Notes from Essays in "Conflict After the Cold War"

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Notes from Conflict After the Cold War

Thucydides, The Melian Dialogue (from History of the Peloponnesian War)

p. 56-60

*One of Melians fundamental mistakes was not bringing the situation before the people but instead keeping the decision making and information to the elite. 

- Melians at the beginning:

            As we see you com to judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is war, if we prove to have right on our side and refuse to submit, and in the contrary case, slavery.

- Athenian response:

            Right is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must

            Your friendship (that they tried to offer) will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness and your enmity of our power.

*In this dialogue you have a decided realist argument proffered by the Athenians. 

- Other potential lessons:

            Melians: difference between idealism and misperception/wishful thinking

            Athenians: drivers of wider interests (Sparta), difference in ethics of power, fidelity of allies

- NATO Parallels?  NATO goes beyond a mere alliance of interests though

MACHIAVELLI, DOING EVIL IN ORDER TO DO GOOD (FROM THE PRINCE) P. 61-65

Of the things for which men, and especially princes, are praised and blamed:

-  profession of goodness requires close contact with those who aren’t good

-  he should be prudent enough to avoid the scandal of myriad vices—the exception being those that give greater security

Of cruelty and clemency, and whether it is better to be loved or feared:

- better to be cruel to a few than to allow disorder to arise where widespread bloodshed is required

- new states are always full of dangers

- better to be feared than loved….love is a chain of obligation broken whenever needed, whereas fear is a dread of punishment that NEVER fails

- abstain from interfering with citizens’ property over death

- with an army though, a prince must not mind being cruel—otherwise he won’t be able to keep his army united and orderly

- men love at their own free will but fear at the will of the prince…so a prince must rely on what is in his power, not the power of others

­**Prince has an ethical requirement to uphold the interest and security of the state

In What Way Princes Must Keep Faith:

- must know howå to use both beast and man—they are interconnected

- also must be the fox and the lion

- most important for a prince to appear to be merciful, faithful, humane, sincere and religious,  than to actually be both***this could actually also be a critique of his time.

- don’t deviate from what is good, but be able to do evil when in a corner

- the ends justify the means!

MACHIAVELLI, MONEY IS NOT THE SINEWS OF WAR (FROM DISCOURSE)

P. 268-270

- everyone can start a war at their pleasure, but can’t so finish it

- money is nothing without a devoted army—in fact it makes a prince more likely to be plundered

- war is made with iron, not gold

- sinews of war are good soldiers not gold—money is necessary but also secondary

- 3 keys to success in war:  plenty of good troops, sagacious commanders and good fortune

HOBBES, THE STATE OF NATURE AND THE STATE OF WAR (LEVIATHAN)

P. 66-69

Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Felicity and Misery:

- State of nature is awful

- men by nature are physically equal—necessity creates rivalry

- from equality proceeds difference—mutual desire creates enemies of the desirers

- from diffidence war—naturally seek to extract greater value than others (security dilemma)

- 3 principle causes of quarrel: 

            competition- gain, violence

            diffidence- safety, family, property

            glory- reputation

- we are always at war and must protect ourselves from one another (war is not actual fighting but the threat of fighting)

- in such a war, nothing is unjust—where no law, no justice

- what brings about peace:  fear of death, desire of things for commodious living and a hope to obtain those things. 

Of Other Laws of Nature:

- the third law of nature—justice

- men perform their convenant made—without a covenant there is no justice

-  constituation and governments bring about rights

***Divine right is breaking down, so what is the basis for the authority of the state (on a secular basis)

- Solution requires a “Leviathan”—an all powerful authority to which everyone submits

***Genesis of realist thinking—foundational source of notion of anarchy as we understand today

KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE

P. 122-128

Containing the definitive articles for perpetual peace among states

- Natural state is one of war—state of peace must be established

First Definitive article of Perpetual Peace

- Civil constitution must republican

- War less likely is citizens must sign off on it

Second Definitive article for Perpetual Peace

- Idea of League of Nations

- War doesn’t decided what’s right

- requirement to give up lawless freedom and sign the social contract

First Supplement: of the Guarantee for Perpetual Peace

***Constitutive pre- requisites of peace

- mainly a philosopher, liberal (but more realist than most of the other liberals)

- believes in state of nature, threat of war like Hobbes

- Domestic solution = republics (war less likely if citizens must sign off on it)

- International solution – federation of free states

            International law is insufficient

            Only republics can join

            State among state not needed or logical

- suggests that people aren’t intrinsically good but that’s not required for a republic (only requires that they be reasonable)

- anticipation of liberal/democratic peace

ANGELL, THE GREAT ILLUSION

P. 271-272

***Obsolescence of war

- wars won’t be fought anymore

- military power is socially and economically futile

- wealth accrues by commerce, not conquest

- in retrospect: fool or prophet?  WWI did break out but at a tremendous  cost

LENIN, IMPERIALISM, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM

P. 281-287

Imperialism as endemic

SCHUMPETER, IMPERIALISM AND CAPITALISM

P. 288-296

- Capitalism is a source of peace  and relies on open commerce

- Imperialism is atavistic and would be solved by more capitalism

- Sources of war are nationalism and militarism

- Solution is ‘responsible statemen” in charge

MEAD, WARFARE IS ONLY AN INVENTION—NOT A BIOLOGICAL NECESSITY

P. 219-223

- Warfare is an invention

- Evidence: many societies don’t have war

- War persists due to lack of a better alternative

Is the UN Charter Relevant in the Twitterific Age of Intervention?

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Is the UN Charter Relevant in the Twitterific Age of Intervention?

            Both liberals and realists would agree that there are scenarios that call for or require intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.  Speaking on the idea of collective global security Kofi Annan said, “In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected . . . whatever threatens one threatens all.” (Lauren, Craig, George, 272).  Annan overreaches in his statement and it is in the application of the limitations and requirements for intervention that realists and liberals disagree today.  It is only in the reconciliation of realist and liberal approaches that a system balancing restraint and freedom can not only be developed, but most importantly applied.  Most notably the international community set out to do just this after World War II with the United Nations (UN) Charter.  While well intentioned, this system has not changed in concert with advances in technology or with the shift in the international balance of relative power. 

            A key feature of the Westphalian Order, still largely in place today, is the mutual respect for sovereignty among nation states.  Although this respect is lessening, most states feel obliged to provide a modicum of international legal justification before interfering in another state’s domestic affairs and even name interventions with this in mind.  The U.S. dubbed their invasion of Panama, “Operation JUST CAUSE.”  Realists focus on the autonomy, power, and security of sovereign state actors and are invested in the modern state system and thus have a higher bar.  Nevertheless, one could see realist support for the U.S. intervention in Pakistan in defense of Afghan sovereignty and the aforementioned invasion of Panama based on the threat to the U.S. of Noriega’s facilitating drug running into the United States.  The liberal viewpoint, with its focus on the interdependence of not only state actors, but also organizations and institutions, and the promotion of human rights, provides to a large measure the basis for the recent series of “humanitarian interventions” such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and its most recent involvement in the Libyan Civil War.  

            Thus a realist might also favor intervention when it contributes to the international balance of power and order.  Although there was an obvious ideological component to the U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War, each side viewed challenges to its sphere of influence as a zero-sum game exemplified by the 1983 U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in response to what was viewed as the Soviet-backed, Cuban militarization of the island.  A liberal might demand intervention in the same situation but for very different reasons—namely because the intervention would enable the independence of the people and the government (Nye, 169). 

            Although imperfect in design and often execution, the UN Charter represents a pragmatic reconciliation of the realist and liberal approaches and more importantly, addresses both the limitations and obligations of states in intervention.  The UN Charter sought to provide a structure to address, evaluate and ratify (when applicable) calls for intervention.  Specifically, Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) does provide a single standard.  Article 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The Security Council has a vested interest in maintaining international balance of power, and the UN provides the framework for nations to make decisions together.  This framework and Chapter VII mandate does not encompass intervening actions like public appeals by government leaders or officials.  Nye describes this wide range of possible actions that build from words to steel (Nye, 166-7).  When “steel” is needed, Article 43 obligates all UN members to contribute as required, but sets a limit on this contribution by including those members in UNSC’s decisions and by allowing them to bring any economic problems to the UNSC as well.  Although the charter has no real enforcement mechanism for states that refuse to participate, the Charter is an improvement over the legal framework of the League of Nations—as it better balances national sovereignty with international legal obligations (and includes the U.S. as a member).  Finally the charter is clear that nothing “shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” (UN Charter, Article 51).  This charter has been criticized, however, for taking too soft an approach to human rights in favor of sovereign ones (Lauren, Craig and George, 76).

            Although the Charter limits U.N.-approved or sponsored intervention with fairly clear criteria, these criteria have been more broadly applied during the late two decades.  Of late, the UN’s loose interpretation of threats to “international peace and security” raises the question of inconsistency. Why did it condone interventions in Iraq and Libya, but does not intervene in China’s violent suppression of public dissent?  This, of course, stems from China’s veto power on the UN Security Council.  One contributing factor may be the 24-hour news cycle for which a closed society like China’s is less vulnerable.  Today it is public opinion, forged by the continual bombardment of images and information, which creates the impetus for action more so than any rigorous evaluative series.

            Without a standard interpretation of Article 39, the UN must create a framework of evaluation for intervention.  First and foremost, the tripwire to intervene must be when the internal threatens the external—when the abuses occurring within a country affect the peace and security of the international community.  It is at this juncture that the obligation must be separated from the limitation.  The international community must agree to intervene but must embrace Huntington and ensure that the intervention itself is regionally led.  The application of sub-state theory is applicable here; those countries in  their region can better understand their culture (strategic and otherwise), and are in the best position to use soft power to affect change.  That soft power traditionally has not been systematically applied in this manner is perhaps why its effectiveness has been limited (Nye, 63-4).  This regional intervention combines the liberals’ focus on interdependence with the realists’ need for power and security. 

            Although flawed and in need of an update to reflect the modern international system, the provisions on intervention in the UN Charter provide satisfactory resolution to the tension between obligations and standards, or limits, on intervention.  The Charter uses a liberal lens to promote international peace and security while providing a realist mechanism to implement said peace and security throughout the globe.  Once must question, though, whether the current trend toward humanitarian intervention can be sustained.  As an increasing number of nations such as Mexico show signs of devolving into failed states, the international community will continue to be challenged to set boundaries on and provide justification for intervening in what were considered until recently, purely domestic issues within sovereign states.  The challenge is for the standards and means of intervention to fully evolve with technology and the role of transparency.  While certain factors like human nature remain timeless, the 24-hour news cycle is already quickly morphing into the 1,440 minutes (and one day the 86,400 seconds) news cycle with a real-time global flow of news and reporting.  The world must not pay mere lip service to former Secretary General Daj Hammarskjöld’s comment that the “United Nations reflects both aspiration and a falling short of aspiration.  But the constant struggle to close the gap . . . makes the difference between civilization and chaos.” (Lauren, Craig, and George, 129).  The struggle in this case must be to keep pace with an increasingly interdependent world and to intervene consistently and only when required. 

 Bibliography

Would You Buy Tickets to Concert of Democracies?

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Concert of Democracies as the Answer to the Impotent UN

           Kant held that a “perpetual peace” could only be reached after a long period of attempts and failure, but emphasized that once realized, it would solidify global  “republican freedom” (Doyle in Betts, 140).  Fukuyama held the global triumph of liberal democracy as the evolutionary embodiment of perfection in international relations (Fukuyama in Betts, 7).  The idea of a “Concert of Democracies (COD)” stand as Ikenberry and Slaughter’s answer, marriage and implementer of Kant’s and Fukuyama’s philosophical thesis.  The authors charge that ultimately U.S. Strategy is to guard its citizens and culture by ensuring safety within its borders, a thriving international economy, and a non-combative cooperative global security environment.  (Ikenberry and Slaughter in Betts, 625).   The COD achieves this strategy by bolstering security cooperation between liberal democracies of the world, effectively creating the framework to codify and implement the “democratic peace” (I and S in Betts, 627).   While Ikenberry and Slaughter’s COD theoretically appears to be viable solution, in execution it could potentially isolate and enervate non-democratic allies, worsen the already questionable efficacy of the United Nations (UN), and discount the critical and rising global role of non-state actors.           

            The merits of a COD fall into the realm of the benefits of collective strength and security.  This concert has already been done on a small scale with alliance building in the past.  There are many examples, most notably President Bush Sr’s first Gulf War coalition.  Although not composed entirely of democracies, the UN Security Council acted to ensure a collective security through a collective response (Lauren, Craig and George, 84).  The unanimity of the Western democracies and Japan acting in concert generated a moral certainty that contributed to the ability of states such as Syria and Egypt to send large combat units in support of alliance efforts.  Additionally, the effect on public opinion in democracies of an awareness that like political entities share a common cause cannot be underestimated in facilitating long-term support for a policy or course of action. 

            One drawback of such a concert is that it serves to isolate non-democratic allies needlessly. While there are few, if any, instances where China and Russia would be offended not to be included in such a concert, there are allies that might take offense. 

Morocco is one of America’s oldest allies but is certainly no democracy (although their diplomatic corps would argue otherwise)—this speaks to a major uncertainty—who makes the cut?  While Ikenberry and Slaughter state that membership will be “self-selective,” this is not always possible.  In making the cut you are unnecessarily excluding potential partners with shared interests, but without liberal democratic forms of government.  Perhaps the biggest drawback to a COD is that typically it will react slowly to a crisis in an effort solidify broad support among its fellow democratic states.  This sluggish response time only allows a crisis to worsen—and could costs lives.  Furthermore the susceptibilities of a COD to the vagaries of public opinion make the execution and sustainment of any decision difficult.  This stands in stark contrast to an authoritarian state that is less constrained and can make quick and unanimous decisions—this is especial problematic because they are the COD’s likely antagonists.  A less evident drawback is that smaller democratic partners may have a disproportionate voice in the course of the concert because of the negative perception that could result if the COD appears to fracture.  It is also dangerous to assume that simply because a nation is a liberal democracy means that they share our same core interests.  This can lead to the U.S. needlessly entangled with nations that possess divergent goals.

            Perhaps the largest uncertainty lies with the United Nations (UN).  Despite Ikenberry and Slaughter’s assertions to the contrary, the COD cannot coexist with the UN—at least not with the U.S. as a member of both organizations.  The success of the COD can only be inversely related to that of the UN.  This means that where the nations of the COD rise, the rest of the world falls.  Furthermore, a realist who espouses the temporality of democracies would have major issues with this concert because it unabashedly espouses the liberal democratic system as the ultimate evolutionary state of the global system.  They might further counter such a plan by echoing Lord Palmerston’s sentiment that “[there are] no eternal allies or perpetual enemies . . . only [national] interests” (Nye, 66).   Finally, conflicts that may require interaction with or intervention by the COD will increasingly involve non-state actors and there is considerable ambiguity with how the COD would interact with them.  These non-state actors include ethnic groups, rebel militias, and multinational corporations, all whose core interests may be asynchronous or non-tangential to the values of liberal democracies. Finally, the COD discounts the role of the most important non-state actor, the economy.  The rise in importance of the global economy as an institution/non-state actor rivals that of many nations that would join this concert.  This rationale is in accord with Fukuyama’s assertion that nations that have achieved their “end of history” (aka liberal democracies) will focus more closely on economic relationships than political and strategic ones. (Fukuyama in Betts, 15). 

            Ultimately, one must demand: to what end?  Realists might criticize that such a concert’s merits or detractors are irrelevant—what matters is the existing balance of power and how such a concert might affect it.  The alienation of non-democratic allies and the debasement of the UN’s efficacy would not only throw the realists’ balance of power into disarray but could end up stunting the spread of liberal democracies.  A COD likely will not make the world free from war, but perhaps may make the world more prone to “just wars.”  It remains to be seen if the COD could be the progression (or perfection) of Kant’s “perpetual peace (Doyle in Betts, 140).  To even have a chance for success the COD cannot coexist with the UN but must supplant them—a herculean—if not impossible, task.  Ikenberry and Slaughter would revel in Doyle’s assertion that “we are lovers of glory,” (Doyle, in Betts, 139), in the case of a concert of democracies, the liberal democracies of the world would be reveling too much in the glory of their “righteousness.”

 Bibliography