Clientelist State-Society Relations Notes (Barkan, Fatton, Pitcher et al)

Clientelist-State-Society Relations

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Below are my class notes on the following three articles:

Legislators, Elections, andPolitical Linkage by Joel Barkan

Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal by Robert Fatton Jr. 

Rethinking Patrimonialism andNeopatrimonialism in Africa (144-156) by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston

Legislators, Elections, andPolitical Linkage by Joel Barkan

SUMMARY:  The legislative and electoral processes in Kenya and Tanzania have survived and are based on the relationship between the citizens of the periphery and the center of the political systems.  This is a post-colonial phenomenon.  More the modernization model (but really in the rational choice camp)—these are the mechanisms that the states connects to society—and the mechanism that gives the (rural) society some voice.  Rural constituent expectations are low which helps—their representatives don’t have to deliver too much (monetarily).  Doesn’t address resource extraction. 

•    Brit parliamentary and electoral institutions were transferred to Kenya & Tanzania - the Westminster model

•    Result of '57 to '63 elections:

•    Emergence of single party

•    Transfer of power to govern & granting independence

•    Emergence of political structure responsive to local interests instead of nat'l interests    

•    Because political control was by single group, the process of competition, mutual criticism, and bargaining between gov't and opposition parties was never established

•    Legislature was not important for public policy making & electoral process did not provide voters a choice of policy alternatives, but a choice btwn governing elites.

The Legislative Process as Political Linkage

•    Legislators (MPs = Members of Parliament) are of more importance than legislature

•    Linkages between gov't and society are necessary for communication and exchange of resources.

•    Legislators in Kenya & Tanzania are 'agents of the center' - facilitate the center's penetration and control of the periphery rather than for connecting periphery to the center.  They are recruited/evaluated by the center and are not responsible for the local people they are assigned to serve.

•    Legislative process is not as a member of the Nat'l Assembly, but as lobbyists on their constituents' behalf the senior bureaucrats of ministries that run programs in their constituents' areas.

•    Linkage role based upon:

            - Capacity of individual legislators to engage in entrepreneurial activities to make                           successful links

        - Amount of access each legislator has

•           The role of the nat'l political party & ideological goals it is committed to.

•           Posture of the civil service toward legislators

•           Nature of the electoral process

The Propensity of Legislators to be Linkers

•    Success depends on their willingness to go out & organize members of their constituencies into political base whose support is valued by the center...and to mediate reciprocal demands of constituents and center.

•    MPs must balance the creation of political base with parliamentary combat; must do the former if they want to remain in office, but must also do the latter well to provide constituent resources to also stay in office.

•    An increasing proportion of MPs have shifted their attention to constituency service and other linkage activites

Access to Resources

•    The challenge for MPs to organize and link projects to the center is gaining access

•    Kenya encourages linking activities on the part of its MPs, but Tanzania did not.

•    Challenge for MP is to create political base that is enough for the regime to value and coopt, but not so large for it to fear.

•    Kenyan system - MPs make direct claims on the ministers and asst ministers.

•    Kenya had four tiered system of informal, personal relationships: president, cabinet ministers (ethnic/regional leaders), asst ministers (future regional leaders), backbenchers (constituency leaders), and tribal elders/businessmen (local notables)

•    Tanzanian legislators are highly restricted and the opportunities for obtaining resources are few.  Creation/establishment of linkages from the periphery to the center are limited because privileged access they might have to the center are cut off.

Legislators and Parties

•    Kenya - MPs are the leading political figures in their constituencies and are unencumbered by party org's beyond their control

•    Tanzania - Legislators must work within an elaborate and centralized party structure where they have minimal influence and org doesn't parallel the constituencies they have been elected to represent.  Legislators have not been able to develop personal machines independent of party control.

Legislators and the Electoral Process

•    Process in both countries is to recruit new individuals into the present ruling elite, promote other individuals, and to renew legitimacy of elite and its mode of governance in the minds of the electorate.

•    Elections are a series of local contests to select representatives of the periphery to lobby at the center.  Concerned about local (not national) issues; ideology rarely discussed.

•    Voters know their MP as what he has and has not done to further interest of local community.

•    Victorious candidates are better educated, earn higher incomes, and are much less likely to be farmers.  Access to top decision makers is the name of the game.

•    Cleavage btwn backbenchers and frontbenchers in Kenya is much less pronounced than in Tanzania, because KANU (in Kenya) has withered from disuse and TANU (in Tanzania) is very restrictive.

•    Both Tanzania and Kenya produce more representatives than leaders.

Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal by Robert Fatton Jr. 

SUMMARY:  The patron/client relationship is not a substitute for class analysis.  President reaches out directly to Marabouts (vs. the MPs doing this in Kenya).  Because of his broader approach he could show that when the state is able to adjust peanut prices to extract a large indirect tax (because the farmers have to eat the difference) with the support of Marabouts. 

            While the system described by Barkan may appear to be representative—it really is cementing a ruling elite class.  More dependency theory which is a bit dated.  Class formation point is an important one but perhaps overstated. 

            In East Asia, economic success and industrialization is being traced back to patrimonialism and clientilism. 

•    Patron/client relationships have been called the national disease of Senegal.  However, it also assures social stability, aids in distribution of political spoils, and assures a degree of popular participation.  It provides some political order.

•    Patron/client are marked by reciprocity / affection, and personal / diffuse linkages rather than class power and control

•    Patron/client have reinforced the existing structures of wealth and privilege, and have served the interests of the ruling class.

•    The more the state and the party penetrated society, the more they enhanced the value of clientelism and patronage.

•    Distribution of spoils, jobs, and promotion in politics fragmented the Senegalese ruling class into clans and factions.  It is inherently hierarchic, exploitative, and corrupt.

•    The system is a flawed reciprocity since it unilaterally benefits the patron.  The patron can command the obedience of those whose survival depends on the access of the resources.

•     

•    In Senegal, the marabouts (heads of major Islamic brotherhoods) enjoyed autonomy and have always been religious and political actors in the clientelist system

•       They are in intermediary positions between the center and their periphery (taalibe), who represent free labor in peanut farms. 

•       Marabouts became clients in patron colonial state.  Now are involved in mutually supportive and beneficial relations with the state.  Marabouts represent transmission belt btwn urban center and agricultural periphery.

•                      Peanut products accounted for 40 to 50% of Senegalese exports.

•    Patron/client are coercive dependence, not ties of genuine reciprocity.  Yet, this dependence has not yet generated resistance.

•    Factionalism is inherent as clients are prepared to shift their allegiances to the highest bidder.

•    Urban loyalties rest on self-interest, not on principles of the collective good.

•    Senegal had adopted industrial strategy based on export promotion, not internal consumption.

•    Patron/client was modernized to support penetration of external economic forces and institutions.

•    Tri-partism in '76 from the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) attempted to modify patron/client relationships.  Clientelist forces were not eliminated, but persisted.

Rethinking Patrimonialism andNeopatrimonialism in Africa (144-156) by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston

SUMMARY: Botswana has a successful neopatrimonial system intertwined with their democracy that has been highly functional.  Some point to the fact, however, that their success was more due to that they were a protectorate instead of a territory and because they were such a small, closely connected elite and this made accountability easier.

•    Use personal power and reciprocities to solidify legitimacy as "open elite democracy"; brings traditional loyalties into the public arena

•    Has fostered stability and growth - and has also resisted challenges to the nation's economic inequalities.

•    Tribal groups, called Kgotlas, were groups of men who built consensus behind tribal chief decisions.  These groups became the core leadership for the state, were legitimate, and did not have to significantly change their system.  The Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) brought together tribal chiefs and kgotlas into its base.

•    BDP has multistranded ties and loyalties that have sustained it in a modern state.

OVERALL:

Patrimononialism is a form of authority which is different from clientilism. 

Neopatrimonialism—an office isn’t literally sold.  Informal ownership. 

Both forms of authority within the state.

*Anytime you have patrons that are more powerful than clients you have clientilism—which can exist outside the state.  Anytime it happens inside the state though you have neopatrimonialism OR massive corruption (i.e., it’s not legitimate). 

Notes on Patrimonialism in Africa (Theobald, Bach, Pitcher and Moran)

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes on Patrimonialism in Africa (Theobald, Bach, Pitcher and Moran)

Embedded and pasted below are notes on patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism from the following three articles:

Robin Theobald, “Patrimonialism,” WorldPolitics 34, 4 (July, 1982), 548-559

Daniel C. Bach, “Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism: Comparative Trajectories and

Readings,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics49, 3 (2011), 275-294

Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran and Michael Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism and

Neopatrimonialism inAfrica,” African Studies Review 52, 1(April 2009), 128-144

Definitions:

Patrimonialism is a form of governance in which all power flows directly from the leader. Essentially, this constitutes the blending of the public and private sector. These regimes are autocratic or oligarchic and exclude the upper and middle classes from power. The leaders of these countries typically enjoy absolute personal power. Usually, the armies of these countries are loyal to the leader, not the nation.  They maintain power through the use of political favors in what is characterized as a “patron-client relationship”

Neopatrimonialism is a term used for patrons using state resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and is indicative of informal patron-client relationships that can reach from very high up in state structures down to individuals in say, small villages.

“Patrimonialism” – Robin Theobald

Robin Theobald, “Patrimonialism,” WorldPolitics 34, 4 (July, 1982), 548-559

The author describes the prevalence of patrimonialism in present society (1982).  She argues that it is very common.  She further argues that some states are merely patrimonial societies that exist as “private instruments of those powerful enough to rule,” and labels the Thai government as an example of this belief. (pg 549).  Theobald goes on to state that patrimonialism may be ideal for the development of certain nations.  King Hassan II of Morocco achieved a monopoly over political appointments by continuously bribing or providing favors to opposition groups in order to hold on to his position.

The author goes on to state that the prevalence for patrimonialism dwindles when a nation becomes more industrialized at which point affluence can be attained by methods other than “who you know,” and more along the lines of “what you know.”  Examples of modern patrimonialism include Kennedy appointing long-time friends to governmental positions or Obama using federal funds to support Solyndra after their campaign contribution.  In effect, the author is NOT stating that patrimonialism is bad, only that it exists everywhere (in some locations it is merely less obvious).

Theobald references a Riordan Roetts study of Brazil and notes that the only way a minority party has maintained its political control is through the delving out of public employment positions, the use of resources on the construction projects of favorable associates, and/or the exchange of substantive favors.  The main threat to a patrimonial state is the mobilization of the urban sector that receives no favors from the president/sultan/king.  She argues that ALL societies are patrimonial to some extent, as a side effect of bureaucracy.   3^rd world countries are most often associated with patrimonialism because its presence is considerably more overt/obvious. (pg 553)  The article goes on to list Mali, Indonesia, Congo, and Egypt as examples of nations that are characterized as “patrimonial.”

Theobald finishes by stating “the consolidation of modern state power was indissolubly linked with the expansion of trade and the diffusion of capitalism.”(pg 556)  A patrimonial bureaucracy thus is the administrative instrument of an underdeveloped economy with limited trade and a large subsistence sector. The limited penetration of commercial transactions in such an economy constitutes a serious impediment to the appropriation of resources by the center, and hence to the development of an efficient "modern" administration.” (pg 557)

Basically, patrimonialism is the only way for a country to develop itself when there is no good method for taxing the public and using tax revenues to develop the nation.

“Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: comparative trajectories and readings” – Daniel C. Bach (2011)

Daniel C. Bach, “Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism: Comparative Trajectories and

Readings,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics49, 3 (2011), 275-294

Article addresses neopatrimonialism’s prevalence in the politics of Africa.

Cameroon was the first nation to apply neopatrimonialism (in the 1970s) as a means of combating “underdevelopment.”   The author notes that Cameroon, in the 1970s, was an authoritarian state, with President Ahidjo staying in power through “monopolistic control over the state” and using his position as “a source of opportunities for family, friends and clients.” (p 276)

The article goes on to further delineate patrimonialism from neopatrimonialism by stating something very similar to the definitions at the beginning of this document.  He goes on to add that neopatrimonialism, unlike traditional patrimonialism, exists with bureaucratic systems and at least a pretense of legal/rational state governmental legitimacy. (pg 277)


Bach then distinguishes between two extremes of neopatrimonialism.  Both forms undercut ethics but one seeks mutual accommodation to advance development (while still allowing the political elites to hold on to power)

1.   Regulated neopatrimonialism –a somewhat regulated form whereby public space and public policy is still an important aspect of the society. (examples include Kenya in the 1960-70s & Cote d'lvoire from 1960-93)

2.   Predatory neopatrimonialism – a form in which the political elite primarily seek personal wealth and results in a failure of institutionalization and eventually the state (also called cronyism or kleptocracy) (examples include Uganda in the 1970s and Nigeria 1983-98)

The author believes that neopatrimonial states are weak, interfere with markets, depend on foreign powers (and foreign aid), and tend to be repressive and anti-developmental. (pg 281)  Indeed this belief was furthered by actions of Mobutu in Nigeria where the elites of the neopatrimonial state were chiefly bent 'on maintaining power and on privatizing public resources for personal gain or gain by [their] ethnic community.

Latin America, South East Asia and post-Communist European States are compared to Africa in their prevalence for neopatrimonialism.  The term “neopatrimonialism” was first coined when describing the authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Argentina in the latter half of the 20^th century.  The difference between Africa and Latin America was that African cases sometimes had more developmentally focused (regulated neopatrimonialism) that wasn’t seeking the total breakdown of institutionalism (dissolving the department of public works, education, health, etc).  Indonesia, under General Suharto (1967-98) was more of a regulated neopatrimonial state while the Philippines were more of a predatory neopatrimonial state.  Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan are further examples of predatory patrimonialism that hindered institutional development. 

In conclusion, the author states that neopatrimonialism can be beneficial but is most often associated with anti-developmental practices as it hinders the free-markets and promotion of social/public goods and services.

Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa - Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran, and Michael Johnston (2009)

Anne Pitcher, Mary H. Moran and Michael Johnston, “Rethinking Patrimonialism and

Neopatrimonialism inAfrica,” African Studies Review 52, 1(April 2009), 128-144

Article addresses neopatrimonialism as an often-misunderstood term that is improperly applied to numerous governments.

Weber described patrimonialism as a way that a ruler could establish legitimate authority by securing compliance from his subjects.  It was not a form of corruption or even an indicator of a weak state.  It was merely a specific form of authority and source of legitimacy stemming from a societies’ allegiance to an individual (versus the office, such as the office of the president or allegiance to uphold the constitution)

The authors argue that patrimonialism is incorrectly used to describe both regimes and numerous types of authority (even democracies).  Patrimonial legitimacy derives its force from the voluntary compliance of subjects with domination by their rulers, which is very different from the domination deployed against slaves, and even from the threat of joblessness used against free workers in industrial capitalist countries.  Patrimonialism is a significant element of the most industrialized nations today, “without undermining democratic processes or economic development.” (pg 3) Additionally, patrimonialism does not lead to neopatrimonialism or vice versa.  Both forms exist and form independent of each other.

            Many nations in Africa were prone to patrimonial rule due to ancestral practices.  Symbolic traditions, such as the transfer of power from a hunted panther to a new chief through the chief’s consumption of the killed panther, created an environment where rulers were both revered and feared in a paternal relationship with society.  The father would forgive while the chief would punish.  (See example of pg 4 of the document)

“Ironically, while patrimonialism is said to cement social bonds in small-scale situations through a reliance on trust, reciprocity, and material exchanges, it is believed to distort power, corrupt authority, and fuel personal aggrandizement when it permeates larger political institutions such as bureaucracies and states.” (pg 6)  Unfortunately, patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism is applied too frequently when describing leaders, regimes, and systems that have poor leadership or undergo economic stagnation.  This has resulted in scholar labeling every African state as patrimonial or neopatrimonial at one time or another, a gross miscalculation in the authors view. 

“Underdeveloped states typically have bureaucracies in which individuals rely on public office to secure private gain because such states lack the institutional arrangements necessary to provide a consistent source of revenue to the state.  Without a stable revenue stream with which to pay its officials, the state fails to create a professional and credible bureaucratic apparatus; officials rely on personal networks for power and funds, thereby creating patrimonial bureaucracies.” (pg 9)  Some scholars believe that patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are results of a colonial legacy. 

In the case of Botswana, the authors argue that neopatrimonial authority is compatible both with high levels of legitimacy and with economic development. (pg 10)  The leadership assumed a patrimonial authority, but used it to further empower the government through economic and infrastructure development.  The Botswana example demonstrates that “there is nothing inherent in patrimonialism to prevent the creation of a democracy by leaders determined to do so.” (pg 25)

Misinterpretation of Weber has resulted in numerous scholars associating neo and traditional patrimonialism as the cause for stagnant economies or failed governments.  The authors contend that true patrimonialism involves reciprocity between the rulers and the subjects with rulers beholden to the publics overall well being.  Finally, the authors state that scholars might be better served by labeling governments by what they really are: authoritarian regimes, dictatorships, or some form of democracy. (pg 26)