Imazighen-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

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Imazighen-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Research Question

As ancient inhabitants of North Africa, the Berber populace has survived more than a millennium of invasions and myriad regime policies.[1]  Over the centuries their identity has oscillated between a proud ethnic one, a dormant marginalized one, an insular tribal one and one struggling for its voice in society.  Their ability to survive and to maintain a distinct ethnic identity throughout it all has largely been a product of negotiations and interactions with ruling regimes and an ability to balance an ethos of fierce resistance (and independence) with an evolving concept of their own group identity.  These group identities (i.e. the regional Berber tribes unique to Algeria and Morocco) have remained in various degrees of tension with a gradually developing Arab-Islamic identity since the Arab invasion in the 7^th century.   During the battle for colonial independence, the Berbers consistently fought against the French and Spanish occupiers.  After independence, however, these two states each embraced unique forms of government and experienced subsequent, but varied, periods of political instability and violence due to regime changes and rebellion.  Throughout this process, Islamism (i.e. political Islam) developed and emerged as a major movement while a collective national identity superseded the Berber one for several decades.  This substrata Berber identity existed only passively until the rise of identity politics in the 1970’s.  An increasingly mobilized Berber movement would actively pursue language objectives beginning in the 1990’s and continuing into the new century.

In Morocco today the Berber movement remains strong but divided.  King Mohamed’s July 2001 creation of l’Institut Royal de Culture Amazigh (IRCAM) has created a split that still exists today with many members of the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCA) refusing to participate in what they view as the monarchy’s attempt to co-opt and temper their movement.  Politically, Berber activists have increasingly rejected the loyalist Mouvement Populaire (MP); the most radical activists forming the Parti Democrate Amazigh Marocaine (PDAM) in 2005. This party was eventually banned by the Moroccan judiciary as illegal due to legislative prohibitions on regional or ethnic political parties.[2]  After the widespread protests fueled by the Arab Spring’s success in neighboring Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the movement won recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic.  Even this victory remains as subject of controversy with some in the movement lambasting it as only a token concession by the palace and part of a broader (and successful) effort to weaken the February 20^th movement.[3] 

Despite being overwhelmingly concentrated in the Kabylie region of Algeria, the Mouvement Culturel Berbere (MCB) has been consistent in its longtime advocacy for linguistic and cultural recognition of Berbers as a whole versus Kabylia regionally.  This national outlook is not monolithic, though, in 2001 Kabyle singer and activist Ferhat Mehenni created the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK).  The MAK asserts that because the MCB and long-time Berber supported opposition political parties (e.g., Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) and Rassemblement pour la Culture Democratie (RCD)) have all failed in effecting reform within the Algerian state as a whole, the focus should shift for reform at the regional level.  Based in Paris, however, the MAK remains an outlier, especially due to its pro-Israel stance.  Overall, the Berber movement in Algeria remains hamstrung in its efforts to promote a national agenda by its weak regional political base and geographic seclusion.  The future of the movement may hinge on its ability to leverage its demands for recognition of its cultural and linguistic autonomy with an agreement to cooperate in pursuing burgeoning Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces in the mountainous Kabylia regions.[4]

The past 40 years have witnessed considerable struggles for the sizable Berber minority populations in both states.  There is an opportunity to investigate the outcomes of these struggles vis-a-vis the Algerian and Moroccan state policies.  This examination of state-movement relations may explain the two very different outcomes for Berber populations in both states as affected by the state.  With one state (i.e. Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e. Algeria), what are the factors that explain these different outcomes?   Since the awakening of a Berber identity in the late 1970’s through the Arab Spring to 2012, has one factor been most influential and emerged most consistently, or are the explanations specific to time and state?   This thesis aims to identify the factors that influence Algerian and Moroccan state interactions with their Berber minority populations.

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[1] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East : A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, Vol. Second Edition (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2002), 54.

[2] Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 220-222.

[3] “North Africa’s Berbers Get Boost from Arab Spring,” The Cortez Journal (May 5, 2012).

[4] Ibid., 223-225.

The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism (Muller 2008) Grad School Notes

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Grad School Notes: 

“Us and Them: The Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism” by J. Muller (2008)

Introduction:

For Americans, Ethnic Nationalism in politics is not an easy concept to grasp of which to give merit, most find it discomfiting both intellectually and morally

Two of best ways (least bad”) responses to ethnic nationalism is ethnic disaggregation or partition. 

People who come to the US usually do so with the expectation that their ethnic identities will lessen or disappear. 

In regions where there is peace now it is only a byproduct of violent ethnic separations—where separation hasn’t occurred—watch out. 

Ethnonationalism formed the Europe we know today despite their claims that nationalism is now supplanted by globalism and transnational institutions.  Today, every European state except for two has a dominant nationalit. 

The Politics of Identity:

Two schools on the idea of a national identity: 

Civic/Liberal:  American conception.  If you live within the borders you are part of the nation, regardless of ethnic or racial background

Ethno:  nations defined by a shared heritage (blood)—common language, faith, ethnicity

But civic nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon in Europe and US.  (e.g. WASPs)

Differing levels of civic vs. ethnonationalism as one travels east from western Europe. The countries in Western Europe had a longer period to develop a more homogenous population—enabling them to become nation-states.

The Rise of Ethnonationalism (EN):

Idea of a nation-state is a recent phenomenon—for most of history people lived in Empires—their own little nations.

Gellner defines:

Rise of ethnonationalism driven by modernity.  Military competition between state led to demand for continual economic growth—this depended on mass literacy and communication—promotion of education and common language—leading to conflicts over language and communal opportunities.

EN also responded to modern state’s weakening of familial and religious social bonds—offering a common ethnic identity.

The ugly side of EN is that the creation of a nation-state necessarily means that there will be minorities created and treated as inferior.

The Great Transformation:

Ethnic cleansing, population transfer, genocide were all byproducts of post World War I breakup of empires as borders were moved to align them with populations and victors.  This nationalism continued to build up through World War II—with Hitler’s Germany as an unholy culmination. 

Postwar but not PostNational:

After WWII, instead of borders being moved, populations were—in the name of postwar stability.  Mixture of ethnic populations deemed subversive and troublesome, this was characterized by the expulsion of ethnic Germans from non Germanic countries.  Carried through the end of the Cold War—this has been the story of ethnic disaggregation and and EN.

Decolonization and After:

EN happened elsewhere too: British partition of India and Pakistan; later partition of Pakistan and Bangladesh; mandate of Palestine’s disestablishment into Israel; expulsion of pied-noirs in Algeria, Asians in Uganda.

The Balance Sheet:

Obvious deleterious effects of EN, but also good things and stability have occurred:

EN has motivated countries to mutual trust and sacrifice—through appeals to that shared heritage.  Post WWII Europe has been so stable because of EN—those sourcers of conflict having been removed. 

New Ethnic Mixing:

Today ethnic mixing occurs largely due to a north and west migration pattern from Asia, Africa and the Middle East.  Whether these groups will assimilate will largely determine future conflict or perhaps another rise of EN. 

Future Implications:

Since modernization is a key cause of EN, one can expect future conflict in modernizing states.  This is especially true in developing new states (think Africa) with borders that cross ethnic boundaries.

Once a certain level of conflict has been reached—remaining a single state becomes counterproductive (Chaim Kaufmann).    Once this point has been reached partition may be the most human response.  Yes, it creates problematic refugee flows but it at least addresses the source of the conflict.  It does however, require a substantial financial commitment from the international community. 

EN is here to stay and ignoring and trying to write it off as imagined and therefore irrelevant might only provoke future conflict. 

Thoughts on a US Response to an Alien Signal

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

You Are on the NSS and You Receive an Alien Signal from Planet Gliese

(Full article is below) 
 
            While the considerations are extensive, the paramount question is a simple one:
to answer the door or not. That this knock took twenty years to reach the United States
from the previously unknown Planet Gliese-581-g (referred to as Gliese hereafter), with
any response carrying the same delay, hearkens back to an age-old era of diplomacy
that existed before World War I and the advent of the telegram and other technological
advances.  Therefore, it is crucial that the President take time in responding, fully
evaluating all possible courses of action, outcomes, and their effects on international
relationships.  Callières warned against neophytes that sought to play the role of
diplomat when they did not know the “interests, the laws, the customs, the language…the
geographical situation” of the countries with which they interacted. In this case, the
U.S. government knows very little about Gliese outside of its ostensible technological
capacity. If the Washington decides to respond, they must send an immediate message
stating that the U.S. is working towards a solution, and also request complete background
data (population and natural resources), and information (history, system of government)
for the Planet Gliese to assist in helping them. After all, if Gliese does not have uranium
or a similar element, telling them how to develop nuclear energy likely will be a fruitless
exercise.

Conclusion:

 If the U.S. decides to respond, though, then the benefit of a multilateral response
depends on if Gliese was truthful and if nuclear energy does indeed save their planet. If
both of these are true, then only the U.S responding would provide the maximum benefit
of the prestige of saving a civilization and the gaining of a strong (at least
technologically) ally. If the response backfires in anyway though, then the U.S. would
benefit from a multilateral response. There is precedent over the last century to hedge
the U.S. response in this manner, as this is the manner in which the United States, and its
partners, have conducted humanitarian intervention over the last 50 years.