FAO Quotables

"But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist."
-Anne Applebaum

Tuesday, August 14, 2012

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft by Lauren, Craig and George

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of our Time






Notes on Force and Statecraft

Introduction:

Dilemma of Force and Statecraft is when/how/if to use force—force that can be so dangerous

FAO *Diplomacy statue by Alves good model for FAOs*

*Does a superpower likes the US actually damage the world order and stability?

*Collective cooperation requires:
            - common interests and competition
            - structure appropriate to size
            - common values and procedures within the structure
            - adaptability


CHAPTER 1: THE EMERGENCE OF DIPLOMACY AND THE GREAT POWERS

Intro:
Diplomacy: the system of regulated and organized contacts between states which Europe has evolvedone of her most important gifts to the world

The Early techniques, instruments and ideas of diplomacy:

- From 6th century B.C., the Greeks developed the practice of choosing ambassadors—they have no battleships at their disposaltheir only weapons are words and opportunities (Demosthenes).
- Romans developed legal concepts like the law of nations, the law that’s commons to all mankind, and the importance of respecting legal obligations and honor treaties.
- Following the Romans, the Byzantine empire organized a special permanent governmental department to deal with foreign affairs.
- The Venetians (15th century) established permanent diplomatic missions with a systemized diplomatic service.
- This all led to the creation of political science—notably among the creators of this discipline was Machiavelli

States and Raison d’Etat in the 17th Century

- War shaped the formation, character and development of modern states
- Transformation began with the 30 years war (1618-48) and the Treaty of Westphalia
- The emergence of the modern state due to:
            Effective armed forces, able bureaucracy and theory of state that defined political interest in rational/practical terms.
- Rise of the raison d’etat = a state is more than its ruler, crown, prince and peoplethe state above all else!      
            EX: Cardinal Richelieu used this idea ruthlessly. 
            *French becomes the lingua franca of diplomacy itself
- Diplomats job = maintaining effective communication between the two princes, delivering letters and in protecting his Master’s subjects and conserving his interests.

- Overwhelming French power led to alliances to balance the power and to the Nine Years War (1688-97)

War and Competition in the 18th Century:

this Age of Reason also witnessed an anarchy against all
- Began with Great Northern War of 1700-1721 (supremacy in the Baltic region)
            Peter the Great brought Russia into being as a modern state to do win at the Battle            of Poltava
- 1713/14 Treaty of Utrecht = first European treaty to mention BoP
- Callieres On the Manner of Negotiating with Princes 1716—best writing ever on diplomatic methodology
            *Cautions again large diplomatic conferences and reliance on lawyers
            *Foreign relations should be done by trained professionals vice politically- connected amateurs
Diplomats should be carefully educated in the lessons of history and trained in diplomatic skills and techniques, and should know exactly the state of the military forces both on land and sea.
- Frederick the Great stated: Negotiating without arms produce as little impression as musical scores without instruments.
- The rape of Silesia by Frederick is a great example of raison d’etat personified
- It took the French revolution and ensuing Napoleonic Wars to shock Europe into collaborationdefeating French forces during the Battle of Nations at Leipzig in 1813
            *Following 1815 Battle of Waterloo this collaboration stood as basis for first          international system based upon BoP for peace and security

CHAPTER 2: THE CLASSICAL SYSTEM OF DIPLOMACY, 1815-1914

Intro:
- efforts here produced a period of unprecedented peacethe classical system of diplomacy

Building a System with a BoP and a Concert:
- Congress of Vienna- major task not to just end past hostilities by to make a viable international system of peace and security
            *Castlereagh and Metternich were the two principal architects to tackle: how to     put power into the service of peace and security
            *The generality of dissatisfaction is a condition of stability because it ensures no     one party is totally satisfied and ensure relative  security (Kissinger)

- This all required a corporate buy-in though and to that end they made the Quadruple Alliance (soon added France to it) and the Concert of Europe
- In every crisis from 1815-1854 they worked together to find solutions to prevent war, and to minimize the wars of 1850s and 60s
- Why could they do this?!
            *Unusually skilled statesmen, and free from pressures of transparent democracies             to some extent
- Clausewitz’s On War: war is the continuation of political activity by other means.  The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it and those means can’t ever be in isolation from their purpose.

Change and an Experiment with a Defensive Alliance System

- Following revolutions of 1848, rise of nationalism created a rise of realpolitiker
            Statecraft is only defined in the exercise and application of raw power
            *Example of the folly of this being the senseless killings in the Crimean War
- the lessons of one generation are not always accepted by another
- This time period saw the widespread acceptance of Darwinism and rise jingoism

-  All this concerned Bismark, who wanted to puruse safety-politics
            *So he created an elaborate defensive alliance system: maintain equilibrium of  forces that was very complicated (and weak because of its complexity)
- 1864 Geneva Convention signed
- 1878 Congress of Berlin prevents danger in the Balkans
- 1884-85 Conference of Berlin called to forestall possibility of crisis arising

Further Change and an Experiment with Bipolar Alignment

- This change started with German-Russian alliance was severed in 1879
            *Poor German leadership launched Weltpolitik = make Germany a global power
- Evolved into post 1907 Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria, and Italy) and Triple Entente (Britain, France and Russia). 

Characteristics of the System

- Composition, numbers and types of actors
- Structure = balance among Great Powersbut this requires flexibility
- Shared goals and objectives
- Statesmen had to develop norms, methods and rules of accommodation
- Wars if fought with limited means for limited political objectives could be legitimate instruments of policy
- Reliance on just war theory and professional diplomats




p. 137-143 Lessons of History and Knowledge for Statecraft

“What is the good of experience if you do no reflect” Frederick the Great

However, Clausewitz warns against those “who never rise above the anecdote”

*Habit of mind (thinking in focused ways about history) categories:
            - Importance in history of individual people (presidents, ambassadors etc)
            - Be attentive to process (the cause and effect of events)
            - The wide range of possibilities (reactions and outcomes)
            - Develop perspective and proportion (knowing what is/isn’t important)


p. 157-160 Congress of Vienna 1814-1815

- everyone shares vital interest in reaching mutually acceptable agreements about how best to create and maintain viable international system to regulate patterns of conflict and cooperation
- 4 major principles: compensation, legitimacy (respect for pre-Napoleonic rulers’ thrones), BoP, and ethics/human rights
- Agreed to reduction in size of standing armies, mutual restraint, buffer zones, neutral areas like Beligium and Switzerland
- Quadruple alliance agrees to meet regularly as the Concert of Europe

P. 180-182 COLLECTIVE SECURITY FOR THE POST-1815 SETTLEMENT

- 1814 Treaty of Chaumont establishes system of collective security
- Metternich and Castlereagh see wisdom of force and statecraft combined
- Criteria of armed force lends credibility to the system of Great Powers
-  Deterrence through collective security is difficult though when combined with BoP structure and shared goals, it was successful

P. 203-206 AMERICAN GUNBOAT DIPLOMACY, 1852-1854

- Gunships better suited to coercive diplomacy—they can be easily dispatched and withdrawn and displayed and controlled—best uniter of force with persuasion
- 1852, President Fillmore sends Commodore Perry to get Japan to open their country
-  He sails there in July 1853 and does inspire fear, he issues US desires and returns in March 1854
            *Results in 1854 Treaty of Kanagawa: Japan accepts incentives and opens 2 ports            for supplying and establishes consular privileges

P. 225-228 BISMARCK AS AN HONEST BROKER IN THE CRISIS OF 1878

- Crisis stemmed from slow disintegration of Ottoman empire, human rights violations and Great Power ambitions in the Balkans.  (Russia-British fight)
- Congress of Berlin in June 1878 meets for a month.  Bismarck is the honest broker of peace
*key is following operational principles of crisis management; Bismarck deliberately built in pauses during negotiations
- Came to understand necessity of mutual restraint and limited objectives. 

P. 228-232 THE GUNS OF AUGUST, 1914

- crisis of 1914 reveals tragic inept mismanagement
- leaders cared more about not appearing weak
- The crisis actually unfolded slowly over 6 week period:  Assassination is on 28 Jun and Austria declares war on Serbia 28 July 1914. 
- it was a pattern of mobilization and escalation
*Most serious mistake in crisis management is for a leader to believe that there is nothing they can do to prevent warnever say inevitable
            **Moltke makes this mistake when he tells the Kaiser that he can’t change his plan for a two-front war
-  Little effort was made to coordinate diplomatic and military actions or communications as part of an overarching strategy
-  BECAUSE OF THESE MISTAKES a local dispute in the Balkans led to invasion of Belgium and WWI which would eventually involve US, China and Japan. 

No comments:

Post a Comment