Resolving Ethnic Conflict: Creating a New I Am

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

Below is a paper I wrote arguing on a multi-pronged approach to resolving ethnic conflict--one that accepts short term violence for the sake of long-term reconciliation.  My complete collection of grad school notes and paper can be found here.

Resolving Ethnic Conflict: Creating a New I Am

For most Americans more comfortable with the concept of civic nationalism, ethnic conflict is a difficult concept to understand comprehensively.  This contemporary American mindset cannot (and should not) mask, however, the bloody primordial relationship between ethnic nationalism and global conflict.  If one is to believe structuralists such as Mueller, these ethnic conflicts will be a regular (if not increasing) occurrence throughout the 21^st century as third world nations continue to modernize.  A united international community with unlimited resources might be able to prevent many of these conflicts, however, fiscal realities—and a public reticent to intercede—more often dictate post-conflict recommendations than pre-emptive military action.  What then is the best way to resolve these ethnic conflicts?  Is total resolution an impossible ideal?  How does one define the term best way, as well as its parameters?  In this essay I argue that the best way is an approach that takes the long view—that accepts a short period of violence and instability for the sake of long-term peace and reconciliation.  The approach best suited to do this is a multi-pronged one that emphasizes a liberal democracy tailored to respond to real or perceived ethnic grievances, and an intentional peace-building process that recognizes the nature of group identities as dynamic and incorporates them in the creation of a new worldview.  I begin by discussing the importance of an ethnic conflict’s origin as well as the state’s role in responding to it in determining a solution.  Then I discuss modernity’s role in state formation and its relevance to conflict resolution.  Finally, I analyze the roles of a liberal democracy, civic nationalism and psychocultural interpretation in creating an enduring cessation of ethnic conflict.  

Notes on Bates' Markets and States in Tropical Africa

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (2005)

By Robert Bates

*African (lack of) development is the story of broken links (leakage).  Between marketing boards and farmers—between marketing boards and infant industrial and manufacturing industries.  Lack of transparency at so many stages is a real breakdown of the social contract—this is amplified by indirect taxes—and by the inefficiency of bureaucracy and non-competitive middling industrial base.

*Failure to embrace/espouse regionalization of markets has stunted all economies—they need market integration. 

*Fragmentation, coercion and co-optation

*Collective irrationality in the face of individual rationality      

*Rent is an administratively created resource (by government)—in which they are getting something for nothing.            

*True purpose of the marketing boards—theoretically—is for them to even out commodity/crop prices—during good years they should save the money for the bad years so they can offer farmers prices above market value.                                                                

DISCUSSION/MAIN POINTS (all the bold points below are repeated here):

- This is part of larger African trend—funds originally designated for farmers and instead used to impose (indirect) taxes on them (p. 12-19).

- Regulation of internal markets is difficult in practice, so another strategy governments espouse is the increase of domestic farm production—ultimately this does little to increase much of anything and instead just creates a new rural elite (in the form of large-scale mechanized farms) at the expense of the small-scale farmers—a politically fruitful venture (but not an agriculturally fruitful one) (p. 45)

*One problem of this book is Bates’ propensity to provide figures in local currency which gives the reader NO scale by which to judge them.  He may as well just make up words for a currency like 600 million poopoos)

- All patterns of protection (resulting from barriers erected to protect domestic industries) in Africa have a common feature:  Effective protection level > nominal protection level

(p. 65)

-furthermore hampering profits and efficiency are prevailing conditions in Africa—a lack of infrastructure means that it’s hard to get parts quickly which means long delays in production and delivery.  This is a prevailing theme in AFRICA! (p. 72)

- In Africa, food takes up 60% of the average urban dwellers budget!!!! (p. 74)

-to date farmers are a relatively inactive interest-group politically—there are definite technological breakthroughs today that would make it easier for them to coordinate. 

- Do small farmers coordinate and organize better today with growth of mobile technology?  (p. 87-91)

-  If Bates just updated this book in 2005, why didn’t he update any of his examples to reflect the last 20 years at least?  (p. 87-91)

- Paradox of agricultural Africa: coexistence of indirect taxes (through low commodity prices) with subsidies on input factors.   This statement here is one of the main points of the whole book (p. 109)

- Marabouts seem like the original sellouts and bums (p. 108-113)

- Bates never mentions anything about agricultural aid (ie Gates Foundation which contributes more $$$ to farming in Africa than USAID)

Entire notes here: