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Notes on the Rural Majority in Africa (Hyden, Jayne, Maclean)
TALKING
POINTS UPON READING ALL THREE ARTICLES: These three articles offer
progressively different views on the rural communities in Africa. The first article suggests that the rural
peasants can survive just fine without government involvement. The second article (30 years later) suggests
that the peasant farms are near widespread failure and require state programs
to assist them. The final article
suggests that the reduction of state sponsored social programs had a
devastating effect on the well-being of the average rural citizen (the same
citizens who required no assistance from the government a mere 30 years prior).
Goran
Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania(University of California Press, 1980)
BLUF: The author is arguing that Africa is the only
continent where the peasantry has not yet been captured by the social
classes. As producers of their own
livelihood, peasants are free from social class influence. Tanzania is used as an example to demonstrate
this belief. (pg 9) The author appears
to take a rationalist approach.
In 1967, Tanzanian President Nyerere adopted a development
strategy that focused on the majority of the population, namely, peasant
farmers. Their contribution to
Tanzanian’s GDP was considerable but production was low due to technological
constraints. Nearly all of the farms are
small plots of less than three hectares.
(pg 10) The wide distribution of
small plots of land created a majority population that was
self-sufficient. Because they are
self-sufficient they do not require access to a market that facilitates the
sale of their crops. Conversely,
peasants in most other parts of the world “have been forced to trade their
dependence on nature for a dependence on other social classes;” a process that
may or may not occur in places such as Tanzania. (pg 11)
African peasants operate under the law of subsistence rather
than the law of value. Essentially, they
will work toward survival requirements NOT toward increased efficiency and
profit. Modernization is seen as a
threat. Institutions do not provide
information or lessons on crop rotation and efficiency improvements. All farm knowledge is simply passed from one
generation to the next. (pg 15)
This institution-less society requires no link between the
producers and the consumers. “History has demonstrated that the
development of society is inconceivable without the subordination of
peasantry. As long as this process is
unfinished, the ruling classes, those who control the state, are bound to be
dependent on the peasants.” (pg 16)
Hence, it is imperative for the peasants to resist state policies and
market economy to maintain their independent status.
History demonstrates that the peasants will eventually fall
prey to the markets and conquest by other social classes, but this process is greatly
stalled by the fact that peasants have access to land where they can meet their
own needs. (pg 17) This process is
accelerated in regions of Africa (like the Sahelian zone in the West) where
droughts are common. Under such
circumstances peasants are unable to meet their own needs and must sacrifice
their economic independence. This
adoption of capitalist markets is not widespread. In Africa, the peasant mode is still in place
and successfully hinders the adoption of a market economy. (pg 19)
Many Marxist scholars argue that the preservation of peasant
society is a good thing. The subjugation
of peasants by the metropolitan elites only serves to destroy what was a
perfectly viable economic system.
Capitalist scholars argue that capitalism preserves the peasant system
as it transitions to a market economy. (pg 21)
The author argues that capitalism will not expand in Africa without
drastic improvements in the efficiency of the agricultural sector (likely through
the adoption of technology and the use of inorganic practices to increase
yield). States have attempted to push a
capitalist agenda through the use of state controlled farms and village
settlements where farmers are exposed to a more diverse society of
producers. These attempts have been
largely unsuccessful.
“Labour rather than land is the real scarce resource.” (pg
25) States can’t exploit surplus because families only work the farms for their
subsistence. Government officials or the
“petty bourgeois leaders” are forced to promise political currency (schools,
clinics) in order to win the peasants favor to promote their own schemes. (pg
30). The peasants remain in a position
of power where they can simply deny the use of such political currency.
Economic development will not occur without further
subordination of the peasantry.
Subordination will not occur because they enjoy their independence. This situation creates a weak social dynamic
with the government in a position of weakness.
Topic of discussion:
If the farmers still rely on some level of trade for survival, how is it not a
capitalist economy?
What the heck is Ujamaa? Ujamaa comes from the
Swahili word for extended family or familyhood and is distinguished by several
key characteristics, namely that a person becomes a person through the people
or community.
If the market is NOT the determinant of African development,
what is? What will ignite
industrialization and widespread economic growth? Does this even NEED to happen?
Many scholars cited in the
article believe that Africa’s lack of modernization is self-inflicted. Asian and Latin American counterparts have
modernized at a much faster rate due to the government’s exploitation of
surplus product and the eventual dependency of the peasants on the social
institutions created by the government.
Class Discussion:
- Economic development requires
the destruction of peasant society. Do
they need a “push” out of agricultural sector or a “push” into
industrial/manufacturing sector?
- He also wrote a book on Kenya
(No Shortcuts to Progress), where
there’s a more capitalist tendency, and where everyone is a lot better off than
in Tanzania. In this case, the
peasantry is sucking resources out of the state (as opposed to Client-State
Patronage in Senegal where the elite is sucking resources out of the peasantry)
directly. The peasant farmers don’t end
up working as hard on the communal farms as their own kitchen farms, and they
just sell food crops amongst themselves or smuggle cash crops across borders =
black market = invisible economy—generally this is bigger than the actual
formal economy. And they get schools and/or social services and only give
political support but still aren’t paying any taxes.
-
- “Economy of affection” maybe a
more cultural than structural argument.
T.S. Jayne, David Mather and Elliot
Mghenhi, “Principal Challenges Confronting
Smallholder Agriculture
in Sub-Saharan Africa,” (2010)
BLUF: Changes over the last two decades have marginalized
smallholder farmers (peasant farmers).
Now governments are increasingly relied upon to determine the future of
smallholder agriculture in Africa. The
author argues that unless technological advances are adopted most small farms
will become unviable.
Date is compared from Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe
The remainder of the
article discusses the eight principal challenges to the viability of the small
farm in Eastern and Southern Africa.
These challenges are broken down below:
1. Decline in land/labor rations and equitable
land distribution
To contrast from the first
article. Labor not land was the
scarcity. In this second article (which
was published 30 years later) Land is now a limiting factor as demonstrated by
the per capita land holdings in each country on the data table below (pg 1385)
Land shortages are further “exacerbated by the apparent rise in the
patronage-based land allocations to political elites.” (pg 1387)
Table 1. Ratio
of cultivated land to agricultural population (10-year means)
|
1960–69
|
1970–79
|
1980–89
|
1990–99
|
Ethiopia
|
0.508
|
0.450
|
0.363
|
0.252
|
Kenya
|
0.459
|
0.350
|
0.280
|
0.229
|
Mozambique
|
0.389
|
0.367
|
0.298
|
0.249
|
Rwanda
|
0.215
|
0.211
|
0.197
|
0.161
|
Zambia
|
1.367
|
1.073
|
0.896
|
0.779
|
Zimbabwe
|
0.726
|
0.664
|
0.583
|
0.525
|
Note: Land
to person ratio = land cultivated to annual and permanent crops population in agriculture.
The author sees the small farm
(peasant farm) community being erased by larger populations and failure to
adapt to natural (weather) conditions that can devastate a harvest. Compared to farms in the rest of the
developing world the “majority of African farms are dependent on rain and one
crop season per year.” (pg 1386)
2. Stagnant food crop productivity and the
performance of markets
“Over the last 40 years, food
crop productivity has risen throughout the rest of the world, yet has remained
stagnant in Africa” (see table below from pg 1387)
Low agricultural productivity (as
a result of technological shortfalls) is creating an atypical situation where
rural people are being “pushed” to urban areas because of a lack of food versus
traditional “pull” forces when there are more jobs to be had in the
cities. These factors combine to create
a “swelling of Africa’s cities and social problems associated with this
[overpopulation].” (pg 1388)
The decrease in farm yields means
that farmers have less surplus income to spend.
The lower the surplus income the less the famer can spend on off-farm
activities that generate revenue for non-agricultural businesses, leading to an
overall stagnation of the economy.
3. Concentration of marketed agricultural
surplus
The vast majority of the
agricultural surplus comes from larger farms that are more in-tune with market
preferences. When the market raises the
price of wheat it can hurt the subsistence farmer who purchases wheat and farms
maize. Essentially, the market driven
economy does not well serve the subsistence farmers in the countries
studied.
4. Demand is growing rapidly but African
smallholders are not filling this demand
Urban populations are growing at a
rate of 4% per year but agricultural production has not grown to sustain an
increased urban population.
Additionally, food preferences for the urban areas demonstrate higher
consumption of rice and wheat while the majority of smallholder farms are producing
maize. (pg 1390)
5. Limited non-farm options for households
with minimal land and education
Labor activities that do not
involve farming are available but the entry cost to pursuing these careers is
the primary barrier for the more impoverished smallholder farm families. Additionally, the future availability of
non-farm jobs is limited by the stagnant economy (which is limited by the lack
of surplus to stimulate the economy).
The author suggests investment in rural education to promote job skills
and empowerment through the understanding of new technology and the inner
workings of the capitalist markets. (pg
1391)
6. HIV/AIDS
Studies show that the death of a head-of-household
does impact the crop output of a family; however, this only represents a small
portion of the rural population. Many
studies show no connection between HIV/AIDS prevalence and crop output. Essentially, HIV/AIDS is one of many
inhibitors to increased productivity (although not a significant one) (pg 1392)
7. Farm policies in high-income countries and
global agricultural trade policies
Global free markets are proving too competitive for
low-output African farms. African
nations cannot afford to subsidize their agricultural industries like the U.S.
Access to developed country markets has not bee achieved with many African
nations suffering import surges following trade liberalization. (pg 1392) Data suggests that reforming rich country
agricultural trade policies would lift a large number of developing country
farmers out of poverty.
**As a discussion point: this belief is a moot point
if there is only a minimal surplus produced (as pointed out earlier in the
article).
8. Donor and state support to agriculture has
decline significantly
Donor assistance to social
programs, education, and health have far outpaced the assistance provided to
agricultural R&D. (pg 1393) The
decline in funding can be attributed to donor frustration with poor
performance, and the perception that money was used to line the pockets of the
rural and urban elites. Additionally,
short time horizons for improvement are expected while agricultural
productivity increases are more associated with long time horizon
improvements.
To stem the tide of failing/unviable small farms the author
suggests the following:
·
Investment in physical infrastructure
(particularly in the realm of transportation)
·
Regional trade (as a method to curb expensive
transportation/shipping costs)
·
Streamlining regulations and trade barriers
(elimination of tariffs and import bans across the globe)
Emphasis on rural financial markets to improve
traders’ capacity to absorb the limited surplus production
Lauren M.
MacLean - Exhaustion and Exclusion in the African Village: The Non-State Social
Welfare of Informal Reciprocity in Rural Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire (2011), Studies in Comparative International Development (2011)
BLUF: Reduced foreign aid has led to the reduction in social
services provided to African citizens, particularly in the rural areas. Social reciprocity (friends and family
helping each other out) was not as extensive as originally thought and policy makers
should consider this fact when deciding what to do.
Previously, it was widely accepted
that strong family networks, communities, and church groups were able to
facilitate the funds necessary for education, healthcare, and additional social
services where the government fell short.
This article seeks to challenge this belief with the authors extensive
field study results from Ghana and Cote d’ Ivoire.
this paper challenges much of the policy and scholarly literature,
which presumes that informal institutions of reciprocity promote both deeply
vibrant and broadly inclusive level s of access to social welfare. (pg 123)
The table 1 below demonstrates that Ghana has relatively low
levels of social reciprocity while Côte d ’Ivoire has higher levels of social
reciprocity. Significant numbers of
people in the Ghana region were not participating in reciprocal social exchange
at all. (pg 124)
Table 2 demonstrates that “only 6% of all Ivoirian respondents
reported that they did not give any type of help, over 39% of Ghanaian respondents
did not invest in any type of social exchange. When only the help given for hospitals, medicine,
school fees, school supplies, and clothing was analyzed, 6 even more dismal
rates of participation in informal social networks was revealed with nearly two
thirds of Ghanaians and one fifth of Ivoirians not participating at all.
So
what does this data mean? It
suggests that informal institutions (the willingness to support each other)
among families, communities, and friends has seriously eroded in the
neighboring regions studied for this article.
Even though the communities are very similar and near each other they
still demonstrated significantly different levels of reciprocity. For some, the levels of social reciprocity
were so low that it is doubtful they would have adequate social security in the
short or long term. (pg 133)
Additionally the author claims that the retrenchment (cost cutting) of
state social programs had a much more devastating impact than was initially
believed because the state sponsored social programs did reach the rural communities.
Should she have included the nuclear family exchanges? Typically immediate families always help each
other globally—therefore, not so worthwhile to include that data.
