The FUUO Qaddafi Files: Part 1

I had the opportunity to attend a conference at a think tank this past fall and was fortunate to scribble down copious notes from the experts (acknowledged academic experts as well as diplomatic ones, i.e. ambassadors).  I am pretty sure this conference fell under the Chatham House rule so I have removed their names but wanted to share their insight in light of recent events. 

A career diplomat opened with a perspective on the history of Qaddafi.    He broke up Qaddafi’s evolution/development into 4 distinct phases:  Anti-zionism and support for African independence, exportive revolution, “I am an African”, and finally “I am president of Africa.” 

            Beginning in the 1970’s, his initial anti-zionism stance was largely an attempt to court the Arab world and emerge as a leader within/of it.  During this time period, the United States closed its embassy (and Wheeler Field) there.  By and large, this attempt was a failure.  However, Qaddafi’s support of African independence does resonate within the continent.  Indicative of his influence over the years is that the first place Nelson Mandela visited after being freed from prison was Libya (then the United States, followed by Cuba). 

            In the 1980’s the “Exportive Revolutionary” or “Coup-maker” phase began. 

One question from a senior State Department offical to the speaker during that time period has stuck with him all these years.  Secretary asked him: “How can we hurt Libya?”  This question ignited many efforts including the beginning of satellite imagery analysis which revealed guerilla training of the various groups in the Sahel region. 

Some of the people being trained included Liberian Charles Taylor and his followers (only 100 people at the start).  Of all the ‘guerilla training’ conducted by Libya, only Taylor’s resulted in the successful overthrow of a government.  Taylor’s initial attack occurred on December 24, 1989 and lead to a devasting 7-year war.  During this war, Qaddafi funneled arms, money and supplies through the Sahel to Burkina Faso and then through the Cote D’ivoire by truck along the coast into Liberia.  He also set up another hub in Benin (their leader at the time held political views similar to those of Qaddafi). 

            One area that the U.S. determined it could hurt Libya was Chad.  During the 70’s and 80’s Qaddafi ‘Finlandized’ Chad through troop presence and financial support.  So the U.S. began covertly supporting rebel leader Hissène Habré (Habré has been dubbed “the African Pinochet” by the Human Rights Watch and currently awaits trial for atrocities committed).   In 1987, Habré began an offensive which routed the occupying Libyan forces in Northern Chad. Shortly after this victory, Habré was brought to the White House for a congratulatory lunch with President Reagan.   During this same time period, Libya also sent 50 taxis to The Gambia in an attempt to help upset and overthrow the government there.  Habré is said to have commented that the reason Qaddafi acted the way he did in West Africa was because “he never accepted the fact that slavery had ended.”

            From 1987-1992 sanctions against Libya began.  Without any Arab support a new Qaddafi emerged: “I am an African.”  And so he began major investments throughout the continent through Libyan government owned companies.  Of interest is that Libya owns the Golden Tulip Hotel in Accra, Ghana (reportedly the only nice hotel).  When President Obama visited there he was unable to stay there because of his fact.  His emergence as a self-proclaimed “African” soon developed into his aspiration to become the “President of Africa.”  Promoting African unity, Qaddafi was quick to proclaim his ability to bring the continent together.  In 1998, he was instrumental in the formation of CEN-SAD (The Community of Sahel-Saharan States) which today has 29 members but also has limited effectiveness.  From this position, he began mediating African conflicts in an effort to exert ‘benign influence’ starting in 1999.    His aspirations to become “President of Africa” met ten years later when he was elected as the head of the African Union (for a term of one year).  During this time period, he continued to push his pan-african vision of a single country, currency, army and passport for all Africans. 

Why did Somali pirates kill four American yachters?

       The Christian Science asks this question and I think it's a good one to examine in that it leads to further important questions? 


What are our gaps in intel and information regarding the structure and organization of the Somali pirate network (gangs)? 

How much communication goes on between the gangs/warlords benefitting from the piracy? 


Was the murder of the 4 yachters a purposeful departure from their modus operandi (i.e. their established business model)?  It is my opinion that it wasn't.  The business model is simply too lucrative.  And the idea of a 'revenge' campaign presupposes that those financing (the warlord, businessmen and gang leaders) care about the welfare of the pirates.  They don't.  They care about the money.  In all likelihood, these murders were an isolated incident by nervous hothead pirates, not a concerted effort by warring gangs to band together (suddenly) to poke America in the eyes.   


I have posted links to a few articles below and included key quotes from those articles on which I have commented. 

SOMALIA: Inside a pirate network IRIN News

"I agreed to engage in piracy because we wanted to get back at the illegal foreign vessels that were fishing in our waters, denying us a livelihood. We targeted foreign cargo vessels for that reason."   This may seem like rhetoric to many in the western community, but a vast majority of the pirates sincerely believe (or believed) this.  And in startk contrast to most Americans, the vast majority of those within the continent of Africa are apathetic (if not sympathetic) toward these Somali pirates. 


"I, as do most pirates, consider myself as having been performing the duties of a coastguard. We usually work in groups of seven to 10 people. Often, our missions are financed by individuals and businessmen who collect half of the ransoms paid."  These pirates are victims in this sense.  They have no other prospects and are taken advantage of by the gang leaders and in some cases, businessmen. 
"Omar*, another of the jailed pirates, added: "Piracy has become booming business in Puntland territories; we receive the fuel and logistics from local business people. For example, when a kidnapped vessel pays ransom, 50 percent of it is taken by the people who invested their money; the pirates only get 50 percent."  These speaks to a need to go after the source!


"The ransom they pay is somehow a punishment for their illegal activity in the Somali water, especially in the era without government," one of the pirates said.  This illegal activity is not fictional.  It's a big deal.  Africa loses $1 BILLION every year due to illegal fishing!  I have written about it here on numerous occassions:
Why Fish if the New Cocaine
CNO Dishes on Fish
One Video Show Why Illegal Fishing is Killing Africa
Deputy AU Chairperson on Maritime Threats to Africa






Somali pirates tell their side TRN News

"they tell the same story, which is they were all fishermen in the beginning, in the '90s, when foreign fishing ships that took advantage of the lack of a government in Somalia to come and illegally fish off of their waters. And so their little Somali skiffs, fishing skiffs, would bump into huge fishing nets that these foreign trawlers would be using to fish. And there was reports of overfishing—and some of this is quite well documented—overfishing, and even some allegations of illegal dumping of waste. So the pirates basically believe that they are ad hoc coast guard in some ways."  This quotes highlights illegal dumping, a hugely underreported issue and one whose importance to those living in Africa cannot be overstated.  Illegal dumping is a HUGE deal!


"you talked about money awash in Kenya, ransom money, and a lot of this is the pirates' money...So you have a very large Somali diaspora in Kenya, and they excel at this sort of Islamic interest-free money transfer."  The mechanics of the money transfer is one of the 'sources' at which we must attack to stop piracy.

U.S. Says Somali Pirates Are Dodging Navies, Operating Near India Coast Bloomberg News

"The U.S. said Somali pirates, who have taken at least $100 million in ransom from hijacked ships over the past two years, are operating as far away as India as they dodge more than 20 naval vessels deployed to hunt them. "  73% of Somali population lives on $2 a day.  2008 per capita income is $600. 

"Battling pirates at sea will not put an end to their attacks, Hopkins said. “Although the most visible face of piracy is on the seas, piracy needs to be combated and will only be defeated on land,” Donna Hopkins (U.S. State Department’s counter- piracy coordinator) said."  Amen, and I would add, not just in Somalia.

"Somalia’s pirate network, by contrast, is “a business operation that does not appear to have any political motivation,” Hopkins said."  I still belive it is a business and the recent murders were a departure from this business model.

Money Laundering for Somali Pirates is Good Business

"The sea pirates use the financial hub of Dubai and Somalia’s southern neighbour Kenya as key transit points to launder the millions of dollars in ransom money by organised and wealthy gangs."  Kenya and Dubai, two great places to start if you want to stop piracy. 

“Reportedly, Kenya’s financial system may be laundering over 100 million dollars each, including an undetermined amount of narcotics proceeds and Somali piracy related funds,” it said."  Again, it's all about the benjamins.
"
“As long as piracy is so lucrative, with ransom payments adding up to tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of dollars, and other economic incentives so bleak, the incentives are obvious,” he said."  I would add that its worth investigating the insurance companies role in all of this.  They are obviously complicit and making money off of this. 

Who are Somalia's pirates?

"Today's pirates are mainly fighters for Somalia's many warlord factions, who have fought each other for control of the country since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991."

"Whom do they work for? The pirates mainly work for themselves."  To be more clear, they do have a loose hierarchy but more likely work as part of decentralized (in comparison to our military) networks.

"The money seems to be distributed by warlords to their families and friends, and then further outward toward their fellow clan-members, says Jhazbhay." We need better intel and investigation into these links.

"While the CIA's chief, Gen. Michael Hayden, suggested recently that Al Qaeda was beginning to expand its reach in the Horn of Africa, and possibly reaching out to radical local Islamist parties such as Al Shabab in Somalia, there appears to be little evidence of a connection between international Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and piracy."  Invoking Al Qaeda is a popular way to get funding.


"Regionally, I think the major problem is that piracy has given some groups the chance to lay their hands on money," says Jhazbhay. "There may be $30 million in ransom money received in recent years. Once they [the various armed groups] get that kind of money, they can buy a ground-to-air missile. Getting [a hold of] arms can affect the struggle for freedom in Somalia, and that affects the whole region."  Yes, it is a vicious cycle.  The more money and experience they gather, the harder they will be to defeat. 


"While individual ships can protect themselves with everything from barbed wire around the ship itself to high-pressure hoses, coalition forces can also do more to track and neutralize suspected pirate mother ships. "I can't see why more work isn't being done with satellites to find the mother ships," says Cornwell."  Good luck with that Cornwell.  These protective measures have proven effective, but a large majority of ships still don't use them. 

How do I know how long tour lengths are in-country for FAOs?

Fellow FAOs, have you ever looked at the billet slate and wondered how long the tours are for in different countries?  I wondered this today and my detailer pointed me to a great reference: JFTR, Appendix Q!  It breaks out all of the countries and show the tour lengths both accompanied and unaccompanied! 

HOW DOES MCCHRYSTAL'S NETWORK APPLY TO DOD FAOS (FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS)?

     Retired General McChrystal has written an excellent article that exposes one way in which the military has adapted to a non-traditional enemy without a straightforward vertical hierchy, one which relies instead on networks.  
     I won't comment on the overall effectiveness of the unit to which he refers (because I know less than nothing about it) but instead wanted to address his article as it could apply to a "DOD FAO network".  Those last three words are in quotation because I believe a "DOD FAO network" to be a hypothetical dream idea at the moment.  In fact, I don't necessarily believe there is even a traditional vertical hierarchy organizing the DOD FAO community (at least not one easily found or ever referred to within the community at large).  And there is certainly no mechanism or network in place to connect FAOs (in a strategic or working vision sense) across the services, across the stove-piped AORs, and across active duty and retired.
   
    Following you will see a selection of quotes from McChrystal's article that I found to be applicable in some respect to creating a DOD FAO network.


"our enemy was a constellation of fighters organized not by rank but on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation and fame"  This idea resonates with me (and I would guess with a fair number of junior officers today).  For a FAO, relationships and acquaintances, as well as reputation are paramount in building from a baseline of intelligence and knowledge.


"The enemy does not convene promotion boards; the network is self-forming...We would watch a young Iraqi set up in a neighborhood and rise swiftly in importance: After achieving some tactical success, he would market himself, make connections, gain followers, and suddenly a new node of the network would be created and absorbed. The network's energy grew."  This speaks to the power of a network.  A DOD FAO network would create its own nodes.  I envision these nodes as ones which initially build from within AORs but then later spread and pulse outwards, overlapping traditional AOR boundaries.  East African nodes pulsing outward and overlapping within Indian nodes.  Brazilian nodes meshing threads with those in Angola and Portugal.  An immediate reaction from some is 'what does all this mumbo-jumbo mean practically!'  How does it manifest itself physically?  I don't know the answer right now.  But I do know that it will be through encouraging and rewarding innovators and risk-takers in the DOD FAO community.  And while the DOD FAO community will never be able to buck or break the military's bureaucratic promotion system, it must allow successful (as acknowledged by those in their networks) FAOs the opportunity for promotion of other sorts (positionally for instance).


"And we had to process that new information in real time -- so we could act on it."  How do FAOs even process information?  On language, on billets, on their experience in those billets and in-country?  How do FAOs process intel?  Does the information travel vertically, or are there avenues that allow it to travel out  and be shared horizontally and diagonally?  

"What was hazy then soon became our mantra: It takes a network to defeat a network."  For the DOD FAO community, in which the enemy can best be stated as our own unique triangles or hourglasses ('stovepipes' in defense-speak) this mantra can be shortened to simply: "It takes a network."


"an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust."  There is limited opportunity for FAOs to establish these 'personal relationships' and ensuing 'trust'.  Every opportunity must be seized to take advantage of physical proximity and build 'the network.'  The dreaded conference must be transformed and shifted from a series of lengthy speeches (and limited discussion) to natural-formed networks (working groups) that focus on processes and information sharing.


"Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act. But transforming a traditional military structure into a truly flexible, empowered network is a difficult process."  Word.  How well do DOD FAOs see, decide and effectively act?  How transparent are decisions made within each service FAO community made?  


""blinks" -- time delays and missed junctures where information was lost or slowed when filtered down the line."  Within the FAO community we often don't have blinks, we have full on naps (I acknowledge this parallel is tenuous at best since these blinks are addressed within the context of battlefield decision-making, but c'mon just go with me).  An entire generation of some of the oldest FAOs (within the Army) are retiring and taking with them an irreplaceable amount of knowledge and experience.  We cannot afford to be passive in retaining this knowledge.  Measures must be put in place to capture it.  If these FAOs are in a robust DOD FAO network, their retirement doesn't mean they are pulled out of it.  Their own node or pulse may not be as bright, but their connections-their threads can remain and overlap and connect to new nodes and pulses.  Another example of this is when DOD FAOs return from country teams (whether within an OSC or as an attaché) their experiences, their passdown, their after action reports, their debriefings are lost within the ether-within their service "triangle".  In a DOD FAO network all of this information would not be confined by services or organization but would instead flow throughout and be pulled to where it was needed.


"Decisions were decentralized and cut laterally across the organization. Traditional institutional boundaries fell away and diverse cultures meshed."  These traditional institutional boundaries exist within our Embassy structure but also within DOD (duh).  


"It [the network] valued competency above all else -- including rank."  While there is much 'looking down the nose' at the aviation community (my old community) for its joviality and apparent lack of professionalism at times, there was one key maxim that transcended this and was part of every good pre-flight brief: "there is no rank in the cockpit."  This did more than encourage all members of the crew (officers and enlisted) to speak up on issues of flight safety and decision-making--it mandated it.  In essence, in the cockpit 'it valued competency above all else.'  This same type of mentality must be instilled within the DOD FAO network (probably most applicable within the academic environment).


      When determining what a DOD FAO network would look like, it is of ultimate importance to note that ABOVE ALL ELSE a network requires its users to believe (whether you are talking about jihad or facebook)...and not just lackadaisically...but fervently and passionately believe...therefore for the FAO network to establish itself and thrive...it needs motivated believers who BELIEVE and are allowed the opportunity and leeway to create a network, to build that groundswell.  
      I know there's not much concrete in this posting, but this is a (mostly) abstract idea that has been percolating within me (and at least a few other junior FAOs) but which I'd never been able to fully articulate until reading McChrystal's article today.  There are plenty of FAOs far smarter and more experienced than me that I am sure have the 'concrete' we need to build and leverage that DOD FAO network.  I look forward to building those nodes, pulses and threads with you.  

The Zanzibar Chest Chronicles Continues

p.197  Hartley describe Somali gangs blowtorching down the statues of Somalia national heroes such as Ahmed Gran and Sayyīd Muhammad `Abd Allāh al-Hasan.  Click on the names for more information on these two gents.  He describes the atmosphere of destruction in Mogadishu as ‘electric’, further describing it as a “dionysian orgy of destruction.”

p.198  At checkpoints, civilians would have to describe their clan family trees: The genealogies tumbled back generation after generation to a founding ancestor.  It was like a DNA helix, or a fingerprint or an encyclopedia of peace treaties…”  One guy who belongs to the ‘wrong’ clan is summarily shot. 

p.199  The british officers who had been stationed in Somalia had called it the “Furthest Shag of the Never-Never land.” 

p.200  In  the 14^th century, Moroccan traveler Ibn Battuta described a flourishing port where hundreds of camels were killed everyday.  Even after their conversion to Islam the interior clans/nomads remained wild and superstitious. 

Zanzibar Chest Chronicles continue

p.193  In 1991, Somalia was sinking into an abyss.  However, this tragedy was buried in the backpages of the newspapers by the Allies’ military buildup against Saddam Hussein.  “For years afterward if you dialed the national code 252 all you heard was elctronic ether, ghostly distorted voices and lonely Morse signals repeated like pleas.”  What a line of prose!  

p.193  Mo Amin (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohamed_Amin), a Kenyan photojournalist

cautions “Never go in and meet a defeated army” on whether they should go to the Somali’s unanncounced.  His life was an interesting one as you will see from his bio…to include his death in an airline hijacking.  Al-Jazeera actually made  a documentary (Mo and Me) about his life.  You can watch the trailer for it here: http://www.a24media.com/index.php/component/content/article/90-films/730-mo-and-me?directory=867  Or if you want to watch the whole documentary, you can watch it on youtube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=652RtYwU-XM

(I couldn’t find a place that sold the DVD…) 

p. 195  Stepping off the plane and into Mogadishu, Hartley describes being hit by the ‘smell of dust and burning bone.”   Hartley is initially concerned when the Somali militia arrives at the airport yelling and screaming at them…till he realized “this was just the way Somalis spoke.”  The Mogadishu airport sign had been spray painted to read “WELL COME TO THE NEW AFRICA.”

Poet of the Week from Mozambique: Jorge Rebelo

Jorge Rebelo’s poetry is powerful and direct.  The poems I have included are ones which he wrote during the Mozambican revolution.  As I discovered in researching this man, Mozambique’s fight for independence from Portugal was one tied uniquely to poetry.  Here’s one book that was written about just this connection: The role of poetry in the Mozambican Revolution. 

If you are like and love to scoot down rabbit holes when it comes to learning, please check out the following links:

 Liberation Leadership: The Men Behind the Mozambique Independence Movement  This is an article written in 1975 (their year of independence).

Obligatory Mozambique Wikipedia Page

http://newritings.wordpress.com/2007/08/30/the-story-of-a-poem/  Hassen Lorgat has a great writeup on Jorge and on the second poem that I have listed here.  He actually went and interviewed Rebelo, and reading his blog would be time well-spent.

I selected Rebelo’s as my poet of the week in light of the recent revolutions sweeping across North Africa and the Middle East.

My favorite line from the first poem is: “Justice rings in my every shot and ancient dreams awaken like birds.”

Poem for a militant

Mother.

I have an iron rifle

your son,

the one you saw chained

one day

(When you cried as if

the chains bound and battered

your hands and feet)

Your boy is free now

Mother. 

Your boy has an iron rifle,

My rifle

will break the chains

will open the prisons

will kill the tyrants

will win back our land

Mother,

Beauty is to fight for freedom,

Justice rings in my every shot

and ancient dreams awaken like birds.

Fighting, on the front,

Your image descends,

I fight for you,

Mother

to dry the tears

of your eyes.

The title of this poem could be heard and seen throughout the 1980’s as South Africa revolted.  Upon first examination, the association of flowers and bullets initially seems to be a preposterous one.  That is until the author shows the reader (listener) that: “here my mouth was wounded because it dared to sing my people’s freedom.”  Rebelo has a gift in illustrating the struggle of ‘the people’ and in framing their fight, their revolt as a part of something as inevitable and pure as nature, as a flower’s growth.  As you read this poem, you can imagine the people of Egypt or Iran or Tunisia reciting and chanting the words.

In our land, bullets are beginning to flower

Come, brother, and tell me your life
come, show me the marks of revolt
which the enemy left on your body

Come, say to me ‘Here
my hands have been crushed
because they defended
The land which they own’

‘Here my body was tortured
because it refused to bend
to invaders’

‘Here my mouth was wounded
Because it dared to sing
My people’s freedom’

Come brother and tell me your life,
come relate me the dreams of revolt
which you and your fathers and forefathers
dreamed
in silence
through shadowless nights made for love

Come tell me these dreams become
war,
the birth of heroes,
land reconquered,
mothers who, fearless,
send their sons to fight.

Come, tell me all this, my brother.
And later I will forge simple words
which even the children can understand
words which will enter every house
like the wind
and fall like red hot embers
on our people’s souls.

In our land
Bullets are beginning to flower.

(Jorge Rebelo was born in Maputo, Mozambique.  A lawyer and a journalist, he joined FRELIMO (Mozambican anti-Portuguese guerrilla group) , becoming its Director of Information.) 

Some of my favorite poetry books: