What role do tribes play in the revolution in Libya?

15 May Update: I recently wrote a paper on the Libyan Revolution: A Coalition to What End.
       
     So when you go to the link you will have to give them your email address to get the entire article (it's free though).  I would post the whole article here, but STRATFOR (and they put out some GREAT products) might not appreciate it and I won't open that door.  But I will include a couple of tidbits that I gleaned from the article.  This was a great article because I knew nothing about the role of tribal dynamics and came away with a deepened understanding.  And, now when I hear names of tribes which I have no clue about, I have a source document to which I can refer. 

"the foundation of his rule has been maintaining ties between his own tribe and the two largest tribes in the country. "  This is referring to the Qadhafi tribe and the Warfallah and the Magariha

"Libya has an estimated 140 tribes, only about 30 of which are viewed as having any real significance. "

"[three historical zones that make up Libya: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.]"

"the typical Libyan — a person of mixed Arab-Berber descent " And most Libyans live along the coast.

"Cyrenaica is where the current uprising began in mid-February. "

"Cyrenaica has long being oriented toward Egypt and the eastern Islamic world, with Tripolitania more oriented to the western Islamic world and the Maghreb."

"Tripolitania is the Gadhafi Tribe"

"since the Gadhafi tribe is not especially large, the Libyan leader has been forced to form confederations with others."

"[“Jamahiriya,” a word coined by Gadhafi  and means “state of the masses,” it was to do away with antiquated notions of tribalism and focus on national identity.]"

"[The Warfallah is the largest tribe in Libya. With an estimated 1 million members.  The Gadhafi and Warfallah have blood ties]"

"[On Feb. 20 Warfallah Tribal Elders released a statement in which they condemned Gadhafi]"

 "[The Zuwaya tribe  reportedly controls  the Sarir, Messla and Aquila oil fields.]"

"Two top officials in the regime that come from the Obeidat tribe have made very public defections in recent days: Maj. Gen. Suleiman Mahmud and Maj. Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis]"

"[The Magariha tribe is the second-largest in Libya. The most powerful member of the Magariha tribe is Col. Abdullah al-Sanussi, the head of the Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO)]"

"[There are prominent Magarihas, however, who are said to have joined forces with the opposition. ]"

"[The Tuaregs, however, matter because of their ability to attack oil and natural gas infrastructure deep in the Libyan desert.]"  This tribe lives entirely in the desert in the Fezzan region.

"[the Tuaregs have a much different culture and history (not to mention language and appearance) from the Arabic peoples along Libya’s coastal regions, as well as the “pure” Arab Bedouins who live in other parts of the Libyan desert. ]"

"[The Toubou more closely resemble sub-Saharan Africans than their countrymen to the north. (Indeed, when reports first emerged about African mercenaries employed by Gadhafi to suppress the uprising, there was some confusion as to whether they might have been Toubou elements of the Libyan military mistaken for foreigners.)]"

"[Gadhafi must ensure that the tribes loyal to him continue to stay loyal and hope that the use of force will help him to overcome the widespread opposition to his rule.]"

Two good articles on Libya and the 'mercenary' issue

        Read these two articles to get a sense of just one slice of the myriad issues at hand in Libya.   I came across these two articles via the always excellent Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) daily media review (also available en francais).  If you aren't a subscriber already, you should sign up!  You can also follow them on twitter (AfricaACSS).  You're on twitter right?     

Libya: African mercenaries 'immune from prosecution for war crimes'
"The key paragraph said that anyone from a non-ICC country alleged to have committed crimes in Libya would “be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction” of their own country. It was inserted despite Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, saying that all those “who slaughter civilians” would “be held personally accountable”. "  Algeria, Ethiopia and Tunisia are among the countries that aren't part of the ICC court.   This hypothetically means that a mercenary from one of those countries couldn't be tried for their war crimes in the ICC.  Of note, the author points out that the US withdrew from the ICC in 2002 in "an attempt to prevent a precedent that could see Americans prosecuted by the ICC for alleged crimes in other conflicts."  As always, there's more to the issue than a quick superficial article I am sure. 

Gaddafi’s ‘African mercenaries’: Myth or reality?  In juxtaposition to first article the author of this article points out some of the subleties surrounding the term "African mercanaries."  I would add that 10% of Libya's population are immigrants. 
"‘According to a United Nations Human Rights statement – ‘Libya must end its practices of racial discrimination against black Africans, particularly its racial persecution of two million black African migrant workers. There is substantial evidence of Libya’s pattern and practice of racial discrimination against migrant workers’
‘Against such a background it is perhaps reasonable to question the validity of this supposed use of “African” mercenaries by the Gaddafi regime to thwart the efforts of protesters. Given Libya’s relatively large black population, are we to assume or conclude that their presence in Gaddafi’s security forces is that mysterious? If so I wonder why?"
    This article is well worth the time to read since the author has aggregated a number of articles on the issue, including one which speaks to the depth of Libyan influence (largely financial) on the continent of Africa. 

I will leave you with one question that is subject to debate:

What is the difference between a mercenary and private corporate security?

One book that was recommended to me is "Elimination of Mercanarism in Africa: A need for a continental approach" edited by Sabelo Gumedze.  I haven't had the chance to read it, but will be sure to provide a review on the ever expanding FAO Reading List (please let me know if you have suggestions for books I am missing). 

Poet of the Week from Angola: Jofre Rocha

Poet of the Week from Angola: Jofre Rocha 


Jofre Rocha is my poet of the week.  I thought this poem was an appropriate one because the author captures the sentiment of loss, lost opportunity, lost experience perfectly.   As someone who has never been forced to flee my country, I am unable to imagine just how difficult and heart-wrenching this ordeal would be.  However, in reading the lines of Rocha's poem I can start to imagine and relate.  For the millions throughout the middle east and North Africa who have been exiled (or are still exiled) this poem must be an especially poignant one.    And that last quatrain, such power and bubbling anger; Rocha's parting shot: 'a thread of anger snaking from their eyes.'

Poem of Return

When I return from the land of exile and silence
do not bring me flowers.

Bring me rather all the dews,
tears of dawns which witnessed dramas.
Bring me the immense hunger for love
and the plaint of tumid sexes in star-studded night.
Bring me the long night of sleeplessness
with mothers mourning, their arms bereft of sons.

When I return from the land of exile and silence,
no, do not bring me flowers...

Bring me only, just this
the last wish of heroes fallen at day-break
with a wingless stone in hand
and a thread of anger snaking from their eyes.

Some of my favorite poetry books:

"Abu's Doctrine" or "Lyons in Libya?"

Regime Change in Libya by ADM (RET) Lyons gave me pause for alarm due to the fervor with which the author subscribes to US intervention in Libya.  (DISCLAIMER: ADM Lyons was commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and senior U.S. military representative to the United Nations, so he possesses infinitely more Naval Street Cred than I do)  Before I get into what I disagree with him on, let me first say that he makes a number of great points:
- One of the worst despots in the world is the mercurial Moammar Gadhafi of Libya.
- Incidentally, Libya having a seat on the Human Rights Council illustrates the need for restructuring of the U.N. and its bylaws.
- We should recall that when Saddam Hussein was about to be forced out of Kuwait he torched the Kuwaiti oil fields. We should anticipate that Col. Gadhafi, as unbalanced as he seems to be, might take similar action as one of his last desperate acts of defiance.

Now on to our differences:
"As a first order of business, we should reposition an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The USS Enterprise and the USS Kearsarge, both in the Red Sea, and perhaps the USS Ponce as well, should be turned around to re-transit the Suez Canal and take a position off the coast of Libya. The Enterprise is to relieve the USS Carl Vinson, which currently is in the Gulf of Aden. This relief could take place in the Mediterranean, which would result in two carriers off the coast of Libya. U.S. Air Force B-2 strike bombers also should be repositioned in the region."  While Qaddafi's actions are despicable and evil, he does not pose an immediate and overwhelming threat to the United States itself.  Yes, his actions will affect us economically (by the way, what would the cost be of ADM Lyons plan) and yes, there are American lives at risk in Libya.  However, repositioning two aircraft carriers and multiple B-2 strike bombers?!  This seems a bit of an overkill.  Instead, I would offer that this is a great chance for our European allies to step forward.   The US is not the only country with aircraft carriers and a Navy.  This appears to be a perfect opportunity for Italy to step forward, along with Spain, France LOL if (!) outside intervention is needed.  And if military defections continue, they may not need anyone's help.  Finally, the Washington Times propensity for providing a nauseating amount of hyperlinks is tiring.

"As part of the next demonstration, we should use the opportunity to implement our strategic strike plan to destroy Iran‘s key nuclear infrastructure and other military facilities."  This seems a vastly overly ambitious plan (and almost a non sequitur), n'est-ce pas?  We still have (essentially) two wars going on.  There are plenty of other evil, ruthless dictators that don't like the US, but I am not sure now if the time for us to go all Grand Theft Auto on the bad guys of the world. 

I'd like to close by pointing readers to something I'll call the Abu Doctrine (and yes, I know it doesn't work from a literal translation aspect but the Abu Muqawama doctrine doesn't have quite the same ring to it).  He points to 4 important questions we should ask ourselves before we intervene abroad.

(http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2011/02/libya.html)

1. Will an international intervention make things better, or worse?

2. If worse, do nothing. If better, who should be a part of this intervention?

3. Should the United States lead the intervention?
4. If so, what should we do?
All too often in humanitarian emergencies or conflicts, we skip ahead to Question 4 without first answering the first three questions. Let us not make that mistake this time. (Because I don't myself even know the answer to Question 1.)

I would add a 5th question (we can call is the FUUO corollary):
5.  What is our exit strategy?  What is the end state we seek to achieve?  In other words what will be the tripwires that cause our departure?  The last thing the US needs to get caught in the middle of is a creation of a new government, constitution (i.e. nation building) in Libya.  We should not act until we (the intervening actors) have examined and answered these five questions. 

Well-written articles on Libya, Egypt and "Getting over being 'over' twitter"

Separating the drivel from the gems can be a tiresome task.  Following people smarter than yourself on Twitter makes finding the gems much easier.  For the poo-poo'ers of twitter (I was among them until recently), you have to get over it.  If it helps, think of twitter as an RSS feed of very timely topical links and information from people you know and respect (for the most part) and who get paid to separate the drivel from the gems.  My name on twitter is: FAOfuuo .  Please feel free to check out the people I currently follow and cherry pick from those to get a start.  Also, let me know if you have questions. 
   Here are a few examples from today: 

Volcano of Rage by Max Rodenbeck concerning Tunisia but mainly Egypt

"O volcano of rage
uniter of Arabs
Boil upon the plains
Foam upon the sands
Engulf them from the hills and the cannons and the trenches
With rage…. "

Qaddafhi and his ilk: Blood and oil

"Just occasionally, the power of ordinary people can overturn the certainties of the experts. That is why countries dealing with dictators should never confuse engagement with endorsement and why the West should press for human rights and democracy—even when it is inconvenient, as it is with China and Russia. Just ask those who have summoned up the courage to risk death for a cause on the streets of Tripoli."

Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious?  40 something solid pages from the International Crisis Group (released yesterday)

If Not Now, When? by Friedman On Arab Democracy
"Seeing the Arab democracy movements in Egypt and elsewhere succeed in modernizing their countries would be hugely beneficial to them and to the world. We must do whatever we can to help. But no one should have any illusions about how difficult and convulsive the Arabs’ return to history is going to be. Let’s root for it, without being in the middle of it. "

FORESIGHT AFRICA: The Continents Greatest Challenges and Opportunities for 2011

This report from the Brookings Institute is well worth a half hour of your time. 
Here's the introduction, you can download it in full at their website:

The Brookings Institution 1

B

efore the recent global economic crisis, African countries experienced one of the longest periods of economic expansion. Although Africa weathered the crisis much better than many other regions, its economies remain fragile and daunted by the challenge of achieving sufficiently high growth rates. Yet, there are also many opportunities that off er hope for African countries to achieve sustainable growth in 2011. In this report, experts from the Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings examine some of the key issues that will matter for Africa in 2011 and beyond. They provide brief overviews of the issues and give policy recommendations to African governments and development partners on how to leverage the opportunities for prosperity, while anticipating and overcoming challenges that could derail Africa’s growth.

Good article from The Oil Drum on Libya and their oil exports

A very informative article on Libya's history in the context of it oil production.  A ton a great charts as well.

'On Ending Piracy in Somalia' or 'Rebooting Max Boot' or 'It's time Kelly Rowland Got Hers'

 (This posting's title links to MAX BOOT's post today in commentary magazine)


Yesterday I posted my meandering commentary on the recent murders by the Somali pirates.  CFR retweeted a link to Max Boot's post on ending piracy ("Are we finally going to get serious about piracy? Here's what it would take: http://bit.ly/eapAAF").  I was excited and quickly clicked to read his article: Time to Stop Making Excuses When It Comes to Fighting Piracy.

And I must admit, that while I agree with his premise that the US needs to get serious about piracy off of the Somali coast, I find his 'solution' to be a superficial and short-sighted one.  


Before I go any further a DISCLAIMER:  

          Max Boot is WAY smarter than I am (he has impeccable credentials and has written of wealth of insightful and intelligent material that I have enjoyed)!  I, on the other hand, was an English major at the Naval Academy, graduated on the low end of the middle of my class and went on to fly helicopters in the Navy (admittedly not the smartest bunch, but always with the most beautiful wives) and have been published only here...on my blog.  So if Boot's article turns out to be a satirical one that went way above my head,  I withdraw my comments and will tuck my tail between my legs...but if not...then I must whole-heartedly disagree with the 'MaxBoot solution.'

Enough with the apologies now, on to my comments:

"We have sent our Navy to patrol the chaotic waters off Somalia but with such restrictive rules of engagement that apparently they can react only once a ship has actually been hijacked, and then use force only if Navy personnel or the hostages are directly threatened by the pirates."  The sheer and overwhelming numbers of merchant traffic off the coast of Somalia and around the Horn of Africa make it impossible for the US Navy to effectively patrol even 1/100 (that's generous) of the area.  I too would be curious to learn what the ROE is with regards to engaging the pirates...but so would the pirates.  Anyway, these pirates aren't stupid.  They hide their guns when they are out on the open waters.  The US Navy can't board every dhow out there.  What do you call a suspected pirate with a concealed weapon?  A Somali fishermen. 

"The result is that there is no effective deterrence to the predations of these ruthless outlaws of the seas, who have turned piracy into big business and are closely linked to the Islamist movement trying to take over Somalia."   Even if we boarded every suspected pirate vessel in the Indian Ocean this would never deter the pirates.  The deterrence of piracy begins ashore (and not just in Somalia, but in Kenya, and Dubai from what I have read in open source reporting) first and foremost with the money.  And then beyond that with the judicial and penal system in the affected countries.  If there aren't secure jails to house the pirates, there is no judge that is going to sentence someone and then have him get out and kill that same judge.  In the United States we often take a sound judicial and prison system for granted.  

   Finally, I'd be curious to see Max Boot's source that 'closely links the Islamist movement to these ruthless outlaws.'  I think any connection between radical islamists and Somali gang leaders is tenuous at best.  And more often this supposed 'link' is just an excuse to get funding...I have found that Al Qaeda loosely translates into 'funding' in Defense Speak.

"If we are serious about this threat, all we need to do is to authorize the Navy to sink any suspected pirate vessels that are sighted unless they surrender immediately;"  Surely you jest! Even with this authorization,we would need about 1000 more naval ships to prosecute and 'sink' suspected pirate vessels.  The time it would take to board every single little dhow or motorboat to see if they were pirates (and how do you legally determine this?) would be extend deployments for decades.  If you really want to go down this road, a more practical approach would be to get a fleet of armed UAVs and give a bunch of middle schoolers crushed up smarties to snort and let them have at it Ender's Game style.  
    Jokes aside, this type of  kill 'em all and let God sort out the rest mentality is one which underlies the our challenges in COIN and nation-building/helping.  If these 'suspected pirates' were Americans operating off the coast of Florida it would not be acceptable to shoot first.  As a military and as a nation we MUST value the lives of non-Americans as much as we would our own citizens!

"...and if they do surrender, to bring back the suspected pirates for trial in the U.S. even if they have not menaced a U.S.-flagged vessel."  This is the part of the article where I guffawed inadvertently.  Has Boot kayak.com'd flights from Mogadishu to NYC lately?  They aren't cheap.    So where would be try these pirates?  In what city?  In what court?  What would the charge be for the 'suspected pirates'?  The logistics of this are mind-boggling.    I agree that guilty pirates need to be prosecuted, but suspected ones? Really?  And we can't try everyone single one in the US regardless.  There needs to be a focus on the judicial systems in Somalia (one day) and the bordering countries (now).

 "All it requires is making more effective use of the force already in place and making use of legal authorities that have been in place for hundreds of years. "  There's a big different between legal authorities and legal abilities as I stated previously.

All this said, here's my .02 on how to end piracy in Somalia (if we are serious):

1.  Go after the money trails in Kenya and Dubai (and anywhere that we know it's happening) aggressively.  This means high profile press coverage in concert with international prosecution and embarrassment.  It also means proving the monetary connections.  In the press reports that I have read so far, I haven't seen any concrete evidence presented.  Ultimately, this means pressuring these governments.  It also means redoubling our efforts to help them build effective judicial and penal systems (the UNODC has already has some success in Kenya with this). 

2.  Go after the gang leaders (of course this won't work until there's an effective government in Somalia because more will sprout up) GTA: Mogadishu style.  This means an intelligence investment/upgrade (on our part and on the part of our partners) among many others.

3.  Establish an effective government in Somalia (Boot, now here's your chance to guffaw). 

4.  Teach the bordering East African countries to police their own waters.  This involves shifting money to our own Coast Guard (vice our Navy) to build these countries' capability and capacity.  It also involves showing them the connection between the maritime environment and the economy (through fishing and fines).  These fines and public coverage of them are important because illegal dumping and fishing is a HUGE and RAMPANT problem (in West Africa as well).   Ultimately this means concerted engagement across DOD and State Department.  The Navy/Coast Guard in most African countries plays a distant Kelly Rowland to the Army's Beyonce.  That means we need our Senior State Department and Defense Officials hammering home to the senior politicians that it's Kelly's turn to shine.

5.  Encourage South Africa to step up.  Engage India and our Arab partners to vastly step up their efforts (at least monetarily).

Okay, that's about all I can think of for now; I know I am missing a ton, but my wife just got home from work and she is much more beautiful than this screen!  Overall, I am disappointed in CFR's cronyism in pointing twitter followers to Boot's article...unless they knew it would inspire dialogue, in which case, mission accomplished CFR.  

Qaddafi Files Part II

My notes from the conference I attending this past fall continue.  These notes are from an academic expert.  They are a work in progress (I will add more to this post soon)--incremental progress is progress nonetheless.

           Qaddafi’s  redefinition of himself (and Libya) as a pan-african vice pan-arab country is a result of some realist calculus. 

            It’s important to note that the African Union (AU) came into being in Sirte, Libya in 1999 (the Sirte declaration).  Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, South Africa and Egypt all split up the initial costs to setup the AU.   Due to his pressure the African Union transition from the AU Commission to the AU Authority.  Thus far, this has been a change in name only (and the AU still routinely refers to the AU Commission). 

            For Libya, the economy has become more and more of a driver.  There are currently six major investment companies within the country (I was scribbling furiously and didn’t get all of them but attempted to verify as best as I could online):

Libya Investment Authority (LIA)

Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF)

Libya Africa Portfolio for Investments (LAP)

Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO)

Libyan Finance Investment Company (LFIC)

            The following things are Libyan owned:

-In Mali: 100,000 hectare acquisition

-Major hotels throughout Africa

-In Uganda: 69% of telecomms

-Recently made $2 billion bid for SHELL downstream assets in Africa

- Recently made a $350 million bid for a 75% stake in Zambian telecomms

-Owns aviation fuel in 28 Africa airports

-Owns 1,250 TAMOIL retail outlets throughout the world

NOTE: while all of these are sound investments, there is an implicit threat to withdraw support from dissident countries.  In the longterm, Libya is seeking to expand its pipleline building, but Libya’s technical capacity is limited. 

            As is evident, Libya acts across multiple sectors to include charities such as the one which built a mosque in Kigali.  Another example is Qaddafi’s financing of the life (essentially) of Queen Mother of Uganda’s Best Kemigasa (I would add though that there have been numerous rumors linking the two romantically).  Despite sound economic activity across the board, Libya (and Qaddafi really) has not given up on ultimately exerting political influence across the continent on the next generation. 

            As one can see in much of the current news, there is a transformation in Libya due to migration: 10% of the population are immigrants. 

“By now, most African leaders have taken in Qaddafi the measure of the man and have learned how to deal with him, BUT they haven’t come to grips with the influence of his sovereign wealth funds.  Most neighboring states just seek to remain on good terms with Libya.”  Mainly because they don’t have any other alternative. 

            This panel (from Fall 2010) concluded with a discussion on Qaddafi’s succession, which is especially timely today.  Most people there placed their bets on a shootout.  One person noted the tremendous amount of US contract work going on infrastructure-wise within Libya.  At the time, the lead panelist favored Seif Al-Islam stating that he came off better internationally (now of course this doesn’t hold as true).

The FUUO Qaddafi Files: Part 1

I had the opportunity to attend a conference at a think tank this past fall and was fortunate to scribble down copious notes from the experts (acknowledged academic experts as well as diplomatic ones, i.e. ambassadors).  I am pretty sure this conference fell under the Chatham House rule so I have removed their names but wanted to share their insight in light of recent events. 

A career diplomat opened with a perspective on the history of Qaddafi.    He broke up Qaddafi’s evolution/development into 4 distinct phases:  Anti-zionism and support for African independence, exportive revolution, “I am an African”, and finally “I am president of Africa.” 

            Beginning in the 1970’s, his initial anti-zionism stance was largely an attempt to court the Arab world and emerge as a leader within/of it.  During this time period, the United States closed its embassy (and Wheeler Field) there.  By and large, this attempt was a failure.  However, Qaddafi’s support of African independence does resonate within the continent.  Indicative of his influence over the years is that the first place Nelson Mandela visited after being freed from prison was Libya (then the United States, followed by Cuba). 

            In the 1980’s the “Exportive Revolutionary” or “Coup-maker” phase began. 

One question from a senior State Department offical to the speaker during that time period has stuck with him all these years.  Secretary asked him: “How can we hurt Libya?”  This question ignited many efforts including the beginning of satellite imagery analysis which revealed guerilla training of the various groups in the Sahel region. 

Some of the people being trained included Liberian Charles Taylor and his followers (only 100 people at the start).  Of all the ‘guerilla training’ conducted by Libya, only Taylor’s resulted in the successful overthrow of a government.  Taylor’s initial attack occurred on December 24, 1989 and lead to a devasting 7-year war.  During this war, Qaddafi funneled arms, money and supplies through the Sahel to Burkina Faso and then through the Cote D’ivoire by truck along the coast into Liberia.  He also set up another hub in Benin (their leader at the time held political views similar to those of Qaddafi). 

            One area that the U.S. determined it could hurt Libya was Chad.  During the 70’s and 80’s Qaddafi ‘Finlandized’ Chad through troop presence and financial support.  So the U.S. began covertly supporting rebel leader Hissène Habré (Habré has been dubbed “the African Pinochet” by the Human Rights Watch and currently awaits trial for atrocities committed).   In 1987, Habré began an offensive which routed the occupying Libyan forces in Northern Chad. Shortly after this victory, Habré was brought to the White House for a congratulatory lunch with President Reagan.   During this same time period, Libya also sent 50 taxis to The Gambia in an attempt to help upset and overthrow the government there.  Habré is said to have commented that the reason Qaddafi acted the way he did in West Africa was because “he never accepted the fact that slavery had ended.”

            From 1987-1992 sanctions against Libya began.  Without any Arab support a new Qaddafi emerged: “I am an African.”  And so he began major investments throughout the continent through Libyan government owned companies.  Of interest is that Libya owns the Golden Tulip Hotel in Accra, Ghana (reportedly the only nice hotel).  When President Obama visited there he was unable to stay there because of his fact.  His emergence as a self-proclaimed “African” soon developed into his aspiration to become the “President of Africa.”  Promoting African unity, Qaddafi was quick to proclaim his ability to bring the continent together.  In 1998, he was instrumental in the formation of CEN-SAD (The Community of Sahel-Saharan States) which today has 29 members but also has limited effectiveness.  From this position, he began mediating African conflicts in an effort to exert ‘benign influence’ starting in 1999.    His aspirations to become “President of Africa” met ten years later when he was elected as the head of the African Union (for a term of one year).  During this time period, he continued to push his pan-african vision of a single country, currency, army and passport for all Africans. 

Why did Somali pirates kill four American yachters?

       The Christian Science asks this question and I think it's a good one to examine in that it leads to further important questions? 


What are our gaps in intel and information regarding the structure and organization of the Somali pirate network (gangs)? 

How much communication goes on between the gangs/warlords benefitting from the piracy? 


Was the murder of the 4 yachters a purposeful departure from their modus operandi (i.e. their established business model)?  It is my opinion that it wasn't.  The business model is simply too lucrative.  And the idea of a 'revenge' campaign presupposes that those financing (the warlord, businessmen and gang leaders) care about the welfare of the pirates.  They don't.  They care about the money.  In all likelihood, these murders were an isolated incident by nervous hothead pirates, not a concerted effort by warring gangs to band together (suddenly) to poke America in the eyes.   


I have posted links to a few articles below and included key quotes from those articles on which I have commented. 

SOMALIA: Inside a pirate network IRIN News

"I agreed to engage in piracy because we wanted to get back at the illegal foreign vessels that were fishing in our waters, denying us a livelihood. We targeted foreign cargo vessels for that reason."   This may seem like rhetoric to many in the western community, but a vast majority of the pirates sincerely believe (or believed) this.  And in startk contrast to most Americans, the vast majority of those within the continent of Africa are apathetic (if not sympathetic) toward these Somali pirates. 


"I, as do most pirates, consider myself as having been performing the duties of a coastguard. We usually work in groups of seven to 10 people. Often, our missions are financed by individuals and businessmen who collect half of the ransoms paid."  These pirates are victims in this sense.  They have no other prospects and are taken advantage of by the gang leaders and in some cases, businessmen. 
"Omar*, another of the jailed pirates, added: "Piracy has become booming business in Puntland territories; we receive the fuel and logistics from local business people. For example, when a kidnapped vessel pays ransom, 50 percent of it is taken by the people who invested their money; the pirates only get 50 percent."  These speaks to a need to go after the source!


"The ransom they pay is somehow a punishment for their illegal activity in the Somali water, especially in the era without government," one of the pirates said.  This illegal activity is not fictional.  It's a big deal.  Africa loses $1 BILLION every year due to illegal fishing!  I have written about it here on numerous occassions:
Why Fish if the New Cocaine
CNO Dishes on Fish
One Video Show Why Illegal Fishing is Killing Africa
Deputy AU Chairperson on Maritime Threats to Africa






Somali pirates tell their side TRN News

"they tell the same story, which is they were all fishermen in the beginning, in the '90s, when foreign fishing ships that took advantage of the lack of a government in Somalia to come and illegally fish off of their waters. And so their little Somali skiffs, fishing skiffs, would bump into huge fishing nets that these foreign trawlers would be using to fish. And there was reports of overfishing—and some of this is quite well documented—overfishing, and even some allegations of illegal dumping of waste. So the pirates basically believe that they are ad hoc coast guard in some ways."  This quotes highlights illegal dumping, a hugely underreported issue and one whose importance to those living in Africa cannot be overstated.  Illegal dumping is a HUGE deal!


"you talked about money awash in Kenya, ransom money, and a lot of this is the pirates' money...So you have a very large Somali diaspora in Kenya, and they excel at this sort of Islamic interest-free money transfer."  The mechanics of the money transfer is one of the 'sources' at which we must attack to stop piracy.

U.S. Says Somali Pirates Are Dodging Navies, Operating Near India Coast Bloomberg News

"The U.S. said Somali pirates, who have taken at least $100 million in ransom from hijacked ships over the past two years, are operating as far away as India as they dodge more than 20 naval vessels deployed to hunt them. "  73% of Somali population lives on $2 a day.  2008 per capita income is $600. 

"Battling pirates at sea will not put an end to their attacks, Hopkins said. “Although the most visible face of piracy is on the seas, piracy needs to be combated and will only be defeated on land,” Donna Hopkins (U.S. State Department’s counter- piracy coordinator) said."  Amen, and I would add, not just in Somalia.

"Somalia’s pirate network, by contrast, is “a business operation that does not appear to have any political motivation,” Hopkins said."  I still belive it is a business and the recent murders were a departure from this business model.

Money Laundering for Somali Pirates is Good Business

"The sea pirates use the financial hub of Dubai and Somalia’s southern neighbour Kenya as key transit points to launder the millions of dollars in ransom money by organised and wealthy gangs."  Kenya and Dubai, two great places to start if you want to stop piracy. 

“Reportedly, Kenya’s financial system may be laundering over 100 million dollars each, including an undetermined amount of narcotics proceeds and Somali piracy related funds,” it said."  Again, it's all about the benjamins.
"
“As long as piracy is so lucrative, with ransom payments adding up to tens of millions if not hundreds of millions of dollars, and other economic incentives so bleak, the incentives are obvious,” he said."  I would add that its worth investigating the insurance companies role in all of this.  They are obviously complicit and making money off of this. 

Who are Somalia's pirates?

"Today's pirates are mainly fighters for Somalia's many warlord factions, who have fought each other for control of the country since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991."

"Whom do they work for? The pirates mainly work for themselves."  To be more clear, they do have a loose hierarchy but more likely work as part of decentralized (in comparison to our military) networks.

"The money seems to be distributed by warlords to their families and friends, and then further outward toward their fellow clan-members, says Jhazbhay." We need better intel and investigation into these links.

"While the CIA's chief, Gen. Michael Hayden, suggested recently that Al Qaeda was beginning to expand its reach in the Horn of Africa, and possibly reaching out to radical local Islamist parties such as Al Shabab in Somalia, there appears to be little evidence of a connection between international Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda and piracy."  Invoking Al Qaeda is a popular way to get funding.


"Regionally, I think the major problem is that piracy has given some groups the chance to lay their hands on money," says Jhazbhay. "There may be $30 million in ransom money received in recent years. Once they [the various armed groups] get that kind of money, they can buy a ground-to-air missile. Getting [a hold of] arms can affect the struggle for freedom in Somalia, and that affects the whole region."  Yes, it is a vicious cycle.  The more money and experience they gather, the harder they will be to defeat. 


"While individual ships can protect themselves with everything from barbed wire around the ship itself to high-pressure hoses, coalition forces can also do more to track and neutralize suspected pirate mother ships. "I can't see why more work isn't being done with satellites to find the mother ships," says Cornwell."  Good luck with that Cornwell.  These protective measures have proven effective, but a large majority of ships still don't use them. 

How do I know how long tour lengths are in-country for FAOs?

Fellow FAOs, have you ever looked at the billet slate and wondered how long the tours are for in different countries?  I wondered this today and my detailer pointed me to a great reference: JFTR, Appendix Q!  It breaks out all of the countries and show the tour lengths both accompanied and unaccompanied! 

HOW DOES MCCHRYSTAL'S NETWORK APPLY TO DOD FAOS (FOREIGN AREA OFFICERS)?

     Retired General McChrystal has written an excellent article that exposes one way in which the military has adapted to a non-traditional enemy without a straightforward vertical hierchy, one which relies instead on networks.  
     I won't comment on the overall effectiveness of the unit to which he refers (because I know less than nothing about it) but instead wanted to address his article as it could apply to a "DOD FAO network".  Those last three words are in quotation because I believe a "DOD FAO network" to be a hypothetical dream idea at the moment.  In fact, I don't necessarily believe there is even a traditional vertical hierarchy organizing the DOD FAO community (at least not one easily found or ever referred to within the community at large).  And there is certainly no mechanism or network in place to connect FAOs (in a strategic or working vision sense) across the services, across the stove-piped AORs, and across active duty and retired.
   
    Following you will see a selection of quotes from McChrystal's article that I found to be applicable in some respect to creating a DOD FAO network.


"our enemy was a constellation of fighters organized not by rank but on the basis of relationships and acquaintances, reputation and fame"  This idea resonates with me (and I would guess with a fair number of junior officers today).  For a FAO, relationships and acquaintances, as well as reputation are paramount in building from a baseline of intelligence and knowledge.


"The enemy does not convene promotion boards; the network is self-forming...We would watch a young Iraqi set up in a neighborhood and rise swiftly in importance: After achieving some tactical success, he would market himself, make connections, gain followers, and suddenly a new node of the network would be created and absorbed. The network's energy grew."  This speaks to the power of a network.  A DOD FAO network would create its own nodes.  I envision these nodes as ones which initially build from within AORs but then later spread and pulse outwards, overlapping traditional AOR boundaries.  East African nodes pulsing outward and overlapping within Indian nodes.  Brazilian nodes meshing threads with those in Angola and Portugal.  An immediate reaction from some is 'what does all this mumbo-jumbo mean practically!'  How does it manifest itself physically?  I don't know the answer right now.  But I do know that it will be through encouraging and rewarding innovators and risk-takers in the DOD FAO community.  And while the DOD FAO community will never be able to buck or break the military's bureaucratic promotion system, it must allow successful (as acknowledged by those in their networks) FAOs the opportunity for promotion of other sorts (positionally for instance).


"And we had to process that new information in real time -- so we could act on it."  How do FAOs even process information?  On language, on billets, on their experience in those billets and in-country?  How do FAOs process intel?  Does the information travel vertically, or are there avenues that allow it to travel out  and be shared horizontally and diagonally?  

"What was hazy then soon became our mantra: It takes a network to defeat a network."  For the DOD FAO community, in which the enemy can best be stated as our own unique triangles or hourglasses ('stovepipes' in defense-speak) this mantra can be shortened to simply: "It takes a network."


"an effective network involves much more than relaying data. A true network starts with robust communications connectivity, but also leverages physical and cultural proximity, shared purpose, established decision-making processes, personal relationships, and trust."  There is limited opportunity for FAOs to establish these 'personal relationships' and ensuing 'trust'.  Every opportunity must be seized to take advantage of physical proximity and build 'the network.'  The dreaded conference must be transformed and shifted from a series of lengthy speeches (and limited discussion) to natural-formed networks (working groups) that focus on processes and information sharing.


"Ultimately, a network is defined by how well it allows its members to see, decide, and effectively act. But transforming a traditional military structure into a truly flexible, empowered network is a difficult process."  Word.  How well do DOD FAOs see, decide and effectively act?  How transparent are decisions made within each service FAO community made?  


""blinks" -- time delays and missed junctures where information was lost or slowed when filtered down the line."  Within the FAO community we often don't have blinks, we have full on naps (I acknowledge this parallel is tenuous at best since these blinks are addressed within the context of battlefield decision-making, but c'mon just go with me).  An entire generation of some of the oldest FAOs (within the Army) are retiring and taking with them an irreplaceable amount of knowledge and experience.  We cannot afford to be passive in retaining this knowledge.  Measures must be put in place to capture it.  If these FAOs are in a robust DOD FAO network, their retirement doesn't mean they are pulled out of it.  Their own node or pulse may not be as bright, but their connections-their threads can remain and overlap and connect to new nodes and pulses.  Another example of this is when DOD FAOs return from country teams (whether within an OSC or as an attaché) their experiences, their passdown, their after action reports, their debriefings are lost within the ether-within their service "triangle".  In a DOD FAO network all of this information would not be confined by services or organization but would instead flow throughout and be pulled to where it was needed.


"Decisions were decentralized and cut laterally across the organization. Traditional institutional boundaries fell away and diverse cultures meshed."  These traditional institutional boundaries exist within our Embassy structure but also within DOD (duh).  


"It [the network] valued competency above all else -- including rank."  While there is much 'looking down the nose' at the aviation community (my old community) for its joviality and apparent lack of professionalism at times, there was one key maxim that transcended this and was part of every good pre-flight brief: "there is no rank in the cockpit."  This did more than encourage all members of the crew (officers and enlisted) to speak up on issues of flight safety and decision-making--it mandated it.  In essence, in the cockpit 'it valued competency above all else.'  This same type of mentality must be instilled within the DOD FAO network (probably most applicable within the academic environment).


      When determining what a DOD FAO network would look like, it is of ultimate importance to note that ABOVE ALL ELSE a network requires its users to believe (whether you are talking about jihad or facebook)...and not just lackadaisically...but fervently and passionately believe...therefore for the FAO network to establish itself and thrive...it needs motivated believers who BELIEVE and are allowed the opportunity and leeway to create a network, to build that groundswell.  
      I know there's not much concrete in this posting, but this is a (mostly) abstract idea that has been percolating within me (and at least a few other junior FAOs) but which I'd never been able to fully articulate until reading McChrystal's article today.  There are plenty of FAOs far smarter and more experienced than me that I am sure have the 'concrete' we need to build and leverage that DOD FAO network.  I look forward to building those nodes, pulses and threads with you.