2.  Go after the gang leaders (of course this won't work until there's an effective government in Somalia because more will sprout up) GTA: Mogadishu style.  This means an intelligence investment/upgrade (on our part and on the part of our partners) among many others.

3.  Establish an effective government in Somalia (Boot, now here's your chance to guffaw). 

4.  Teach the bordering East African countries to police their own waters.  This involves shifting money to our own Coast Guard (vice our Navy) to build these countries' capability and capacity.  It also involves showing them the connection between the maritime environment and the economy (through fishing and fines).  These fines and public coverage of them are important because illegal dumping and fishing is a HUGE and RAMPANT problem (in West Africa as well).   Ultimately this means concerted engagement across DOD and State Department.  The Navy/Coast Guard in most African countries plays a distant Kelly Rowland to the Army's Beyonce.  That means we need our Senior State Department and Defense Officials hammering home to the senior politicians that it's Kelly's turn to shine.

5.  Encourage South Africa to step up.  Engage India and our Arab partners to vastly step up their efforts (at least monetarily).

Okay, that's about all I can think of for now; I know I am missing a ton, but my wife just got home from work and she is much more beautiful than this screen!  Overall, I am disappointed in CFR's cronyism in pointing twitter followers to Boot's article...unless they knew it would inspire dialogue, in which case, mission accomplished CFR.