FAO Quotables

"But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist."
-Anne Applebaum

Showing posts with label liberalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label liberalism. Show all posts

Friday, February 9, 2018

What role does ideology play in the establishment of a welfare regime?

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

My complete collection of Grad School Notes can be found here (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing, Islam, Comparative Politics).

In this essay I argue that ideology plays a critical role in the establishment of a welfare regime.  The modern welfare regime is inexorably tied to the ideology of liberalism, in stark contrast to its Marxist roots.  

In addressing the role of ideology within the creation of a welfare regime it is useful to define these terms.  An ideology usually develops when someone makes an observation about a phenomenon in society or history and creates a theory to explain it.  When this theory is transformed and becomes an explanation for everything—usually as a normative mindset—it becomes an ideology.  An ideology asserts that its worldview can explain any problem, conflict  or occurrence.   In its comprehensiveness then it is very useful but logically it can be very circular and unsatisfying.  Ideologies are most often characterized by an -ism (e.g., communism, marxism, objectivism, liberalism, fascism, feminism).  

A welfare regime is a government whose laws and policies seek to provide for some measure of the wealth (in the holistic sense) of the entire people.   Typically the elements of this welfare include shelter, security, education, health care and subsistence.  This idea’s ideological roots harken back to Hobbes’ conception of the social contract—the agreement by which people cede elements of their individual freedom for the good of the whole.  The abdication of rights transforms a person’s natural state from one that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” to one that emerges in concert with a state’s creation.  With only the church and private charities to provide for a population’s welfare prior to the emergence of the welfare state, Hobbes’ description of most people’s lives was an apt one.
The specific ideology that a state embraces plays a pivotal role in the development of its welfare regime.  Today this development is a foregone conclusion as nearly every state is a welfare one in some measure.  There are a plethora of catalysts for this progression but the most fundamental one is that of risk mitigation.  Failing to provide at least a modicum of welfare puts a state at risk for social instability and upheaval (from revolution), international economic decline (from competition) and strategic political decline (from global competitors).  If risk management is the primary influence on a welfare regime, then a state’s interpretation of social justice is an important secondary factor.  
While the modern (post World War II) welfare state is a product of liberalism’s influence on the tension between democracy’s conception of political equality and capitalism’s conception of economic inequality, its true roots are in Marxism.  The normative concept of class equality is a central underlying principle of a welfare regime.  Few states espouse the severe notion of class conflict as a sole driving force anymore but nearly all now recognize the insidious destabilizing effect of chasmic economic and political inequality.  When an ideology eventually disappears (and all do), it does so either because it failed or because everyone ended up believing it.  Whereas an idea like fascism failed, echoes of Marxism live on today.  

The liberalist notion that individual freedoms must be protected is the balancing factor that tempers the excesses of the capitalist market.  As Crepaz points out, this balance manifests uniquely in different states.  Sweden, Germany and the United States all place their baseline level of economic equality at different marks.  The width of an acceptable gap determines the level of welfare provisions by the state.  In these examples the aforementioned circular nature of ideology is instructive as Crepaz shows that even the liberal belief in individual freedom for all becomes tempered when the all includes people deemed to be outsiders.  The evolving notion of liberalism will continue to affect the level of welfare provided as states continue to embrace liberal democracy.  

Tuesday, February 18, 2014

Resolving Ethnic Conflict: Creating a New I Am



IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

Below is a paper I wrote arguing on a multi-pronged approach to resolving ethnic conflict--one that accepts short term violence for the sake of long-term reconciliation.  My complete collection of grad school notes and paper can be found here.





Resolving Ethnic Conflict: Creating a New I Am

For most Americans more comfortable with the concept of civic nationalism, ethnic conflict is a difficult concept to understand comprehensively.  This contemporary American mindset cannot (and should not) mask, however, the bloody primordial relationship between ethnic nationalism and global conflict.  If one is to believe structuralists such as Mueller, these ethnic conflicts will be a regular (if not increasing) occurrence throughout the 21st century as third world nations continue to modernize.  A united international community with unlimited resources might be able to prevent many of these conflicts, however, fiscal realities—and a public reticent to intercede—more often dictate post-conflict recommendations than pre-emptive military action.  What then is the best way to resolve these ethnic conflicts?  Is total resolution an impossible ideal?  How does one define the term best way, as well as its parameters?  In this essay I argue that the best way is an approach that takes the long view—that accepts a short period of violence and instability for the sake of long-term peace and reconciliation.  The approach best suited to do this is a multi-pronged one that emphasizes a liberal democracy tailored to respond to real or perceived ethnic grievances, and an intentional peace-building process that recognizes the nature of group identities as dynamic and incorporates them in the creation of a new worldview.  I begin by discussing the importance of an ethnic conflict’s origin as well as the state’s role in responding to it in determining a solution.  Then I discuss modernity’s role in state formation and its relevance to conflict resolution.  Finally, I analyze the roles of a liberal democracy, civic nationalism and psychocultural interpretation in creating an enduring cessation of ethnic conflict.  






Tuesday, November 13, 2012

Democratization in Africa (Ottaway, Joseph, Bratton & Walle)


Democratization in Africa (Ottaway, Joseph, Bratton & Walle)

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Here are class notes on the below readings about democratization in Africa.

African Democratization and the Leninist Option (1997)
By Marina Ottaway
Democratization in Africa after 1989 (1997)
By Richard Joseph
Approaches to Democratization (1997)
By Bratton and Walle


Monday, October 8, 2012

Friday, August 24, 2012

IR Notes on Power and Levels of Analysis

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

IR Notes on Power and Levels of Analysis


Power =
            - Ability to affect others to get the outcomes one wants
            - Ability to get others to do what they wouldn’t otherwise do
            *This is the difference between getting your kids to go outside and play and getting them to clean their room

- Typically realists align with hard power (using force to get what you want)
            Hard power = military (but this hard power comes in degrees: WAR vs COIN)     
            Soft power = material power/ideas

**Power must be addressed/examined in context because each situation may require different power resources
- Power is a relational concept that must be though of within BoP context

- BoP can be outcome or policy
- Walt also talks about the “balance of threat”

- Levels of analysis is a method of categorized events/causes:
           
            System (neorealists)
                        Structure (mechanical metaphors)
                        Process (biological metaphors)
            State (liberalists for the most part)
                        Types of states (democracies, autocracies)
                        Traits of states (nationalism)
            Sub-state
                        Aspects of states (bureaucratic politics, organizational process)
                        Disaggregated sovereignty
            Individuals (constructivists for the most part)
                        Human nature (psychological processes)
                        Particular people


Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Notes on "The Relationship between theory and policy in IR" by Walt

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Stephen Walt, The Relationship between theory and policy in IR, 2005

The gap between theory and policy can be narrowed only if the academic community begins to place greater value on policy relevant theoretical work

-policy-makers disdain academics and are rarely selected for their IR scholarship
-on the other side of the coin, scholars have little incentive to develop ideas that might be useful

What types of knowledge do policy makers need?
- policy-makers rely on factual knowledge, rule of thumb, typologies, empirical laws and theories.

- IR theory work: “efforts to account for interstate and trans-state processes, issues and outcomes in general causal terms”

What is a good theory?
- should be logically consistent and empirically valid, complete, explanatory, explain an important phenomenon, be useful in its recommendations, and be stated clearly

How Theory can Aid Policy
- Bad IR policies can lead policy makers astray and good IR theory can make good policy
- policy problems can also bring innovation in IR as happened with the advent of nuclear weapons
*4 ways theory can help:
            - Diagnosis (coopt or contain, relevance of information)
            - Prediction (anticipate events, behaviors, preferences) however, policy-makers    can also affect event outcomes themselves
            - Prescription (show how to affect a desired outcome, don’t bomb civilian pop,    just military targets)
            - Evaluation (did we achieve the desired results)

THESIS:
So realists believe China is out to get US?  This seems to be the prevailing view among military leadershipare military leaders more prone to realism?

Different Agendas
- Policy makers can be less interested in figuring out a tendency than how to overcome it
- Even the best theory does not often help policy makers with their large hurdle of implementation



Monday, August 20, 2012

Notes on Stephen Walt's "IR: One World, Many Theories"

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 


*We are better off with a diverse array of competing ideas than a single theoretical orthodoxy.

Where are we coming from?

study of IR is protracted competition between realist, liberal and radical

*Realism: struggle for power among self-interested states, pessimistic about prospects for peace
            Classical:     states (like humans) have innate desire to dominate others
            Neorealist:   effects of international system, a number of great powers trying to                                    survive
            Defensive:states merely seek to survive and guarantee security through                                                alliances and defensive military postures

*Liberalism:
            - economic interdependence would discourage states from using force against each other
            - Spread of the democracy the key to world peace (democratic states more peaceful than autocratic ones)
            - encourage states to forgo immediate gains for greater benefits of long term           
            cooperation

*Radicalism:
            - orthodox Marxism say capitalism central cause of conflict
            - neomarxist dependency theory says large capitalists states ally with elites of developing world to exploit the masses
            - deconstructionist emphasize importance of language and discourse but haven’t   
            offered a lot on alternatives to mainstream theories

New Wrinkles in Old Paradigms
*In Realism redux, the problem of relative and absolute gains arises. 
*New Liberalism:
            - Democratic peace theory says democracies rarely fight each other, however in new democracies, the states are more prone to war, so promoting democracy can actually promote instability
            - Institutionalist point to NATOs ability to adapt
*Constructivism
            - the impact of ideas, such as Gorbachev embracing ‘common security’
            - Wendt: Anarchy is what states make of it

Domestic politics Reconsidered:
- emergence of interest in the concept of culture which intersects and overlaps with constructivists
*Walt points to realism as the most compelling framework for the future
















Tuesday, August 14, 2012

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft by Lauren, Craig and George

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of our Time






Notes on Force and Statecraft

Introduction:

Dilemma of Force and Statecraft is when/how/if to use force—force that can be so dangerous

FAO *Diplomacy statue by Alves good model for FAOs*

*Does a superpower likes the US actually damage the world order and stability?

*Collective cooperation requires:
            - common interests and competition
            - structure appropriate to size
            - common values and procedures within the structure
            - adaptability


CHAPTER 1: THE EMERGENCE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE GREAT POWERS

Intro:
Diplomacy: the system of regulated and organized contacts between states which Europe has evolvedone of her most important gifts to the world

The Early techniques, instruments and ideas of diplomacy:

- From 6th century B.C., the Greeks developed the practice of choosing ambassadors—they have no battleships at their disposaltheir only weapons are words and opportunities (Demosthenes).
- Romans developed legal concepts like the law of nations, the law that’s commons to all mankind, and the importance of respecting legal obligations and honor treaties.
- Following the Romans, the Byzantine empire organized a special permanent governmental department to deal with foreign affairs.
- The Venetians (15th century) established permanent diplomatic missions with a systemized diplomatic service.
- This all led to the creation of political science—notably among the creators of this discipline was Machiavelli

States and Raison d’Etat in the 17th Century

- War shaped the formation, character and development of modern states
- Transformation began with the 30 years war (1618-48) and the Treaty of Westphalia
- The emergence of the modern state due to:
            Effective armed forces, able bureaucracy and theory of state that defined political interest in rational/practical terms.
- Rise of the raison d’etat = a state is more than its ruler, crown, prince and peoplethe state above all else!      
            EX: Cardinal Richelieu used this idea ruthlessly. 
            *French becomes the lingua franca of diplomacy itself
- Diplomats job = maintaining effective communication between the two princes, delivering letters and in protecting his Master’s subjects and conserving his interests.

- Overwhelming French power led to alliances to balance the power and to the Nine Years War (1688-97)

War and Competition in the 18th Century:

this Age of Reason also witnessed an anarchy against all
- Began with Great Northern War of 1700-1721 (supremacy in the Baltic region)
            Peter the Great brought Russia into being as a modern state to do win at the Battle            of Poltava
- 1713/14 Treaty of Utrecht = first European treaty to mention BoP
- Callieres On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes 1716—best writing ever on diplomatic methodology
            *Cautions again large diplomatic conferences and reliance on lawyers
            *Foreign relations should be done by trained professionals vice politically- connected amateurs
Diplomats should be carefully educated in the lessons of history and trained in diplomatic skills and techniques, and should know exactly the state of the military forces both on land and sea.
- Frederick the Great stated: Negotiating without arms produce as little impression as musical scores without instruments.
- The rape of Silesia by Frederick is a great example of raison d’etat personified
- It took the French revolution and ensuing Napoleonic Wars to shock Europe into collaborationdefeating French forces during the Battle of Nations at Leipzig in 1813
            *Following 1815 Battle of Waterloo this collaboration stood as basis for first          international system based upon BoP for peace and security

CHAPTER 2: THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM OF DIPLOMACY, 1815-1914

Intro:
- efforts here produced a period of unprecedented peacethe classical system of diplomacy

Building a System with a BoP and a Concert:
- Congress of Vienna- major task not to just end past hostilities by to make a viable international system of peace and security
            *Castlereagh and Metternich were the two principal architects to tackle: how to     put power into the service of peace and security
            *The generality of dissatisfaction is a condition of stability because it ensures no     one party is totally satisfied and ensure relative  security (Kissinger)

- This all required a corporate buy-in though and to that end they made the Quadruple Alliance (soon added France to it) and the Concert of Europe
- In every crisis from 1815-1854 they worked together to find solutions to prevent war, and to minimize the wars of 1850s and 60s
- Why could they do this?!
            *Unusually skilled statesmen, and free from pressures of transparent democracies             to some extent
- Clausewitz’s On War: war is the continuation of political activity by other means.  The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it and those means can’t ever be in isolation from their purpose.

Change and an Experiment with a Defensive Alliance System

- Following revolutions of 1848, rise of nationalism created a rise of realpolitiker
            Statecraft is only defined in the exercise and application of raw power
            *Example of the folly of this being the senseless killings in the Crimean War
- the lessons of one generation are not always accepted by another
- This time period saw the widespread acceptance of Darwinism and rise jingoism

-  All this concerned Bismark, who wanted to puruse safety-politics
            *So he created an elaborate defensive alliance system: maintain equilibrium of  forces that was very complicated (and weak because of its complexity)
- 1864 Geneva Convention signed
- 1878 Congress of Berlin prevents danger in the Balkans
- 1884-85 Conference of Berlin called to forestall possibility of crisis arising

Further Change and an Experiment with Bipolar Alignment

- This change started with German-Russian alliance was severed in 1879
            *Poor German leadership launched Weltpolitik = make Germany a global power
- Evolved into post 1907 Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy) and Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia). 

Characteristics of the System

- Composition, numbers and types of actors
- Structure = balance among Great Powersbut this requires flexibility
- Shared goals and objectives
- Statesmen had to develop norms, methods and rules of accommodation
- Wars if fought with limited means for limited political objectives could be legitimate instruments of policy
- Reliance on just war theory and professional diplomats


Monday, August 13, 2012

Notes on Nye's "Understanding International Conflicts"

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes on Nye's "Understanding International Conflicts"

Below are my grad school notes on the first four chapters of Nye's Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (7th Edition) .




Another IR Essay I wrote.


Chapter 1: Is there an enduring logic of conflict in world politics?

INTRO:  The world is shrinking and making conditions we once knew nothing about in remotie countries relevant. The new century will yield more states (vs. the idea of globalization/homogenization)—since 1989 intrastate war has been on the rise.

*What is international politics?
            3 forms of world politics:  world imperial, feudal and anarachic system of states (aka territorial states)
            Order and justice: national concerns outweigh concerns for international justice
            What does the 21st century hold?

*Differing views of anarachic politics:
            Realist and liberal approach to international politics view the state of nature differently.

Realist: Hobbes/Thucydides, continuity, state actors only, military force only
Vs.
Liberal: Locke, state of trade prevents war, change, globalization due to disease, climate change, nations want to just survive

“Theories are roadmaps to unfamiliar territory”

*Building blocks: actors, goals and instruments
            There are no longer just state actors—there’s now IBM, Shell etc
            There is no longer just military security—there’s human security etc
            There’s no longer just military force alone—there’s economic etc

*Peloponnesian War (in which Athens was eventually defeated by Sparta)
            - Thucydides says it was because Sparta feared Athen’s rise.
            - But perhaps it was actually a prisoner’s dilemma (security dilemma) where the   best outcome collectively isn’t the best one individually.
            - But this requires communication, trust (difficult in anarchy), and    credibility

Is War with China inevitable?

*Ethical Questions in International Politics
            - There exist moral arguments for and against war.  A good argument considers motives, means and consequences.
            - Ethic’s role in international politics is smaller because of the varied scale of  morals and causation


*3 Moral categories: Skeptics, State Moralists and Cosmopolitans

Skeptics: Might makes right, Morals have no place, no choices exists

State Moralists: good fences make good neighbors, state sovereignty trumps all, society of states

Cosmopolitans: no borders only humanity, redistribution, society of individuals

*Just war doctrine prohibit killings of civilians

Chapter 2:  Origins of Great 20th Century Conflicts (10 JAN 2012)

International Systems and Levels of Causation
*The international political system is the pattern of relationships among the states
            The system produces the consequences, which can ones unintended by the actors (Ex. From Bolshevik revolution to Stalin entering a pact with Hitler)
*Geopolitics has a role with half of all conflicts between 1816 and 1992 occurring between neighbors.
            - There’s also a propensity to checkerboard alliance to counterbalance neighbor.

Levels of Analysis
*Waltz’s 3 levels of causation: the individual, the state and the international system
*Idea that if all countries were democratic there’d be less war

- System level analysis is explanation from outside-in (how the system constrains the state)
- second level is inside-out (outcomes explained by happenings inside state)

*The rule of parsimony (occam’s razor) = say a lot with a little
            Range of a theory is also important and how many possibilities/anomalies it addresses

Systems and Process
*Structure of a system refers to its distribution of power and process refers to patterns and types of interactions among its units

- Unipolar, bipolar, multipolar:
            Unipolar system tend to degrade as states rise to challenge sole leader
            Bipolar system breeds rigid alliances and increase risk of global war
            Multipolar tend to have flexible alliances and if war, it’s a limited one

***Author touts that during bipolar cold war no central war occurred for more than 40 yearsbut a lot of SMALL conflicts did (ex. Proxy wars in Africa)

- International system process is determined by: it’s structure, the surrounding cultural and institutional context and whether states are revolutionary or moderate

Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments
*A realist structural theory can be added to by constructivist work as was the case with the French Revolution
- States can change their goals and their means          
            Sometimes these means are technical like the advent of the machine gun and
            Sometimes social like Napoleon conscription

The Structure and Process of 19th Century System
- For structural realists the big change came with Germany’s unification in 1870.  This disrupted the balance of power.  They were either strong enough to take on both France and Russia or if not, they might be weak enough to be invade
            However, an individual prevented mayhem: Bismarck was a gifted and focused interlocutor who formed and maintained a complex systems or treaty’s and alliance that prevented full scale war from 1870 to 1890. 

*WWI was not inevitablehuman choice played a role, as did the post-Napoleonic changes in Europe (process)
            - Shock from Napoleonic war setup the 1815 Congress of Vienna.
*Constructivist attention to process reminds us not be blind to social change

A Modern Sequel
*There were similar worries in Europe when East and West Germany united but there were several reasons the past wasn’t repeated:
            - American stayed involved
            - The EU played a uniting role
            - Domestically, Germany had the benefits of 50 years of democratic process in     
            West Germany

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy
- Neorealism: state act similiarly because of international systemHOWEVER, domestic politics DO matter
            EX: Peloponnesian War started with domestic conflict between the oligarchs and   democrats in Epidamnus

- Classic Liberalism: War is bad for business, thus capitalist states are peaceful….HOWEVER WWI quashed this notion.          
            ***I would add that war itself is a business stimulant from an economic     perspective though

Liberalism Revived
*Resurgence of liberalism in 1960s and 70s along the lines of economic, social and political
            - Trade gives states a way to transform their standing through economic growth     vice military conquest.  The Japan example is often used, HOWEVER the US was         providing their security for them!

- Neoliberalism emphasize the importance of institutions because they stabilize (and thereby provide escape from security dilemma) in 4 ways:
            1. provide sense of continuity (EU)
            2. provide opportunity for reciprocity (time will balance out unevenness)
            3. provide flow of information and transparency
            4. provide method/means for conflict resolution (EU Commision and Court of        Justice)
*Today’s liberals seek islands of peace or pluralistic security communities

Liberal Democracy and War
- Liberalists and constructivists both tout power of democratic values
            They say liberal democracies don’t fight each other, however they do still vote to go to war at times
            *Furthermore, states transitioning to democracy are MORE likely to engage in       conflict

Defining National Interests
- Realists = states have little choice in defining their national interest due to the international system which dictate their national interests and foreign policy
            - However, liberalists and constructivist say there’s much more to it domestically
            Than that
           
Variations in Foreign Policies
* Can be due to revolutions, changes in bureaucracy (***p. 51 Vietnam example is a bit simplistic

Counterfactuals
- These are contrary to fact conditionals, and they illuminate the role of the accidental and give us a way to examine significance of causal factors

*You can tell if a counterfactual is good using:
            1. Plausibilty (cotenability)- must be reasonable
            2. Proximity in time- closeness of two events in chain of causation
            3. Relation to Theory- this makes them useful by tieing into broader knowledge
            Base
            4. Fact- need to be accurate (multiple CFs just confuse the issue)

CHAPTER 3 BALANCE OF POWER AND WWI

BALANCE OF POWER

- WWI often blamed on balance of power.  Some say that BoP causes stability BUT that doesn’t mean peace (but does mean preserving independence).
            *BoP has preserved the anarchic system

Power

- The ability to achieve one’s purpose/goals; to affect others to get a desired outcomes.  It can also mean holding resources. 
            Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power to realized power (measured by other’s changed behaviors).  However, power resources are context dependent. 
            EX: Bismark’s use of railway technology

- Hard power: can depend on carrorts (inducements) or sticks (threats)
- Soft (attractive) power: getting others to want what you want
            It’s not necessarily more effective or ethical than hard power (e.g. OBL)
EX: Hard power necessary against hardened terrorists, but soft power needed to win hearts and minds of mainstream populace

Balances as distributions of power

*BoP can mean:
1. Distribution of power
            Hegemonic stability theory: imbalanced power = peace
2. Policy of balancing requires two assumptions to predict behavior:
            - Structure of international politics is anarchic system of states
            - States value their independence above all else
            *State will join the side that seems weaker
            *Efforts to use ideology to predict state behavior are often wrong, whereas            counterintuitive balancing of power predictions are often correct.
                        China, USSR, Vietnam and Cambodia were not in fact, all the same
            *However important to note that perceptions of threat are influenced by the          proximity of that threat
3. Describe multipower historical cases: this depends on structure and process to explain 
            Structure is in alliances whereas the process is in nationalism and meetings etc.

ORIGINS OF WWI
Intro:
- As the alliance system became less flexible, the BoP became less multipolar and the likelihood of war increased

Three Levels of Analysis:
- system level (structure and process), domestic societal level, Individuals

- system level: rise of German Power and increased alliance system rigidity
            Rise of nationalism
            Rise in complacency about peace
            German policy vague and confusing
- domestic societal level:
            Internal crisis of declining Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires
            Domestic political situation in Germany: Rye and Iron Coalition
- individuals:
            Mediocrity of leadership: Franz Joseph, Count Berchtold, Czar Nicholas II and Kaiser wilhem II. 

Was War Inevitable?
- No.
            - Deep causes were changes in the structure of BoP and parts of domestic political            systems.  Also big was rise of German strength, bipolar alliance development, nationalism etc….
            - Intermediate causes were German policy, complacency and leadership      idiosyncrasies.
            - Precipitating cause was Franz Ferdinand assassination

What Kind of War?

-  Using counterfactuals can help explore this issue, but ultimately human choices matters
            EX: In June 1914, Britain sent 4 battleships to Germany for a state visit—SO probable doesn’t equal inevitable

Lessons of History Again:

- Beware of:
            *complacency about peace
            *next crisis will fit same pattern as last crisis (Iraq)
*Today the ideology and acceptance of war is much weaker than the prevailing fatalist Darwinist argument of the era
****Is this really true, where does NYE get this from?

CHAPTER 4: THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WWII

The Rise and Fall of Collective Security
- Wilson a classic liberal/idealist who viewed BoP as immoral
- BoP seeks to preserve sovereign state system—NOT peace
- Wilson sought to change this international system from BoP to collective security
The League of Nations
- Collective sec:
            Make aggression illegal and outlaw offensive war
            Deter aggression through coalition on non-aggressors
            If deter fails, ALL states punish
*International law supercedes domestic law
- 3 differences between CS and BoP
            In CS, focus is on aggressive policies NOT capacity
            In CS, coalitions are NOT predetermined until aggressor acts, but then requires ALL
            CS is global and universal, NO neutrals
- Ambiguity of LoN undermined it from the start
            US refusing to join
            Article 16 not specific—states can decide not join in sanctions or actions
         
LINKS:
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/thoughts-on-us-response-to-alien-signal.html