FAO Quotables

"But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist."
-Anne Applebaum

Thursday, November 29, 2012

Notes on Kraska's Freakonomics of Maritime Piracy



BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 


General points:
The issue of incentives is important because it addresses the root cause of why people make the decisions that they do.  Freakonomics is in many ways the study of behavioral economics—how people respond to incentives. 

Shipping: 90% of world trade travels by sea. 

Initial and conventional responses have addressed the problem at at sea—where the incentives are NOT.  They did this through 3 separate task forces and the IRTC—all of these things only served to dampen slightly the piracy problem.  Piracy is a balloon and these conventional measures only serve to push the problem to other parts of the Indian Ocean. 

The author delves at length into the many incentives for Somali piracy to exist and thrive.  Namely among these things is the money.  Aside from the millions entering Somalia from pirate ransoms—there is no other economy in Somalia. This economic and stability vacuum is at the center of it all.  Piracy is the economy.  While the number of perpetrators is relatively small, the number of those who benefit is huge. 

Those who benefit runs from the pirates themselves to the everyday citizens to tribal chiefs to the Kenyan real-estate market (unintended consequences of sky-rocketing real estate prices) to those that are now providing security for the transit shipping to the insurance companies that can charge higher premiums to the Yemeni navy that charges for escorts.     The cost-benefits of one piracy raid yield a take home for the pirate worth a decade of work in other industry. 

This means that piracy has caused a development boom in parts of Somalia but has also shot up inflation. 

While often cited in its origins as a means of combatting illegal fishing and dumping (IIU), the piracy has actually brought a revival to the fishing industry and its stocks since perpetrators now find stealing its fish too risky a venture.  These has lowered the price for fish—good for the fishermen and the people. 

The key to crafting good governmental economic policy lies in using incentives to guide behavior toward the desired outcome while accounting for individuals behavioral economic choices.

Most money that reaches TFG is wasted on corruption and ineptitiude. 


Utility of approach?
Yes,  The key in using incentives in conjunction with policy is to guide behavior toward the desired outcome while accounting for individuals behavioral economic choices.  One must be careful with incentives as to the law of unintended consequences though. 

Versus Conventional approach?
This is largely dependent on one’s definition of success.  If success is completely eradicating piracy off the Somali coast, then this is a resounding no.    If one’s goal is to reduce the piracy then this has been successful—BUT not in a sustainable manner.  That is the key.  Conventional at sea approaches require a sustained presence and economic commitment.  When these aren’t present the piracy will return. 

The freakonomics of piracy are on shore and here they must be addresses with policing and governance but also through incentives.  Prosecution and jail time (means building judicial capacity and jail infrastructure, and international legal infrastructure) are incentives but an economy must also be built in its place. 

Author advocates for supporting a stronger Puntland for enforcement.  

SUMMARY: 

Kraska espouses the “Freakonomics” assertion (and common assertion for economists) that incentives matter.  Paying close attention to incentives can provide useful insight into the problem of maritime piracy in Somalia.  The author traces the problem of piracy by first examining global trade—90% of which is carried out by sea.  With such a high volume, even proportionally small effects (e.g., hijacked or destroyed merchant vessels) can have amplified results across the entire industry.
Discarding the common claim by Somali pirates that they only started piracy to combat the rampant illegal fishing and dumping taking place off their nation’s coastline, Kraska delves into piracy as a business.  Practically this means examining the flow of money.  With a stability and economic vacuum, the pirate economy IS the economy in Somalia—with bleed over effects into its neighbors.  Thus the incentives for piracy to continue flows through every facet of society.  For the pirate himself, one raid can net him a payoff worth what he could make otherwise in a decade of work.  The pirate, however, is only receiving a small portion of the ransom money.  The rest flows to the warlords running the increasingly complex operations and from them into the local economy—this means to the tribal chiefs, local officials, businesses etc.  This influx of money has sparked a development boom along the Somali coastline but has also created rampant inflation that grows unchecked by an impotent Transitional Federal Government (TFG) without any means to control it.  This money has also driven up the real estate market in Kenya where Somalis with hundreds of thousands of dollars to spend and invest have driven the price for homes up to such a level where middle class Kenyans can no longer afford homes.   One unexpected side effect of the pirates’ success has been to aid the Somali fishermen.  With less illegal fishing off their coast, there has been a boom in the fishing industry—providing more fish and making the fish themselves more affordable. 
Unfortunately, since the piracy began to spike the majority of the conventional efforts to counter and quell it have ignored the incentives of it.  Instead they have sought to contain it or reduce it at sea.  This approach ignores the root causes of Somali piracy.  To date there have been 3 task forces (CTF 150/1, NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield, UN’s OPERATION ATALANTA) all working parallel efforts to defeat the pirates at sea.  The majority of this is done through protective convoys and through the establishment of the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC)—a dedicated route patrolled and monitored by Naval Vessels.  The Yemeni Navy has even monetized the process charging millions of dollars for escort by its naval vessels.  While in recent years these efforts have driven down the number of successful hijackings they haven’t come even close to stopping them.   Instead a balloon effect occurs—the pirates are squeezed along the coast line and Gulf of Aden so they just expand elsewhere—in most cases further and further out into the Indian Ocean. 
This is not to say there have not been successful measures taken at sea.  Perhaps the greatest success story has been the employment of  Private Maritime Security Companies (PMSC) aboard merchant vessels.  While this tactic is shunned by much of the international community, not a single US merchant vessel with a PMSC aboard has been hijacked.  Furthermore, standardized operating procedures and evasive maneuvering has lessened much of the impact of the piracy.  All of this however, ignores the central problem.  All of these tactics require a sustained and constant presence.  Once they leave—the piracy will return.  Thus one must be cautious in labeling these efforts as successful since the definition of success is a tangible thing.
The author points out the true success with come by addressing the problem ashore.  This means investing in better governance and policing capacity.  He points out the efficacy of using stable semi-autonomous regions like Puntland (or Somaliland) as investment points to drive out and crush the pirate networks.  This approach is best as it addresses the incentives.  An increased presence and investment ashore can decrease the benefits for one to risk piracy.  This is being done through advances in the international legal infrastructure as well as the physical infrastructure (i.e., much needed jails in Somalia and neighboring countries).  Only through this type of approach can piracy be quashed.   

LINKS:

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Updike's 6 rules on literary criticism from Brain Pickings


I came across this gem on the always excellent Brain Pickings website.  You too, should read the content here on a regular basis, your life will be more interesting for it.

You can also follow Maria Popova on twitter at @brainpicker

If you want to read more on Updike you can read an excellent interview with him the from phenomenal Paris Review here.  In the 1967 interview at Martha's Vineyard the interviewer asked him (among many questions) why he writes so much literary criticism. 
His response:
"I do it (a) when some author, like Spark or Borges, excites me and I want to share the good news, (b) when I want to write an essay, as on romantic love, or Barth's theology, (c) when I feel ignorant of something, like modern French fiction, and accepting a review assignment will compel me to read and learn."
 
From Updike:
My rules, drawn up inwardly when l embarked on this craft, and shaped intaglio- fashion by youthful traumas at the receiving end of critical opinion, were and are:
  1. Try to understand what the author wished to do, and do not blame him for not achieving what he did not attempt.
  2. Give him enough direct quotation–at least one extended passage–of the book’s prose so the review’s reader can form his own impression, can get his own taste.
  3. Confirm your description of the book with quotation from the book, if only phrase-long, rather than proceeding by fuzzy precis.
  4. Go easy on plot summary, and do not give away the ending. (How astounded and indignant was I, when innocent, to find reviewers blabbing, and with the sublime inaccuracy of drunken lords reporting on a peasants’ revolt, all the turns of my suspenseful and surpriseful narrative! Most ironically, the only readers who approach a book as the author intends, unpolluted by pre-knowledge of the plot, are the detested reviewers themselves. And then, years later, the blessed fool who picks the volume at random from a library shelf.)
  5. If the book is judged deficient, cite a successful example along the same lines, from the author’s ouevre or elsewhere. Try to understand the failure. Sure it’s his and not yours?
To these concrete five might be added a vaguer sixth, having to do with maintaining a chemical purity in the reaction between product and appraiser. Do not accept for review a book you are predisposed to dislike, or committed by friendship to like. Do not imagine yourself a caretaker of any tradition, an enforcer of any party standards, a warrior in an idealogical battle, a corrections officer of any kind. Never, never (John Aldridge, Norman Podhoretz) try to put the author ‘in his place,’ making him a pawn in a contest with other reviewers. Review the book, not the reputation. Submit to whatever spell, weak or strong, is being cast. Better to praise and share than blame and ban. The communion between reviewer and his public is based upon the presumption of certain possible joys in reading, and all our discriminations should curve toward that end.


Notes on Inequality in Africa Article


BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

NOTES:
Typical inequality measurement:
- The traditional measure of inequality is done through the Gini Coefficient.  Measured on a scale from 0 to 1.  The closer to 1 the less equal the distribution of income.  Conversely the closer to 0 the more equal the income distribution with 0 being a state where the whole population had the same income. 

- There are also less tangible measurements such as resentment, violence and political instability. 
The article gives the example of the Uganda entrepreneur who receives “juju” sticks from resentful fellow villagers outside of his home. 

Gini problems. 
1. One must be careful not to hold the Gini coefficient as the assumed standard for which all nations should strive.    It is only one measure.  The U.S. after all shares a Gini coefficient very similar to many African nations—but vastly different amounts of wealth per capita   
2. Furthermore, the Gini Coeff could rise in a poor developing country at the same time as less people are living in poverty (because the baseline could be raising). 
3.  For many African nations there isn’t even a Gini coefficient!  12/55—there are not even coefficient’s available for over 20% of the nations in Africa! 


Influences on inequality:
- Government graft and corruption, patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, clientilism
            This cronyism can amplify problems by putting people in power without the knowledge of education to do their job. 
- inefficient economic policies (ex. Fuel subsidies in Nigeria)
- Lack of transparency.
- lack of income tax
- Lack of global attention—much more focus on gap between Africa as a whole and other nations or between different African nations—both ignore the inequality within a nation’s borders. 
- Kuznets Hypothesis: in poor localized agricultural economies, incomes are relatively equal but an relative income gap widens as the economies grow and urbanize

Solutions for to bridge the gap?
- This question assumes something should be done or must be done!  This should not be assumed nor should it necessarily be the focus of economic reform in a nation. 
- While wide income gaps may be morally repugnant, the evidence that they promote political instability and violence is inconclusive.  There is equally persuasive arguments (Walker Connor for instance)  to be made that relative political inequality contribute to instability and violence more so than economic.  There is a big difference between resentment (a mental state) and violence (a physical state). 
- That said, to answer the question, there needs to be an increase in government capacity and accountability and transparency.  Instead of regressive sales taxes and import duties, fairly delineated income taxes could be instituted.  In many nations this isn’t done because of infrastructure limitations (both physical—roads etc…)  and banking limitations.  However, with the dominance of the mobile industry (and mobile banking) this offers methods for governments to implement and collect taxes efficiently and with accountability (fairly). 
- reduction in general subsidies (these unnecessarily benefit the affluent)
- refocus revenues to baseline raising services like clean water, better roads, primary education, prenatal vitamins and immunization—this is an interesting assertion by the author since it runs counter to addressing the inequality itself and is more focused on raising the baseline. 
- the poor must be given a greater stake.

-->
SUMMARY:  
               A non-traditional measure of income inequality is given at the outset of the article.  For one Ugandan entrepreneur that started a business that expanded far beyond his small village, the inequality was measured through resentment and “juju”sticks.  Despite employing many villagers and bringing development to his region, his neighbors begrudged him for owning a nicer house (and the only one with a generator). 
Traditionally income inequality is measured, however, by using the Gini Coefficient (GC).  The GC measures the distribution of income across the population of a country.  The GC is on a scale from 0 to 1—0 being a nation where everyone had the same amount of income and 1 being a nation where one person had all the income.  Most African nations score poorly (values in the .45 to .65 range).  There are three considerations, though, with the GC.  First, one must acknowledge that it’s only one economic measure.  This limits its utility—especially when one considers that the U. S. is routinely grade with a GC in the .5 range.  A secondary consideration builds on the first limitation—a nation’s GC can rise (typically considered a bad thing) while the number of people in poverty can lessen.  This means that a developing country can have a small group of people receiving more income (thereby raising the GC) but also at the same time increasing the amount of wealth within a country.  Finally, is the problem that 12/55 nations in Africa don’t even have a GC!  In 20% of African nations there’s not even enough data (or access) available to determine the income distrubtion. 
            The author delves into the myriad factors that promote this inequality.  Most of these happen to be the usual culprits: government corruption, graft, cronyism, clientilism, patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism.  All of these factors combine with a lack of transparency and physical infrastructure that strands the poor in a permanent economic stratum. 
            The question of what can be done to close this income gap is a valid one but it must be considered as to whether this is the right question.  Should a gap reduction be the economic focus?  This question brings to the forefront a valid argument made by Walker Connor who points out that perhaps political inequality is a more significant driver of political instability and violence that economic inequality.  Connor makes a persuasive argument worth considering—perhaps its better to work to bridge political equity and avoid violence than it is to focus on economic equality which may only serve to avoid resentment.  That said, to bridge the gap Zachary advocates striking regressive sales taxes and import duties in favor of a more fairly delineated income tax.  This serves to give the poor in a better a greater stake in its future.  There is little government expectation by a nation where no one pays income taxes.  Practically such a move requires significant physical infrastructure so that the government can reach its population in the hinterlands.  Most significantly, on a continent where most people are unbanked it requires harnessing existing technology.  This means embracing mobile banking (a move already being done in many nations) to collect and levy taxes.  On a larger scale bridging the gap requires a global shift in focus.  Too often Africa is treated as a country—monolithic nations that all require the same solutions to their problems.  The reality is that each nation needs a tailored and separate approach.  The focus needs to shift to the gaps inside each nation’s borders and not on comparing them to other nations.  


LINK:
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2010_7/16-23MR47.pdf 

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Notes on Economic Geography of Regional Integration (Gill & Deichmann)

Notes on Economic Geography of Regional Integration (Gill & Deichmann)

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

"To Regionally integrate or not to regionally integrate"

Overall Summary
The authors argue that traditional assessment is debating the wrong issue.  They are typically arguing which is better—global trade agreements or more focused regional approaches. 
2 False assumptions:
- Debate also assumes regional integration is just about preferential trade access
- It’s not an “either or” choice—regional integration can act as a stepping stone allowing small states to scale up their supply capacity—eventually giving them access to world markets. 

- Developing countries must not only encourage transformation across its industries and services but also spatially within its borders—this means balanced growth in density, distance and division.  This spatial distribution can help alleviate the fates of the “bottom billion” that are still accumulating to urban centers that don’t have access to the global markets—exacerbating their situation in ever growing slums.  This requires thoughtful and intentional government planning at the 3 spatial levels:
            Connective Infrastructure
            Blind Institutions
            Targeted Incentives

What countries benefit most?
They are quick to point out that ALL countries can benefit from this type of integration—however—small countries located far from world markets can certainly benefit most.    This usually means countries in Africa and Central Asia. 

Why?
Regional integration allows: boosted supply capacity by providing regional public goods and maximizing specialization
3 key principles:  Start Small, Think Global, Compensate the least fortunate

Start Small—clearly defined narrow areas of cooperation—EU started out as agreement by six countries on coal and stell

Think Global—No Islands!  Access to global markets is the key!  Small poor landlocked countries MUST have regional integration to LEAPFROG them into the global scene

Compensate the Least Fortunate—development means specialization and drives population to those centers.  This must be balanced with remittances as well as explicit compensation for infrastructure and social services (to promote even spatial growth).  Also requires local effort and government policies like revenue sharing to compensate the landlocked countries.

This requires a tailored approach (all to overcome thick economic borders):
1. Regions close to major world markets
            Common institutions key (thin economic borders)
2. Regions with big economies far from world markets
Regional infrastructure to increase home market which also increases access for small countries (connect)
3. Regions with small economies far from world markets
            Bottom billion countries.  Need ALL THREE I’s:  Institutions, Infrastructure and Incentives (increased support for infrastructure development for instance).  


SUMMARY: 
-->
The authors basic argument is that most economists have been asking the wrong questions and making the wrong assumptions.  This boils down to two common false assumptions:
1. Regional integration is just about preferential trade access
2.  Regional integration and global trade agreements are an “either” “or” proposition. 
They argue that these assumptions ignore the relationship between the two methods and that the approach needs to be tailored to each nations geography (both physical and economic).  To that end they argue for three combined approaches:
1.  Institutions blind to the physical borders
2. Connective regional infrastructure to enable trade
3.  Incentives for the more isolated power countries. 
Using these approaches can boost a small nation’s supply capacity and allow for the maximization of specialization. 
            The authors are quick to point out that while small geographically isolated underdeveloped countries are the ones most likely to benefit from this approach (most African and central Asian nations), ALL nations can benefit.  The key for the small nations disconnected from the global market is spatially purposeful development—meaning spatial balance for density, distance and division.  The common propensity is for the population of developing countries to migrate to the urban centers.  But when these urban centers are isolated without access to the global markets this just creates slums.  This is one of the central problems described by Collier in Bottom Billion.  This phenomenon follows Kuznet’s widely accepted hypothesis that describes how poor localized agricultural economies experience a rapidly widening income gap when urbanization occurs.   
Regional integration then offers these nations a springboard by which they can develop evenly and gain access to global markets eventually. 
            The authors advocate three central principles.  The first is to start small. They give the example of the European Union which originally began as a trade agreement between three nations regarding coal and mining.  A narrow focus allows countries to develop evenly and to focus on full economic integration.    The next principle to think globally.  The end result is never solely regional integration but is instead using that connective infrastructure to leapfrog a small cutoff country into the global economy.  The last principle is to compensate the poor or disadvantaged.  This means that a government must be purposeful in balancing urban development by raising the baseline of the physical infrastructure in the nation.  Practically this means paving roads and ensuring an expansion of baseline social services.  This can also take place in the form of remittances sent back home to the countryside which when used well can spur development there.
            Overall, the authors stress the need to overcome the thick economic borders of many states.  They describe how large nations with access to the global economy benefit from integrated institutions.  They add that large nations far from the global market can expand their reach through a connective regional infrastructure.  Lastly they add that the small nations far from the global market can benefit a combination of institutions, infrastructure and incentives. 

LINK:
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2008/12/deichmann.htm

           

Thursday, November 22, 2012

Notes on "Nigeria's Shot at Redemption"


BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

This is a great article I read for my international economics class.  It stands as sage advice for newly resource rich countries or potentially resource rich countries like Madagascar.

Mistakes made:
- The mistakes left Nigeria saddled with enormous debt
- 1973-4 and 79-80 gave Nigeria $300 billion windfall entre 1970-2001
- They didn’t account for the two givens of oil windfalls: non-renewability and price volatility
- They focused on the wrong things (or didn’t focus broadly enough) and assumed that oil prices would always rise—didn’t account for price volatility. 
-  In an effort to avoid Dutch Disease (deterioration of non-resource traded good sectors due to abundance and development of natural resource sector at its expense) they ignored the dangers of debt overhang.  This means: credibility gap and inability to attract foreign financing despite potential for high RoR investments. 
- corruption and bad governance degraded public institutions
- Failure to correct for inflation each year

Lessons Learned:
- even brief mismanagement can yield decades of hangover effects.  Management of an oil windfall is paramount
- need for oil-price-based fiscal rule: disconnects oil revenue from government expenditure—this dampens the effect that pricing changes can have on the overall economy by limiting appreciation and volatility of real exchange rate (RER).  This was signed into law.
- OPBFR is not enough since even accruing oil revenues still means asset depletion, therefore gov spending requires a robust rate of return which requires a:
- due process mechanism:  competitive bidding for gov contracts.  Also NEEDS still a systematic cost-benefit analysis system for public investments—they did a good job of this when they bought back their Paris Club debt in 2005. 
- governments must anticipate that oil prices won’t always rise and accordingly must adopt conservative fiscal policies.
- corrective measures can’t be limited to economic policy but must extend to embrace good governance and transparency—the EITI++ rating is essential in this as well as its publication of government revenues. 

3 actions: responsible gov. investments with high RoR, future generations benefit assurance and management of oil price volatility. 
3 outcomes: avoid debt overhang, lower volatility of RER, diversified economy to include non-oil industry. 

What's a new (better) approach to oil revenue management?
- oil price boom of the early 21st century gives Nigeria a shot at redemption that may be a worthwhile model for other countries to emulate. 
- management must have it’s eye on future generations so that they can benefit from a resource that will eventually disappear—this is done with a healthy and diversified economy and low indebtedness. 
- Nigeria did this in two steps:  first it tackled corruption and political stability (99-2003), then it expanded its focus (2003-2007) to economic and anti-corruption reform (emphasizing, fiscal, structural and institutional and governance reforms measures).
- EITI- Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—voluntary measures to promote transparency and accountability.  Country must publish what it pay and make public revenues from oil, gas, mining.  Nigeria one of first adopters in May 2007—they have also exceeded this minimum and set a basis for other countries. 
- reforms carry momentum which must be capitalized.  It also requires political leadership to break the cycle of corruption and put things like OPBFR into law

Others:
- Holland 1950’s discovered natural gas in north sea.  Brings a lot of dollars into country.  Real exchange rate productivity of economy

 - Distributional fund is the right way to do it.  Alaska has done this to a certain extent with a certain amount of revenues getting earmarked and the citizens getting a check.  Subisidies are inefficient because they don’t target specific disadvantaged groups—everyone (including the rich) get benefit of subsidy. 

SUMMARY: 
-->
      Nigeria experienced an oil boom from 1973-4 and then another from 1979-80.  In all they experienced a $300 billion windfall from 1979-2001.  They squandered this windfall in four ways.  First, they failed to account for the two givens of the oil industry: it is non-renewable and it is subject to price volatility.  Second, they focused too much on the wrong thing.  The government was so worried about combatting Dutch disease (i.e., an overdevelopment of an extractive industry at the expense of the non-traded good sector) that they completed ignored the significance of the threat of debt overhang.  Third, they failed to correct for ensuing rising inflation each year (as the Real Exchange Rate skyrocketed in appreciation 56%).  Finally, rampant corruption and poor governance only served to amplify all of these problems. 
            All of these mistakes combined to illustrate that even a short period of mismanagement can produce decades of hangover effects.  Significantly the Nigerian governments actions at the end of the 90’s offer valuable lessons with regard to oil revenue management.  The biggest step the government took was signing into law the Oil Price Based Fiscal Rule (OPBFR).  The law effectively disconnected the oil revenue from government spending.  This served to dampen the volatility of RER appreciation.  They were also one of the first nations to voluntarily join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007.  This initiative made revenues from oil, gas and mining all available to the public.  This transparency encouraged fiduciary responsibility throughout all sectors.   Furthermore they were proactive in combatting their debt overhang.  A major stride came in 2006 when they bought back their Paris Club debt. 
            All in all, Nigeria handled their new oil windfall in measured steps.  The first step took place from 1999-2003 as they tackled corruption and built political stability.  Once progress had been made there they enacted major reforms in the anti-corruption and economic arena.  These efforts served to diversify the economy, promote RER stability and eliminate debt overhang.  The final step was (and continues to be) to harness the momentum of change.  This requires political leadership as the government must be kept on task in diversifying their investments from oil revenue to insure a high rate of return.  This return is necessary to give their future generations the assurance that the benefits from the oil will last after the resource itself is long gone.  One significant shortfall of the Nigerian government not mentioned in the article is their embrace of gasoline subsidies for the general public.  This measure robs their government coffers of billions of dollars and benefits myriad individuals in Nigeria that have no need for a subsidy.  They would be far better served to target those they benefit with a yearly distribution of revenue from the oil industry as is done in Alaska. 






Wednesday, November 21, 2012

"5" from Rabearivelo's From the Night (Nadika Tamin'ny Alina)

"5" from Rabearivelo's From the Night (Nadika Tamin'ny Alina)

Love this poem, especially that last line--what a raw and true sentiment.

5
You sleep, my darling;
you sleep in her arms, my youngest child
I do not see your eyes, heavy with night,
which shine like beads of real gold
or like ripe grapes.

A gust of fine wind half-opens our door,
puffs up your thin dress
and ruffles your hair,
then sweeps a paper from my table,
which I chase to the threshold.

I lift my head,
and there in my hand is the poem just begun:
your eyes blink in the sky
and I call the poem: STARS.



Tuesday, November 20, 2012

"51" from Rabearivelo's "Old Songs From Imerina Lands"

"51" from Rabearivelo's Old Songs From Imerina Lands

-- There, to the west, is a tree that has little pretty leaves.
-- It's not the tree that has little pretty leaves, but it is us, here, who have a pretty little love.

et en Francais

-- La, a l'ouest, il y a un arbre qui a des petites et jolies feuilles.
-- Ce n'est pas pas l'arbre qui a des petites et jolies feuilles, mais c'est nous, ici, qui avons un joli petit amour

















Monday, November 19, 2012

My Complete Notes on Hartley's "The Zanzibar Chest"

Notes on The Zanzibar Chest by Aidan Hartley

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 



I've embedded my complete notes below.  Previously all of these notes had been spread out over 15 posts or so.

From time to time, God causes men to be born—and thou art one of them—who have a lust to go
abroad at the risk of their lives and discover news—today it may be of far-off things, tomorrow of
some hidden mountain, and the next day of some nearby men who have done a foolishness against
the state. These souls are very few; and of these few, not more than ten are of the best.
-Kim

I love Hartley’s opening quote. If there were ever an engraving to be mounted on the wall of my
hypothetical office it would be this . Part of the path to achievement is often began just by the act
of writing your goal down: to be one of the ‘ten best’ FAOs, foreign policy experts, africanists.

 

LINKS:
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/09/africa-book-recommendation-zanzibar.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/following-adm-stavridis-advice-on.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chronicles-continues.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_10.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continues.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_11.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_13.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_17.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_19.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continues.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/03/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/03/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_22.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/05/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html

Friday, November 16, 2012

Zanzibar Chest Chronicles pages 250-265

My complete notes are here.


p. 250 Aiden describes first day of UNITAF UN Task Force for OPERATION RESTORE HOPE. 
This was the only western military intervention done for strictly humanitarian reason.  Consisted of “battalions for peace.”  It would be interested to compare these with Beebe’s idea of ‘engagement brigades.’

p.252 “Africa Wins Again—AWA” Marine captains description of what would happen after they would deliver food, only to have it taken from the peasants by the militia once the marines left.

p.253  “At least I get to do what they taught me in the foreign service and have drinks with a room full of mass murderers.” –John Fox on a cocktail party the UN threw for the warloads in Addis.  Aydiid were invited to peace conferences instead of prosecuted or killed. 

p. 256  Mogadishu is called “Skinnyland” by the marines and is separated physically and emotionally from their base at the airfield.  Aiden describes this early time with female USArmy soldiers on the beach in bikinis with their M-16 slung over their soldiers.  This would be a key image in a movie version of the book. 

p. 257 MAY 1993 UNOSOM (UNISOM) takes command from the marines.  SC resoluation 814 Peacekeeping troops given Chapter VII ROE:  permits them to disarm militias and police cease-fire, ‘take appropriate action” to prevent resumption of violence.  It’s commanded by General Cevik Bir.  Real command though was by: ADM Howe (RET) as civilian special envoy and MAJ Gen Montgomery—he compared Mogadishu to Idniana Jones and the Temple of Doom. 

p. 263  “Experience is an art to be studied rather than a haphazard process.” Lord Belhaven

p. 265 As Aiden retraces his father and davey’s steps 60 years later through the deserts of Arabia he recollects another quote by Belhaven:

7 books for a GOFO/CEO/Executive to read about Africa or Africa Starter Reading List



UPDATED 17 APR 2016

First off, for the uninitiated I should address the term GOFO.  GOFO stands for General Officer Flag Officer and technically it should (in my opinion) spelled GO/FO but it typically is not.

I was once asked by a flag officer to recommend three books that he should read prior to being assigned to the Africa AOR (Area of Responsibility).  I don't remember exactly what I told him but I am sure I included a few of the 6 books below.  

In recently updating my massive "THE Africa Reading List", I realized that its length can be overwhelming. For the person newly assigned to Africa, it may as well be written in Chinese (or Swahili).  

For the aspiring Africanist I have put together my completely biased starter list:  6 7 books (in no particular order) that will not only inform and educate you but more importantly will pique your appetite to read more!


1. It Happened on the Way to War by Rye Barcott
Rye wasn't a FAO (he was HUMINT) but his work in Kenya is instructive of the potential wielded by well-informed, educated and locally-connected military officers.

2. Africa Since Independence by Paul Nugent
There is no riveting history of the entire continent of 55 countries out there but Nugent does a decent job. “Decolonization could never have simply been the negation of colonization.” I have pretty extensive notes on this book here that give the big ideas of many of the chapters: 13 Pages of Notes/Summary of Nugent's Book

3. The Zanzibar Chest by Aidan Hartley.  
This was the first book I ever read on Africa.  It was recommended to me by a POLAD at a State Department function.  Hartley's writing is superb and made me fall in love with the continent.

4. The Shadow of the Sun by Ryszard Kapuscinski.
Beautiful writing.  In the foreword to this book he writes: "Africa does not exist."

5. The Ultimate Weapon is No Weapon by Shannon Beebe and Mary Kaldor
He's got a great chapter on Africa that is challenging and thought-provoking.  Tragically, LTC Beebe died in a plane crash in August 2011.  

6. Getting Somalia Wrong by Mary Harper
Because everyone loves to talk about Somalia--now you will actually be able to speak intelligently on the subject.

7.  All Our Names by Dinaw Mengestu.
This is the great African novel.  Beautifully written, comprehensive in scope--with all the timeless elements like heartbreak, identity and (lost) love.

For reference only:
Africans: The History of the Continent by John Iliffe
His thesis is heavily tied to population growth as a major variable in overall history. He places a heavy emphasis on the role of of social organizations and horizontal structures. Extensive notes available on this book here: Notes on Iliffe