Human Nature: Marx, Nietzche, Russell, Weber, Constant, Durkheim

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

My complete collection of Grad School Notes can be found here (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing, Islam, Comparative Politics).

(These notes are from my grad school Comparative Politics Class)

MARX

Marx's view of human nature was that we change nature. And that this labour is a social act. I'd imagine he'd say human nature was capable of reaching perfection, since communism require people to fulfill their work perfectly in cooperation with others.


They disagree in that Marx has emphasis on the man doing work for the benefit of society, while Nietzsche quite plainly states man works to achieve his own power.












NIETZSCHE

              Nietzsche believes that there is no such thing as a good or evil human nature, and that the thought that there would be these two values derives from master-slave morality as he liked to call it. These values arise from life-affirming and life-denying things, such as wealth vs. poverty, strength vs. weakness, etc. He also believed in something called the will to power, basically saying everything we do is an attempt to further our own power in some way. Another important concept is the Ubermensch - superperson. Basically this is his ideal person. There's really no concrete definition of what this is, although i personally just hold to the idea it's someone who has completely separated himself from morality.

             They disagree in that Marx has emphasis on the man doing work for the benefit of society, while Nietzsche quite plainly states man works to achieve his own power.

RUSSELL

Believes that the lust for power is a part of human nature.

"The love of power is a part of human nature, but power-philosophies are, in a certain precise sense, insane. The existence of the external world... can only be denied by a madman... Certified lunatics are shut up because of the proneness to violence when their pretensions are questioned; the uncertified variety are given control of powerful armies, and can inflict death and disaster upon all sane men within their reach."


Nature of power: 

Russell's view of human nature, like that of Thomas Hobbes, is somewhat pessimistic. By Russell's account, the desire to empower oneself is unique to human nature. No other animals besides Homo sapiens, he argues, are capable of being so unsatisfied with their lot, that they should try to accumulate more goods than meet their needs. The "impulse to power", as he calls it, does not arise unless one's basic desires have been sated. (Russell 1938:3) Then the imagination stirs, motivating the actor to gain more power. In Russell's view, the love of power is nearly universal among people, although it takes on different guises from person to person. A person with great ambitions may become the next Caesar, but others may be content to merely dominate the home. (Russell 1938:9)
This impulse to power is not only explicitly present in leaders, but also sometimes implicitly in those who follow. It is clear that leaders may pursue and profit from enacting their own agenda, but in a "genuinely cooperative enterprise", the followers seem to gain vicariously from the achievements of the leader. (Russell 1938:7–8)
In stressing this point, Russell is explicitly rebutting Friedrich Nietzsche's infamous "master-slave morality" argument. Russell explains:
"Most men do not feel in themselves the competence required for leading their group to victory, and therefore seek out a captain who appears to possess the courage and sagacity necessary for the achievement of supremacy... Nietzsche accused Christianity of inculcating a slave-morality, but ultimate triumph was always the goal. 'Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth. '" (Russell 1938:9, emphasis his).
The existence of implicit power, he explains, is why people are capable of tolerating social inequality for an extended period of time (Russell 1938:8).
However, Russell is quick to note that the invocation of human nature should not come at the cost of ignoring the exceptional personal temperaments of power-seekers. Following Adler (1927) — and to an extent echoing Nietzsche — he separates individuals into two classes: those who are imperious in a particular situation, and those who are not. The love of power, Russell tells us, is probably not motivated by Freudian complexes, (i.e., resentment of one's father, lust for one's mother, drives towards Eros and Thanatos (Love and Death drives, which constitute the basis of all human drives, etc.,) but rather by a sense of entitlement which arises from exceptional and deep-rooted self-confidence. (Russell 1938:11)

WEBER

He thought that what moved people was a religious principle so that catholics who could get resolution at any time for their sins within the framework of a loving god could basically be childlike and play whereas the protestants had a harsh god whom you had to devote your life to pleasing and even then could not guarantee your good works would get you into heaven as god is a god and all powerful and has his choice so protestants are more driven to good works and piousness and driving social change.
look up protestant work ethic we still use the term now-

Given that we choose our brand of religion it would be safe to say that he thought people were driven by that choice about how to act in society In Northern Ireland Where there is roughly 60/40 protestants to catholics there is the notion that the catholics are the childlike ones whilst the protestants are responsible and running the country.
Weber sees that human beings are animals oriented toward meaning, and meaning, as we’ve seen, is subjective and not objective. Weber also understands that all humans are oriented toward the world and each other through values.

Further, Weber sees the primary level of analysis to be the social action of individuals; for Weber, individual action is social action only insofar as it is meaningfully oriented toward other individuals. Weber sees these meaningful orientations as produced within a unique historical context. Weber’s perspective, then, is a cultural one that privileges individual social action within a historically specific cultural milieu. This orientation clearly sets him apart from Spencer, Durkheim, and Marx, who were much more structural in their approaches.

CONSTANT

“that noble disquiet which pursues and torments us, that desires to broaden our knowledge and develop our faculties… it is to this self-development that our destiny calls us” (Constant 1816). Industry, innovation, and production are all key-words in this tradition.
“Here lies a man who did honor to human nature”

Constantian theses contained in the work on religion and referring to the human nature can be formulated as follows: 1. A man is not entirely the product of society in which he lives and its culture, but he is a being that can be defined by his stable and unchangeable nature. 2. What the human nature is like can be judged by examining the behaviours common to all people and their creations, for example religion. 3. The human nature is unchangeable . However, the forms change, through which it manifests itself in various periods of the development of humanity. In people's religious behaviour, for example, there is manifested something which is the permanent source of every religion and is inherent in human nature. Constant calls it "le sentiment religieux" (a religious feeling). The religious forms, beliefs, rites, institutions etc., in which it manifests itself, change but, itself, it remains the permanent element of the human soul. 4. Rationality constitutes the essence of humanity. There exist, however, such spheres of human behaviour which indicate that the human nature cannot be described only in the rational categories. Besides reason, the man is governed by at least two forces: the above - mentioned feeling and egoism.

DURKHEIM

In Suicide (1897), Durkheim explores the differing suicide rates among Protestants and Catholics, arguing that stronger social control among Catholics results in lower suicide rates. According to Durkheim, Catholic society has normal levels of integration while Protestant society has low levels. Overall, Durkheim treated suicide as a social fact, explaining variations in its rate on a macro level, considering society-scale phenomena such as lack of connections between people (group attachment) and lack of regulations of behavior, rather than individual's feelings and motivations.[37][56]
This study has been extensively discussed by later scholars and several major criticisms have emerged. First, Durkheim took most of his data from earlier researchers, notably Adolph Wagner and Henry Morselli,[57] who were much more careful in generalizing from their own data. Second, later researchers found that the Protestant–Catholic differences in suicide seemed to be limited to German-speaking Europe and thus may always have been the spurious reflection of other factors.[58] Durkheim's study of suicide has been criticized as an example of the logical error termed the ecological fallacy.[59][60] However, diverging views have contested whether Durkheim's work really contained an ecological fallacy.[61]More recent authors such as Berk (2006) have also questioned the micro-macro relations underlying Durkheim's work.[62] Some, such as Inkeles (1959),[63] Johnson (1965)[64] and Gibbs (1968),[65] have claimed that Durkheim's only intent was to explain suicide sociologically within a holistic perspective, emphasizing that "he intended his theory to explain variation among social environments in the incidence of suicide, not the suicides of particular individuals."[66]
Despite its limitations, Durkheim's work on suicide has influenced proponents of control theory, and is often mentioned as a classic sociological study. The book pioneered modern social research and served to distinguish social science from psychology and political philosophy.[67]
The duality of Human Nature is the opposition of the two following concepts: Soul VS. Body. (From a religious point of view) The Body is egoist and the Soul is Reasonable. These two concepts are in opposition and makes us the contradictory beings we are.

This opposition gives us the need for spirituality in order to bind them. (Or at least make them coexist peacefully.)

Durkheim call the duality of human nature: Homo Duplex. 

Durkheim thus returned to the conception of the duality of human nature first found in The Division of Labor:

... social man superimposes himself upon physical man. Social man necessarily presupposes a society which he expresses or serves. If this dissolves, if we can no longer feel it in existence and action about and above us. whatever is social in us is deprived of all objective foundation... Thus we are bereft of reasons for existence: for the only life to which we could cling no longer corresponds to anything actual; the only existence still based upon reality no longer meets our needs... So there is nothing more for our efforts to lay hold of, and we feel them lose themselves in emptiness.24
It is in this social (rather than the earlier. psychological) sense therefore that our activity needs an object transcending it; for such an object is implicit within our moral constitution itself, and cannot be lost without this constitution losing its raison d'être to the same degree.

Notes on Kraska's Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy

 Notes on Kraska's The Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

General points:

The issue of incentives is important because it addresses the root cause of why people make the decisions that they do.  Freakonomics is in many ways the study of behavioral economics—how people respond to incentives. 

Shipping: 90% of world trade travels by sea. 

Initial and conventional responses have addressed the problem at at sea—where the incentives are NOT.  They did this through 3 separate task forces and the IRTC—all of these things only served to dampen slightly the piracy problem.  Piracy is a balloon and these conventional measures only serve to push the problem to other parts of the Indian Ocean. 

The author delves at length into the many incentives for Somali piracy to exist and thrive.  Namely among these things is the money.  Aside from the millions entering Somalia from pirate ransoms—there is no other economy in Somalia. This economic and stability vacuum is at the center of it all.  Piracy is the economy.  While the number of perpetrators is relatively small, the number of those who benefit is huge. 

Those who benefit runs from the pirates themselves to the everyday citizens to tribal chiefs to the Kenyan real-estate market (unintended consequences of sky-rocketing real estate prices) to those that are now providing security for the transit shipping to the insurance companies that can charge higher premiums to the Yemeni navy that charges for escorts.     The cost-benefits of one piracy raid yield a take home for the pirate worth a decade of work in other industry. 

This means that piracy has caused a development boom in parts of Somalia but has also shot up inflation. 

While often cited in its origins as a means of combatting illegal fishing and dumping (IIU), the piracy has actually brought a revival to the fishing industry and its stocks since perpetrators now find stealing its fish too risky a venture.  These has lowered the price for fish—good for the fishermen and the people. 

The key to crafting good governmental economic policy lies in using incentives to guide behavior toward the desired outcome while accounting for individuals behavioral economic choices.

Most money that reaches TFG is wasted on corruption and ineptitiude. 

Utility of approach?

Yes,  The key in using incentives in conjunction with policy is to guide behavior toward the desired outcome while accounting for individuals behavioral economic choices.  One must be careful with incentives as to the law of unintended consequences though. 

Versus Conventional approach?

This is largely dependent on one’s definition of success.  If success is completely eradicating piracy off the Somali coast, then this is a resounding no.    If one’s goal is to reduce the piracy then this has been successful—BUT not in a sustainable manner.  That is the key.  Conventional at sea approaches require a sustained presence and economic commitment.  When these aren’t present the piracy will return. 

The freakonomics of piracy are on shore and here they must be addresses with policing and governance but also through incentives.  Prosecution and jail time (means building judicial capacity and jail infrastructure, and international legal infrastructure) are incentives but an economy must also be built in its place. 

Author advocates for supporting a stronger Puntland for enforcement.  

SUMMARY: 

Kraska espouses the “Freakonomics” assertion (and common assertion for economists) that incentives matter.  Paying close attention to incentives can provide useful insight into the problem of maritime piracy in Somalia.  The author traces the problem of piracy by first examining global trade—90% of which is carried out by sea.  With such a high volume, even proportionally small effects (e.g., hijacked or destroyed merchant vessels) can have amplified results across the entire industry.

Discarding the common claim by Somali pirates that they only started piracy to combat the rampant illegal fishing and dumping taking place off their nation’s coastline, Kraska delves into piracy as a business.  Practically this means examining the flow of money.  With a stability and economic vacuum, the pirate economy IS the economy in Somalia—with bleed over effects into its neighbors.  Thus the incentives for piracy to continue flows through every facet of society.  For the pirate himself, one raid can net him a payoff worth what he could make otherwise in a decade of work.  The pirate, however, is only receiving a small portion of the ransom money.  The rest flows to the warlords running the increasingly complex operations and from them into the local economy—this means to the tribal chiefs, local officials, businesses etc.  This influx of money has sparked a development boom along the Somali coastline but has also created rampant inflation that grows unchecked by an impotent Transitional Federal Government (TFG) without any means to control it.  This money has also driven up the real estate market in Kenya where Somalis with hundreds of thousands of dollars to spend and invest have driven the price for homes up to such a level where middle class Kenyans can no longer afford homes.   One unexpected side effect of the pirates’ success has been to aid the Somali fishermen.  With less illegal fishing off their coast, there has been a boom in the fishing industry—providing more fish and making the fish themselves more affordable. 

Unfortunately, since the piracy began to spike the majority of the conventional efforts to counter and quell it have ignored the incentives of it.  Instead they have sought to contain it or reduce it at sea.  This approach ignores the root causes of Somali piracy.  To date there have been 3 task forces (CTF 150/1, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, UN’s OPERATION ATALANTA) all working parallel efforts to defeat the pirates at sea.  The majority of this is done through protective convoys and through the establishment of the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC)—a dedicated route patrolled and monitored by Naval Vessels.  The Yemeni Navy has even monetized the process charging millions of dollars for escort by its naval vessels.  While in recent years these efforts have driven down the number of successful hijackings they haven’t come even close to stopping them.   Instead a balloon effect occurs—the pirates are squeezed along the coast line and Gulf of Aden so they just expand elsewhere—in most cases further and further out into the Indian Ocean. 

This is not to say there have not been successful measures taken at sea.  Perhaps the greatest success story has been the employment of  Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) aboard merchant vessels.  While this tactic is shunned by much of the international community, not a single US merchant vessel with a PMSC aboard has been hijacked.  Furthermore, standardized operating procedures and evasive maneuvering has lessened much of the impact of the piracy.  All of this however, ignores the central problem.  All of these tactics require a sustained and constant presence.  Once they leave—the piracy will return.  Thus one must be cautious in labeling these efforts as successful since the definition of success is a tangible thing.

The author points out the true success with come by addressing the problem ashore.  This means investing in better governance and policing capacity.  He points out the efficacy of using stable semi-autonomous regions like Puntland (or Somaliland) as investment points to drive out and crush the pirate networks.  This approach is best as it addresses the incentives.  An increased presence and investment ashore can decrease the benefits for one to risk piracy.  This is being done through advances in the international legal infrastructure as well as the physical infrastructure (i.e., much needed jails in Somalia and neighboring countries).  Only through this type of approach can piracy be quashed.   

LINKS:

https://portal.mmowgli.nps.edu/game-wiki/-/wiki/PlayerResources/Published+papers

http://www.freakonomics.com/2008/11/21/spreading-the-pirate-booty-around/ 
Notes on Counter Piracy Debate Regarding Effectiveness

Answering Questions on PhD's from Exum and Blattman

6 NOV 2012 UPDATE from earlier post: 

I've added the link to a post by Chris Blattman (a professor at Columbia, @cblatts on twitter) in which he answers frequently asked questions about PhD applications.

Abu Muqawama's Ph.D for Dummies Post.

If you're like me and have no clue what it means to have a Ph. D or how to get one, you should read the below post (and the comments) from Abu Muqawama's blog.  You'll feel smarter just by reading it.  

(Unfortunately, he doesn't cover at how they go about getting those Doctor prescription pads--the sole reason I would like to get a PhD is to officially be a titled "Doctor"--I envision an office crowded with dusty books and papers and a fat square prescription pad on my desk from which I scribble prescriptions for knowledge)

Frequently Asked PhD Questions by Chris Blattman

LINKS:

http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/08/phds-dummies.html
http://chrisblattman.com/about/contact/gradschool/
https://twitter.com/cblatts

http://www.phdcomics.com/

How to Write an A+ Paper in Grad School

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

How to Write an A+ Paper in Grad School

"The Elements of an A+ Paper" document below was written by one of my favorite professors at NPS: Dr. Mohammad Hafez.  My biggest regret is that I did not have this guide my first two quarters. 

When you are pursuing an International Relations type Master's Degree is seems that every week you have a 6-12 page paper due.  The "Elements" gives you a template to get your writing started and to tackle the research paper as a whole.  Your paper practically writes itself when you use "Elements." Before you turn it in, use my My Personal Editing Checklist.  

While you are here, consider buying one of Dr. Hafez's three books--he's a great writer.

 

Elements of an A+ Paper

Below is the first paragraph from a recent essay for which I received an A (95).  The essay in its entirety is embedded below.

Empires As Sanctifying, Transformative Safety Valves

Empires are a near universal experience with ancient roots. While most often
studied with a Europe-centric focus (e.g. the Romans, the Greeks, the Byzantines etc.), the
process of empire-building affected nearly every modern nation today. The first wave of modern
empire-building lasted approximately 400 years beginning in the 15th century. By 1800, these
empires had grown from humble beginnings in coastal European islands to the faraway shores of
India, the Philippines and South America. During this time period nearly every European state
expanded its territory in some way, however, Spain, England and Portugal were notable for the
duration and breadth of their empires. What were the driving forces behind their rapid expansion?
Which motivating factors were common ones and which ones were dissimilar? Where did the
processes of empire-building themselves converge and diverge? I argue that the roots of empire
for each nation began in their own domestic conflicts that were inextricably tied to the broader
politics of succession and rule in Europe at large. Notably these conflicts underscored the need
for additional sovereign territory (and its associated wealth) for which imperial expansion served
as an ideal solution and safety valve. I begin by providing a brief analysis of these preconditions
(i.e. the roots) that enabled and motivated the three countries’ expansion. Next, I focus on the
processes and nature of each country’s territorial acquisitions. I then make the case that while
each nation was distinctly influenced by its own domestic situation, an evolving understanding of
the role of intermediaries, as well as the concept of governed “peoples,” ultimately shaped their
empires.







Other Writing Links:

My Personal Editing Checklist

On Revising Well or “Taking the ax to your work” or “Getting the words right”


101 Writing Tips from Famous Authors

On the Dangers of Half-Hearted IR Policy Implementation

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

On the Dangers of Half-Hearted IR Policy Implementation- A Historical Example    

   The post-WWI isolationist Congress’ handcuffing of Wilson’s idealism/liberalism and aspirations for a “community of power,” illustrates well the dangers of half-heartedly attempting to implement any sole international relations theory.  From the onset, the absence of crucial members sapped the power of the League of Nations; this weakness was further amplified by the lack of any concrete means to enforce its charter.  Finally, the League’s impotence was fully realized in the flawed policy of appeasement that grew from it.  The most obvious counterfactual to first explore then is: How effective would the League have been with the membership and the U.S., Germany and Japan?  

      Even the full-blown implementation of Wilson’s plan, however, likely would have met defeat (at some level) because liberalism (and realism) assume too much about the nature of man (and require every state to buy into the same interpretation).  Liberalism assumes a common value system shared by every person and state, when in reality many states have very different value systems; and it also assumes (and continues to assume) democracy as the best answer.  It was these different value systems that made the effects of appeasement so egregious in the time period leading up to WWII.  In appeasing Germany the aggressor state, the allies ignored the associated territorial and human losses.  While appeasement can be an effective diplomatic tool,[1] its effects can be devastating when the appeased operate on a different value system from the appeasers.  Had the allies operated under the realist assumption of the selfish, dominant nature of man (and by extension state), they never would have trusted the promises of Hitler.  Unfortunately, Hitler demonstrated the power of an unbridled realist, one who forged public opinion to his foreign policy desires, and not the other way around, as was the case with Wilson. 

Questions for further discussion include:

1.  How has the U. S. presidential election cycle (and the equivalent cycle in other democratic states) correlated to significant foreign policy decisions throughout history?

In other words, is decision-making about conflicts arising closer to an election ‘season’ influenced more by public opinion?  To that end, is the influence of public opinion less pronounced on newly elected leaders?

2.  How has the assumption of democracy as a ‘value system’ shaped and continue to shape foreign policy?  Does this assumption affect both realism and liberalism equally?  How does monarchy fit into state-state interactions today?

---

[1] Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (New York, Pearson Longman, 2009), 111.

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft by Lauren, Craig and George

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of our Time

Notes on Force and Statecraft

Introduction:

Dilemma of Force and Statecraft is when/how/if to use force—force that can be so dangerous

FAO *Diplomacy statue by Alves good model for FAOs*

*Does a superpower likes the US actually damage the world order and stability?

*Collective cooperation requires:

            - common interests and competition

            - structure appropriate to size

            - common values and procedures within the structure

            - adaptability

CHAPTER 1: THE EMERGENCE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE GREAT POWERS

Intro:

Diplomacy: the system of regulated and organized contacts between states which Europe has evolved…one of her most important gifts to the world

The Early techniques, instruments and ideas of diplomacy:

- From 6^th century B.C., the Greeks developed the practice of choosing ambassadors—they have no battleships at their disposal…their only weapons are words and opportunities (Demosthenes).

- Romans developed legal concepts like the law of nations, the law that’s commons to all mankind, and the importance of respecting legal obligations and honor treaties.

- Following the Romans, the Byzantine empire organized a special permanent governmental department to deal with foreign affairs.

- The Venetians (15^th century) established permanent diplomatic missions with a systemized diplomatic service.

- This all led to the creation of political science—notably among the creators of this discipline was Machiavelli

States and Raison d’Etat in the 17^th Century

- War shaped the formation, character and development of modern states

- Transformation began with the 30 years war (1618-48) and the Treaty of Westphalia

- The emergence of the modern state due to:

            Effective armed forces, able bureaucracy and theory of state that defined political interest in rational/practical terms.

- Rise of the raison d’etat = a state is more than its ruler, crown, prince and people…the state above all else!      

            EX: Cardinal Richelieu used this idea ruthlessly. 

            *French becomes the lingua franca of diplomacy itself

- Diplomats job = maintaining effective communication between the two princes, delivering letters and in protecting his Master’s subjects and conserving his interests.

- Overwhelming French power led to alliances to balance the power and to the Nine Years War (1688-97)

War and Competition in the 18^th Century:

-  this Age of Reason also witnessed an anarchy against all

- Began with Great Northern War of 1700-1721 (supremacy in the Baltic region)

            Peter the Great brought Russia into being as a modern state to do win at the Battle            of Poltava

- 1713/14 Treaty of Utrecht = first European treaty to mention BoP

- Callieres On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes 1716—best writing ever on diplomatic methodology

            *Cautions again large diplomatic conferences and reliance on lawyers

            *Foreign relations should be done by trained professionals vice politically- connected amateurs

Diplomats should be carefully educated in the lessons of history and trained in diplomatic skills and techniques, and should know exactly the state of the military forces both on land and sea.

- Frederick the Great stated: Negotiating without arms produce as little impression as musical scores without instruments.

- The rape of Silesia by Frederick is a great example of raison d’etat personified

- It took the French revolution and ensuing Napoleonic Wars to shock Europe into collaboration…defeating French forces during the Battle of Nations at Leipzig in 1813

            *Following 1815 Battle of Waterloo this collaboration stood as basis for first          international system based upon BoP for peace and security

CHAPTER 2: THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM OF DIPLOMACY, 1815-1914

Intro:

- efforts here produced a period of unprecedented peace…the classical system of diplomacy

Building a System with a BoP and a Concert:

- Congress of Vienna- major task not to just end past hostilities by to make a viable international system of peace and security

            *Castlereagh and Metternich were the two principal architects to tackle: how to     put power into the service of peace and security

            *The generality of dissatisfaction is a condition of stability because it ensures no     one party is totally satisfied and ensure relative  security (Kissinger)

- This all required a corporate buy-in though and to that end they made the Quadruple Alliance (soon added France to it) and the Concert of Europe

- In every crisis from 1815-1854 they worked together to find solutions to prevent war, and to minimize the wars of 1850s and 60s

- Why could they do this?!

            *Unusually skilled statesmen, and free from pressures of transparent democracies             to some extent

- Clausewitz’s On War: war is the continuation of political activity by other means.  The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it and those means can’t ever be in isolation from their purpose.

Change and an Experiment with a Defensive Alliance System

- Following revolutions of 1848, rise of nationalism created a rise of realpolitiker

            Statecraft is only defined in the exercise and application of raw power

            *Example of the folly of this being the senseless killings in the Crimean War

- the lessons of one generation are not always accepted by another

- This time period saw the widespread acceptance of Darwinism and rise jingoism

-  All this concerned Bismark, who wanted to puruse safety-politics

            *So he created an elaborate defensive alliance system: maintain equilibrium of  forces that was very complicated (and weak because of its complexity)

- 1864 Geneva Convention signed

- 1878 Congress of Berlin prevents danger in the Balkans

- 1884-85 Conference of Berlin called to forestall possibility of crisis arising

Further Change and an Experiment with Bipolar Alignment

- This change started with German-Russian alliance was severed in 1879

            *Poor German leadership launched Weltpolitik = make Germany a global power

- Evolved into post 1907 Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy) and Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia). 

Characteristics of the System

- Composition, numbers and types of actors

- Structure = balance among Great Powers…but this requires flexibility

- Shared goals and objectives

- Statesmen had to develop norms, methods and rules of accommodation

- Wars if fought with limited means for limited political objectives could be legitimate instruments of policy

- Reliance on just war theory and professional diplomats

Notes on Nye's "Understanding International Conflicts"

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes on Nye's "Understanding International Conflicts"

Below are my grad school notes on the first four chapters of Nye's Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (7th Edition) .




Another IR Essay I wrote.

Chapter 1: Is there an enduring logic of conflict in world politics?

INTRO:  The world is shrinking and making conditions we once knew nothing about in remotie countries relevant. The new century will yield more states (vs. the idea of globalization/homogenization)—since 1989 intrastate war has been on the rise.

*What is international politics?

            3 forms of world politics:  world imperial, feudal and anarachic system of states (aka territorial states)

            Order and justice: national concerns outweigh concerns for international justice

            What does the 21^st century hold?

*Differing views of anarachic politics:

            Realist and liberal approach to international politics view the state of nature differently.

Realist: Hobbes/Thucydides, continuity, state actors only, military force only

Vs.

Liberal: Locke, state of trade prevents war, change, globalization due to disease, climate change, nations want to just survive

“Theories are roadmaps to unfamiliar territory”

*Building blocks: actors, goals and instruments

            There are no longer just state actors—there’s now IBM, Shell etc

            There is no longer just military security—there’s human security etc

            There’s no longer just military force alone—there’s economic etc

*Peloponnesian War (in which Athens was eventually defeated by Sparta)

            - Thucydides says it was because Sparta feared Athen’s rise.

            - But perhaps it was actually a prisoner’s dilemma (security dilemma) where the   best outcome collectively isn’t the best one individually.

            - But this requires communication, trust (difficult in anarchy), and    credibility

Is War with China inevitable?

*Ethical Questions in International Politics

            - There exist moral arguments for and against war.  A good argument considers motives, means and consequences.

            - Ethic’s role in international politics is smaller because of the varied scale of  morals and causation

*3 Moral categories: Skeptics, State Moralists and Cosmopolitans

Skeptics: Might makes right, Morals have no place, no choices exists

State Moralists: good fences make good neighbors, state sovereignty trumps all, society of states

Cosmopolitans: no borders only humanity, redistribution, society of individuals

*Just war doctrine prohibit killings of civilians

Chapter 2:  Origins of Great 20^th Century Conflicts (10 JAN 2012)

International Systems and Levels of Causation

*The international political system is the pattern of relationships among the states

            The system produces the consequences, which can ones unintended by the actors (Ex. From Bolshevik revolution to Stalin entering a pact with Hitler)

*Geopolitics has a role with half of all conflicts between 1816 and 1992 occurring between neighbors.

            - There’s also a propensity to checkerboard alliance to counterbalance neighbor.

Levels of Analysis

*Waltz’s 3 levels of causation: the individual, the state and the international system

*Idea that if all countries were democratic there’d be less war

- System level analysis is explanation from outside-in (how the system constrains the state)

- second level is inside-out (outcomes explained by happenings inside state)

*The rule of parsimony (occam’s razor) = say a lot with a little

            Range of a theory is also important and how many possibilities/anomalies it addresses

Systems and Process

*Structure of a system refers to its distribution of power and process refers to patterns and types of interactions among its units

- Unipolar, bipolar, multipolar:

            Unipolar system tend to degrade as states rise to challenge sole leader

            Bipolar system breeds rigid alliances and increase risk of global war

            Multipolar tend to have flexible alliances and if war, it’s a limited one

***Author touts that during bipolar cold war no central war occurred for more than 40 years…but a lot of SMALL conflicts did (ex. Proxy wars in Africa)

- International system process is determined by: it’s structure, the surrounding cultural and institutional context and whether states are revolutionary or moderate

Revolutionary and Moderate Goals and Instruments

*A realist structural theory can be added to by constructivist work as was the case with the French Revolution

- States can change their goals and their means          

            Sometimes these means are technical like the advent of the machine gun and

            Sometimes social like Napoleon conscription

The Structure and Process of 19^th Century System

- For structural realists the big change came with Germany’s unification in 1870.  This disrupted the balance of power.  They were either strong enough to take on both France and Russia or if not, they might be weak enough to be invade. 

            However, an individual prevented mayhem: Bismarck was a gifted and focused interlocutor who formed and maintained a complex systems or treaty’s and alliance that prevented full scale war from 1870 to 1890. 

*WWI was not inevitable…human choice played a role, as did the post-Napoleonic changes in Europe (process)

            - Shock from Napoleonic war setup the 1815 Congress of Vienna.

*Constructivist attention to process reminds us not be blind to social change

A Modern Sequel

*There were similar worries in Europe when East and West Germany united but there were several reasons the past wasn’t repeated:

            - American stayed involved

            - The EU played a uniting role

            - Domestically, Germany had the benefits of 50 years of democratic process in     

            West Germany

Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy

- Neorealism: state act similiarly because of international system…HOWEVER, domestic politics DO matter

            EX: Peloponnesian War started with domestic conflict between the oligarchs and   democrats in Epidamnus

- Classic Liberalism: War is bad for business, thus capitalist states are peaceful….HOWEVER WWI quashed this notion.          

            ***I would add that war itself is a business stimulant from an economic     perspective though

Liberalism Revived

*Resurgence of liberalism in 1960s and 70s along the lines of economic, social and political

            - Trade gives states a way to transform their standing through economic growth     vice military conquest.  The Japan example is often used, HOWEVER the US was         providing their security for them!

- Neoliberalism emphasize the importance of institutions because they stabilize (and thereby provide escape from security dilemma) in 4 ways:

            1. provide sense of continuity (EU)

            2. provide opportunity for reciprocity (time will balance out unevenness)

            3. provide flow of information and transparency

            4. provide method/means for conflict resolution (EU Commision and Court of        Justice)

*Today’s liberals seek islands of peace or pluralistic security communities

Liberal Democracy and War

- Liberalists and constructivists both tout power of democratic values

            They say liberal democracies don’t fight each other, however they do still vote to go to war at times

            *Furthermore, states transitioning to democracy are MORE likely to engage in       conflict

Defining National Interests

- Realists = states have little choice in defining their national interest due to the international system which dictate their national interests and foreign policy

            - However, liberalists and constructivist say there’s much more to it domestically

            Than that

           

Variations in Foreign Policies

* Can be due to revolutions, changes in bureaucracy (***p. 51 Vietnam example is a bit simplistic

Counterfactuals

- These are contrary to fact conditionals, and they illuminate the role of the accidental and give us a way to examine significance of causal factors

*You can tell if a counterfactual is good using:

            1. Plausibilty (cotenability)- must be reasonable

            2. Proximity in time- closeness of two events in chain of causation

            3. Relation to Theory- this makes them useful by tieing into broader knowledge

            Base

            4. Fact- need to be accurate (multiple CFs just confuse the issue)

CHAPTER 3 BALANCE OF POWER AND WWI

BALANCE OF POWER

- WWI often blamed on balance of power.  Some say that BoP causes stability BUT that doesn’t mean peace (but does mean preserving independence).

            *BoP has preserved the anarchic system

Power

- The ability to achieve one’s purpose/goals; to affect others to get a desired outcomes.  It can also mean holding resources. 

            Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power to realized power (measured by other’s changed behaviors).  However, power resources are context dependent. 

            EX: Bismark’s use of railway technology

- Hard power: can depend on carrorts (inducements) or sticks (threats)

- Soft (attractive) power: getting others to want what you want

            It’s not necessarily more effective or ethical than hard power (e.g. OBL)

EX: Hard power necessary against hardened terrorists, but soft power needed to win hearts and minds of mainstream populace

Balances as distributions of power

*BoP can mean:

1. Distribution of power

            Hegemonic stability theory: imbalanced power = peace

2. Policy of balancing requires two assumptions to predict behavior:

            - Structure of international politics is anarchic system of states

            - States value their independence above all else

            *State will join the side that seems weaker

            *Efforts to use ideology to predict state behavior are often wrong, whereas            counterintuitive balancing of power predictions are often correct.

                        China, USSR, Vietnam and Cambodia were not in fact, all the same

            *However important to note that perceptions of threat are influenced by the          proximity of that threat

3. Describe multipower historical cases: this depends on structure and process to explain 

            Structure is in alliances whereas the process is in nationalism and meetings etc.

ORIGINS OF WWI

Intro:

- As the alliance system became less flexible, the BoP became less multipolar and the likelihood of war increased

Three Levels of Analysis:

- system level (structure and process), domestic societal level, Individuals

- system level: rise of German Power and increased alliance system rigidity

            Rise of nationalism

            Rise in complacency about peace

            German policy vague and confusing

- domestic societal level:

            Internal crisis of declining Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires

            Domestic political situation in Germany: Rye and Iron Coalition

- individuals:

            Mediocrity of leadership: Franz Joseph, Count Berchtold, Czar Nicholas II and Kaiser wilhem II. 

Was War Inevitable?

- No.

            - Deep causes were changes in the structure of BoP and parts of domestic political            systems.  Also big was rise of German strength, bipolar alliance development, nationalism etc….

            - Intermediate causes were German policy, complacency and leadership      idiosyncrasies.

            - Precipitating cause was Franz Ferdinand assassination

What Kind of War?

-  Using counterfactuals can help explore this issue, but ultimately human choices matters

            EX: In June 1914, Britain sent 4 battleships to Germany for a state visit—SO probable doesn’t equal inevitable

Lessons of History Again:

- Beware of:

            *complacency about peace

            *next crisis will fit same pattern as last crisis (Iraq)

*Today the ideology and acceptance of war is much weaker than the prevailing fatalist Darwinist argument of the era

****Is this really true, where does NYE get this from?

CHAPTER 4: THE FAILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WWII

The Rise and Fall of Collective Security

- Wilson a classic liberal/idealist who viewed BoP as immoral

- BoP seeks to preserve sovereign state system—NOT peace

- Wilson sought to change this international system from BoP to collective security

The League of Nations

- Collective sec:

            Make aggression illegal and outlaw offensive war

            Deter aggression through coalition on non-aggressors

            If deter fails, ALL states punish

*International law supercedes domestic law

- 3 differences between CS and BoP

            In CS, focus is on aggressive policies NOT capacity

            In CS, coalitions are NOT predetermined until aggressor acts, but then requires ALL

            CS is global and universal, NO neutrals

- Ambiguity of LoN undermined it from the start

            US refusing to join

            Article 16 not specific—states can decide not join in sanctions or actions

         
LINKS:
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/thoughts-on-us-response-to-alien-signal.html