FAO Quotables

"But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist."
-Anne Applebaum

Showing posts with label economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label economy. Show all posts

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Notes on Inequality in Africa Article


BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

NOTES:
Typical inequality measurement:
- The traditional measure of inequality is done through the Gini Coefficient.  Measured on a scale from 0 to 1.  The closer to 1 the less equal the distribution of income.  Conversely the closer to 0 the more equal the income distribution with 0 being a state where the whole population had the same income. 

- There are also less tangible measurements such as resentment, violence and political instability. 
The article gives the example of the Uganda entrepreneur who receives “juju” sticks from resentful fellow villagers outside of his home. 

Gini problems. 
1. One must be careful not to hold the Gini coefficient as the assumed standard for which all nations should strive.    It is only one measure.  The U.S. after all shares a Gini coefficient very similar to many African nations—but vastly different amounts of wealth per capita   
2. Furthermore, the Gini Coeff could rise in a poor developing country at the same time as less people are living in poverty (because the baseline could be raising). 
3.  For many African nations there isn’t even a Gini coefficient!  12/55—there are not even coefficient’s available for over 20% of the nations in Africa! 


Influences on inequality:
- Government graft and corruption, patrimonialism, neopatrimonialism, clientilism
            This cronyism can amplify problems by putting people in power without the knowledge of education to do their job. 
- inefficient economic policies (ex. Fuel subsidies in Nigeria)
- Lack of transparency.
- lack of income tax
- Lack of global attention—much more focus on gap between Africa as a whole and other nations or between different African nations—both ignore the inequality within a nation’s borders. 
- Kuznets Hypothesis: in poor localized agricultural economies, incomes are relatively equal but an relative income gap widens as the economies grow and urbanize

Solutions for to bridge the gap?
- This question assumes something should be done or must be done!  This should not be assumed nor should it necessarily be the focus of economic reform in a nation. 
- While wide income gaps may be morally repugnant, the evidence that they promote political instability and violence is inconclusive.  There is equally persuasive arguments (Walker Connor for instance)  to be made that relative political inequality contribute to instability and violence more so than economic.  There is a big difference between resentment (a mental state) and violence (a physical state). 
- That said, to answer the question, there needs to be an increase in government capacity and accountability and transparency.  Instead of regressive sales taxes and import duties, fairly delineated income taxes could be instituted.  In many nations this isn’t done because of infrastructure limitations (both physical—roads etc…)  and banking limitations.  However, with the dominance of the mobile industry (and mobile banking) this offers methods for governments to implement and collect taxes efficiently and with accountability (fairly). 
- reduction in general subsidies (these unnecessarily benefit the affluent)
- refocus revenues to baseline raising services like clean water, better roads, primary education, prenatal vitamins and immunization—this is an interesting assertion by the author since it runs counter to addressing the inequality itself and is more focused on raising the baseline. 
- the poor must be given a greater stake.

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SUMMARY:  
               A non-traditional measure of income inequality is given at the outset of the article.  For one Ugandan entrepreneur that started a business that expanded far beyond his small village, the inequality was measured through resentment and “juju”sticks.  Despite employing many villagers and bringing development to his region, his neighbors begrudged him for owning a nicer house (and the only one with a generator). 
Traditionally income inequality is measured, however, by using the Gini Coefficient (GC).  The GC measures the distribution of income across the population of a country.  The GC is on a scale from 0 to 1—0 being a nation where everyone had the same amount of income and 1 being a nation where one person had all the income.  Most African nations score poorly (values in the .45 to .65 range).  There are three considerations, though, with the GC.  First, one must acknowledge that it’s only one economic measure.  This limits its utility—especially when one considers that the U. S. is routinely grade with a GC in the .5 range.  A secondary consideration builds on the first limitation—a nation’s GC can rise (typically considered a bad thing) while the number of people in poverty can lessen.  This means that a developing country can have a small group of people receiving more income (thereby raising the GC) but also at the same time increasing the amount of wealth within a country.  Finally, is the problem that 12/55 nations in Africa don’t even have a GC!  In 20% of African nations there’s not even enough data (or access) available to determine the income distrubtion. 
            The author delves into the myriad factors that promote this inequality.  Most of these happen to be the usual culprits: government corruption, graft, cronyism, clientilism, patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism.  All of these factors combine with a lack of transparency and physical infrastructure that strands the poor in a permanent economic stratum. 
            The question of what can be done to close this income gap is a valid one but it must be considered as to whether this is the right question.  Should a gap reduction be the economic focus?  This question brings to the forefront a valid argument made by Walker Connor who points out that perhaps political inequality is a more significant driver of political instability and violence that economic inequality.  Connor makes a persuasive argument worth considering—perhaps its better to work to bridge political equity and avoid violence than it is to focus on economic equality which may only serve to avoid resentment.  That said, to bridge the gap Zachary advocates striking regressive sales taxes and import duties in favor of a more fairly delineated income tax.  This serves to give the poor in a better a greater stake in its future.  There is little government expectation by a nation where no one pays income taxes.  Practically such a move requires significant physical infrastructure so that the government can reach its population in the hinterlands.  Most significantly, on a continent where most people are unbanked it requires harnessing existing technology.  This means embracing mobile banking (a move already being done in many nations) to collect and levy taxes.  On a larger scale bridging the gap requires a global shift in focus.  Too often Africa is treated as a country—monolithic nations that all require the same solutions to their problems.  The reality is that each nation needs a tailored and separate approach.  The focus needs to shift to the gaps inside each nation’s borders and not on comparing them to other nations.  


LINK:
http://www.milkeninstitute.org/publications/review/2010_7/16-23MR47.pdf 

Thursday, November 22, 2012

Notes on "Nigeria's Shot at Redemption"


BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

This is a great article I read for my international economics class.  It stands as sage advice for newly resource rich countries or potentially resource rich countries like Madagascar.

Mistakes made:
- The mistakes left Nigeria saddled with enormous debt
- 1973-4 and 79-80 gave Nigeria $300 billion windfall entre 1970-2001
- They didn’t account for the two givens of oil windfalls: non-renewability and price volatility
- They focused on the wrong things (or didn’t focus broadly enough) and assumed that oil prices would always rise—didn’t account for price volatility. 
-  In an effort to avoid Dutch Disease (deterioration of non-resource traded good sectors due to abundance and development of natural resource sector at its expense) they ignored the dangers of debt overhang.  This means: credibility gap and inability to attract foreign financing despite potential for high RoR investments. 
- corruption and bad governance degraded public institutions
- Failure to correct for inflation each year

Lessons Learned:
- even brief mismanagement can yield decades of hangover effects.  Management of an oil windfall is paramount
- need for oil-price-based fiscal rule: disconnects oil revenue from government expenditure—this dampens the effect that pricing changes can have on the overall economy by limiting appreciation and volatility of real exchange rate (RER).  This was signed into law.
- OPBFR is not enough since even accruing oil revenues still means asset depletion, therefore gov spending requires a robust rate of return which requires a:
- due process mechanism:  competitive bidding for gov contracts.  Also NEEDS still a systematic cost-benefit analysis system for public investments—they did a good job of this when they bought back their Paris Club debt in 2005. 
- governments must anticipate that oil prices won’t always rise and accordingly must adopt conservative fiscal policies.
- corrective measures can’t be limited to economic policy but must extend to embrace good governance and transparency—the EITI++ rating is essential in this as well as its publication of government revenues. 

3 actions: responsible gov. investments with high RoR, future generations benefit assurance and management of oil price volatility. 
3 outcomes: avoid debt overhang, lower volatility of RER, diversified economy to include non-oil industry. 

What's a new (better) approach to oil revenue management?
- oil price boom of the early 21st century gives Nigeria a shot at redemption that may be a worthwhile model for other countries to emulate. 
- management must have it’s eye on future generations so that they can benefit from a resource that will eventually disappear—this is done with a healthy and diversified economy and low indebtedness. 
- Nigeria did this in two steps:  first it tackled corruption and political stability (99-2003), then it expanded its focus (2003-2007) to economic and anti-corruption reform (emphasizing, fiscal, structural and institutional and governance reforms measures).
- EITI- Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative—voluntary measures to promote transparency and accountability.  Country must publish what it pay and make public revenues from oil, gas, mining.  Nigeria one of first adopters in May 2007—they have also exceeded this minimum and set a basis for other countries. 
- reforms carry momentum which must be capitalized.  It also requires political leadership to break the cycle of corruption and put things like OPBFR into law

Others:
- Holland 1950’s discovered natural gas in north sea.  Brings a lot of dollars into country.  Real exchange rate productivity of economy

 - Distributional fund is the right way to do it.  Alaska has done this to a certain extent with a certain amount of revenues getting earmarked and the citizens getting a check.  Subisidies are inefficient because they don’t target specific disadvantaged groups—everyone (including the rich) get benefit of subsidy. 

SUMMARY: 
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      Nigeria experienced an oil boom from 1973-4 and then another from 1979-80.  In all they experienced a $300 billion windfall from 1979-2001.  They squandered this windfall in four ways.  First, they failed to account for the two givens of the oil industry: it is non-renewable and it is subject to price volatility.  Second, they focused too much on the wrong thing.  The government was so worried about combatting Dutch disease (i.e., an overdevelopment of an extractive industry at the expense of the non-traded good sector) that they completed ignored the significance of the threat of debt overhang.  Third, they failed to correct for ensuing rising inflation each year (as the Real Exchange Rate skyrocketed in appreciation 56%).  Finally, rampant corruption and poor governance only served to amplify all of these problems. 
            All of these mistakes combined to illustrate that even a short period of mismanagement can produce decades of hangover effects.  Significantly the Nigerian governments actions at the end of the 90’s offer valuable lessons with regard to oil revenue management.  The biggest step the government took was signing into law the Oil Price Based Fiscal Rule (OPBFR).  The law effectively disconnected the oil revenue from government spending.  This served to dampen the volatility of RER appreciation.  They were also one of the first nations to voluntarily join the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) in 2007.  This initiative made revenues from oil, gas and mining all available to the public.  This transparency encouraged fiduciary responsibility throughout all sectors.   Furthermore they were proactive in combatting their debt overhang.  A major stride came in 2006 when they bought back their Paris Club debt. 
            All in all, Nigeria handled their new oil windfall in measured steps.  The first step took place from 1999-2003 as they tackled corruption and built political stability.  Once progress had been made there they enacted major reforms in the anti-corruption and economic arena.  These efforts served to diversify the economy, promote RER stability and eliminate debt overhang.  The final step was (and continues to be) to harness the momentum of change.  This requires political leadership as the government must be kept on task in diversifying their investments from oil revenue to insure a high rate of return.  This return is necessary to give their future generations the assurance that the benefits from the oil will last after the resource itself is long gone.  One significant shortfall of the Nigerian government not mentioned in the article is their embrace of gasoline subsidies for the general public.  This measure robs their government coffers of billions of dollars and benefits myriad individuals in Nigeria that have no need for a subsidy.  They would be far better served to target those they benefit with a yearly distribution of revenue from the oil industry as is done in Alaska. 






Friday, November 2, 2012

NGO Handbook, Africa's Pulse, CCA EJournal


Below are three resources to check out over the weekend:)  

Incidentally, the World Bank has my favorite bookstore in DC.  I wrote about it here.

NGO Handbook 
The NGO Handbook is published by the State Department's Bureau of International Information Programs.

World Bank
ANALYSIS - Africa's Pulse, Volume 6 (Oct 12)
Africa Pulse is published by the Office of the Chief Economist of the Africa Region at the World Bank. It provides analysis of economic issues shaping the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Corporate Council on Africa (CCA)
NEWSLETTER – Africa eJournal (Nov 12)


Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Nazis chasing butterflies, South Sudanese Insects, West African Coup Disease

What I'm reading today:




The former rebel Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) has ruled South Sudan since it seceded from Sudan in July 2011.
President Bashir described the SPLM as "insects" that needed to be eliminated.
Fighting between the two countries has now spread to another area, further adding to fears of all-out war.
South Sudan seized the Heglig oil field - generally recognised as Sudanese territory - eight days ago. On Tuesday fighting broke out north of Aweil in South Sudan, about 100 miles (160km) west of Heglig.
Generally recognized by whom?  What lazy reporting!  I know for a fact that SPLA leadership would dispute this "general recognition".






Secret files from British colonial rule - once thought lost - have been released by the government, one year after they came to light in a High Court challenge to disclose them.
Some of the papers cover controversial episodes: the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, the evacuation of the Chagos Islands, and the Malayan Emergency.
In particular, the first batch of papers reveal:
Official fears that Nazis - pretending to catch butterflies - were plotting to invade East Africa in 1938



It took a while but we in West Africa learnt the very hard way that, given the opportunity, uniformed men are certainly more cruel and just as corrupt as their civilian compatriots.
The surprising thing was how easily the coups were accepted:
  • A group of soldiers seizes the studios of the state (and only) broadcaster and make their announcement about having come to save us
  • The entire population falls into line and members of parliament and ministers of state give themselves up to be locked up in police stations and prisons for months and even years


Mauritania is experiencing a vibrant protest movement touching many sectors of political and civil society. Each day seems to bring fresh reports of demonstrations or rallies, sit-ins or gatherings. A member of the 22 states that make up the Arab League, with a complex mix of issues stemming from political, social and financial inequality, Mauritania was naturally caught up in the wave of uprisings that have swept across the region since 2010.