African Legislature Grad School Notes

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

African Legislature Grad School Notes

            

H. Kwasi Prempeh, “Presidents Untamed,” Journal of Democracy 19, 2 (April 2008)

Joel D. Barkan, “African Legislatures and the ‘Third Wave’ of Democratization,” in Joel D. Barkan (ed), Legislative Power in Emerging African Democracies (Lynne Rienner, 2009)

Staffan Lindberg, “What Accountability Pressures do MPs in Africa Face and How Do They Respond,” Journal of Modern African Studies 48, 1 (2010)

- When the opposition is well represented, there are those in parliament with incentives to assert legislature as legislature…regardless these are self interested parties.  In Kenya’s case the MPs get paid 125K a year (well above median income)—they say that it keeps them from being corrupted.

- at the end of the day the MPs themselves may be interested in reform—he sees the push for free secondary education as a signal that they may be trying to reduce the resource demands upon themselves by providing constitutent services.

***the thrust of this argument is that nothing is broken—it’s just answering the call of the people that force the system to act in this way—a bottom up problem that requires a top down solution.  So why do the constituents act in this way?  You have to find that out.

- this also point to the failure of institutions but why would people want anything different—they know they can get something tangible currently—broad public works or services are things they necessarily see. 

- This comes from their perception and expectations of how the whole system works—we elect you and you give us stuff. 

- closer to the Hiden argument is the idea that there’s a moral obligation to provide for the community from which you come.

- in some cases equally important is for the MP to be seen as being vocal and active in the parliament—“that’s my guy” mentality

- parliamentary systems weren’t originally designed to operate with a president so they were at odds

- in the 90’s it was redesigned to be more appropriate for a president system which creates the opportunity for more institutional roles—but they are starting from ground zero

- without permanent staff—how effective can an MP be?  They need the committee staffs, otherwise they just don’t ever address these types of issues (like a defense committee would do)

- A PR system might address the problems of the constituent services demanded but that might also open up another set of challenges.    You might also be taking a hit on democracy though

*How people are elected is important—

- the idea of “the provider”—the moral economy argument would show that most people don’t really even have an idea of what their MP does—he is just another with means.

- a pro-western monarch who oversees an Islamic democracy is perhaps the most palpable of situations—this ensures democracy will continue and not just “once”

LINKS:
http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/12/why-africa-needs-open-legislatures

Imazighen-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

Imazighen-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Research Question

As ancient inhabitants of North Africa, the Berber populace has survived more than a millennium of invasions and myriad regime policies.[1]  Over the centuries their identity has oscillated between a proud ethnic one, a dormant marginalized one, an insular tribal one and one struggling for its voice in society.  Their ability to survive and to maintain a distinct ethnic identity throughout it all has largely been a product of negotiations and interactions with ruling regimes and an ability to balance an ethos of fierce resistance (and independence) with an evolving concept of their own group identity.  These group identities (i.e. the regional Berber tribes unique to Algeria and Morocco) have remained in various degrees of tension with a gradually developing Arab-Islamic identity since the Arab invasion in the 7^th century.   During the battle for colonial independence, the Berbers consistently fought against the French and Spanish occupiers.  After independence, however, these two states each embraced unique forms of government and experienced subsequent, but varied, periods of political instability and violence due to regime changes and rebellion.  Throughout this process, Islamism (i.e. political Islam) developed and emerged as a major movement while a collective national identity superseded the Berber one for several decades.  This substrata Berber identity existed only passively until the rise of identity politics in the 1970’s.  An increasingly mobilized Berber movement would actively pursue language objectives beginning in the 1990’s and continuing into the new century.

In Morocco today the Berber movement remains strong but divided.  King Mohamed’s July 2001 creation of l’Institut Royal de Culture Amazigh (IRCAM) has created a split that still exists today with many members of the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCA) refusing to participate in what they view as the monarchy’s attempt to co-opt and temper their movement.  Politically, Berber activists have increasingly rejected the loyalist Mouvement Populaire (MP); the most radical activists forming the Parti Democrate Amazigh Marocaine (PDAM) in 2005. This party was eventually banned by the Moroccan judiciary as illegal due to legislative prohibitions on regional or ethnic political parties.[2]  After the widespread protests fueled by the Arab Spring’s success in neighboring Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the movement won recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic.  Even this victory remains as subject of controversy with some in the movement lambasting it as only a token concession by the palace and part of a broader (and successful) effort to weaken the February 20^th movement.[3] 

Despite being overwhelmingly concentrated in the Kabylie region of Algeria, the Mouvement Culturel Berbere (MCB) has been consistent in its longtime advocacy for linguistic and cultural recognition of Berbers as a whole versus Kabylia regionally.  This national outlook is not monolithic, though, in 2001 Kabyle singer and activist Ferhat Mehenni created the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK).  The MAK asserts that because the MCB and long-time Berber supported opposition political parties (e.g., Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) and Rassemblement pour la Culture Democratie (RCD)) have all failed in effecting reform within the Algerian state as a whole, the focus should shift for reform at the regional level.  Based in Paris, however, the MAK remains an outlier, especially due to its pro-Israel stance.  Overall, the Berber movement in Algeria remains hamstrung in its efforts to promote a national agenda by its weak regional political base and geographic seclusion.  The future of the movement may hinge on its ability to leverage its demands for recognition of its cultural and linguistic autonomy with an agreement to cooperate in pursuing burgeoning Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces in the mountainous Kabylia regions.[4]

The past 40 years have witnessed considerable struggles for the sizable Berber minority populations in both states.  There is an opportunity to investigate the outcomes of these struggles vis-a-vis the Algerian and Moroccan state policies.  This examination of state-movement relations may explain the two very different outcomes for Berber populations in both states as affected by the state.  With one state (i.e. Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e. Algeria), what are the factors that explain these different outcomes?   Since the awakening of a Berber identity in the late 1970’s through the Arab Spring to 2012, has one factor been most influential and emerged most consistently, or are the explanations specific to time and state?   This thesis aims to identify the factors that influence Algerian and Moroccan state interactions with their Berber minority populations.

---

[1] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East : A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, Vol. Second Edition (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2002), 54.

[2] Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 220-222.

[3] “North Africa’s Berbers Get Boost from Arab Spring,” The Cortez Journal (May 5, 2012).

[4] Ibid., 223-225.

Clientelist State-Society Relations Notes (Barkan, Fatton, Pitcher et al)

Clientelist-State-Society Relations

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Below are my class notes on the following three articles:

Legislators, Elections, andPolitical Linkage by Joel Barkan

Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal by Robert Fatton Jr. 

Rethinking Patrimonialism andNeopatrimonialism in Africa (144-156) by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston

Legislators, Elections, andPolitical Linkage by Joel Barkan

SUMMARY:  The legislative and electoral processes in Kenya and Tanzania have survived and are based on the relationship between the citizens of the periphery and the center of the political systems.  This is a post-colonial phenomenon.  More the modernization model (but really in the rational choice camp)—these are the mechanisms that the states connects to society—and the mechanism that gives the (rural) society some voice.  Rural constituent expectations are low which helps—their representatives don’t have to deliver too much (monetarily).  Doesn’t address resource extraction. 

•    Brit parliamentary and electoral institutions were transferred to Kenya & Tanzania - the Westminster model

•    Result of '57 to '63 elections:

•    Emergence of single party

•    Transfer of power to govern & granting independence

•    Emergence of political structure responsive to local interests instead of nat'l interests    

•    Because political control was by single group, the process of competition, mutual criticism, and bargaining between gov't and opposition parties was never established

•    Legislature was not important for public policy making & electoral process did not provide voters a choice of policy alternatives, but a choice btwn governing elites.

The Legislative Process as Political Linkage

•    Legislators (MPs = Members of Parliament) are of more importance than legislature

•    Linkages between gov't and society are necessary for communication and exchange of resources.

•    Legislators in Kenya & Tanzania are 'agents of the center' - facilitate the center's penetration and control of the periphery rather than for connecting periphery to the center.  They are recruited/evaluated by the center and are not responsible for the local people they are assigned to serve.

•    Legislative process is not as a member of the Nat'l Assembly, but as lobbyists on their constituents' behalf the senior bureaucrats of ministries that run programs in their constituents' areas.

•    Linkage role based upon:

            - Capacity of individual legislators to engage in entrepreneurial activities to make                           successful links

        - Amount of access each legislator has

•           The role of the nat'l political party & ideological goals it is committed to.

•           Posture of the civil service toward legislators

•           Nature of the electoral process

The Propensity of Legislators to be Linkers

•    Success depends on their willingness to go out & organize members of their constituencies into political base whose support is valued by the center...and to mediate reciprocal demands of constituents and center.

•    MPs must balance the creation of political base with parliamentary combat; must do the former if they want to remain in office, but must also do the latter well to provide constituent resources to also stay in office.

•    An increasing proportion of MPs have shifted their attention to constituency service and other linkage activites

Access to Resources

•    The challenge for MPs to organize and link projects to the center is gaining access

•    Kenya encourages linking activities on the part of its MPs, but Tanzania did not.

•    Challenge for MP is to create political base that is enough for the regime to value and coopt, but not so large for it to fear.

•    Kenyan system - MPs make direct claims on the ministers and asst ministers.

•    Kenya had four tiered system of informal, personal relationships: president, cabinet ministers (ethnic/regional leaders), asst ministers (future regional leaders), backbenchers (constituency leaders), and tribal elders/businessmen (local notables)

•    Tanzanian legislators are highly restricted and the opportunities for obtaining resources are few.  Creation/establishment of linkages from the periphery to the center are limited because privileged access they might have to the center are cut off.

Legislators and Parties

•    Kenya - MPs are the leading political figures in their constituencies and are unencumbered by party org's beyond their control

•    Tanzania - Legislators must work within an elaborate and centralized party structure where they have minimal influence and org doesn't parallel the constituencies they have been elected to represent.  Legislators have not been able to develop personal machines independent of party control.

Legislators and the Electoral Process

•    Process in both countries is to recruit new individuals into the present ruling elite, promote other individuals, and to renew legitimacy of elite and its mode of governance in the minds of the electorate.

•    Elections are a series of local contests to select representatives of the periphery to lobby at the center.  Concerned about local (not national) issues; ideology rarely discussed.

•    Voters know their MP as what he has and has not done to further interest of local community.

•    Victorious candidates are better educated, earn higher incomes, and are much less likely to be farmers.  Access to top decision makers is the name of the game.

•    Cleavage btwn backbenchers and frontbenchers in Kenya is much less pronounced than in Tanzania, because KANU (in Kenya) has withered from disuse and TANU (in Tanzania) is very restrictive.

•    Both Tanzania and Kenya produce more representatives than leaders.

Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal by Robert Fatton Jr. 

SUMMARY:  The patron/client relationship is not a substitute for class analysis.  President reaches out directly to Marabouts (vs. the MPs doing this in Kenya).  Because of his broader approach he could show that when the state is able to adjust peanut prices to extract a large indirect tax (because the farmers have to eat the difference) with the support of Marabouts. 

            While the system described by Barkan may appear to be representative—it really is cementing a ruling elite class.  More dependency theory which is a bit dated.  Class formation point is an important one but perhaps overstated. 

            In East Asia, economic success and industrialization is being traced back to patrimonialism and clientilism. 

•    Patron/client relationships have been called the national disease of Senegal.  However, it also assures social stability, aids in distribution of political spoils, and assures a degree of popular participation.  It provides some political order.

•    Patron/client are marked by reciprocity / affection, and personal / diffuse linkages rather than class power and control

•    Patron/client have reinforced the existing structures of wealth and privilege, and have served the interests of the ruling class.

•    The more the state and the party penetrated society, the more they enhanced the value of clientelism and patronage.

•    Distribution of spoils, jobs, and promotion in politics fragmented the Senegalese ruling class into clans and factions.  It is inherently hierarchic, exploitative, and corrupt.

•    The system is a flawed reciprocity since it unilaterally benefits the patron.  The patron can command the obedience of those whose survival depends on the access of the resources.

•     

•    In Senegal, the marabouts (heads of major Islamic brotherhoods) enjoyed autonomy and have always been religious and political actors in the clientelist system

•       They are in intermediary positions between the center and their periphery (taalibe), who represent free labor in peanut farms. 

•       Marabouts became clients in patron colonial state.  Now are involved in mutually supportive and beneficial relations with the state.  Marabouts represent transmission belt btwn urban center and agricultural periphery.

•                      Peanut products accounted for 40 to 50% of Senegalese exports.

•    Patron/client are coercive dependence, not ties of genuine reciprocity.  Yet, this dependence has not yet generated resistance.

•    Factionalism is inherent as clients are prepared to shift their allegiances to the highest bidder.

•    Urban loyalties rest on self-interest, not on principles of the collective good.

•    Senegal had adopted industrial strategy based on export promotion, not internal consumption.

•    Patron/client was modernized to support penetration of external economic forces and institutions.

•    Tri-partism in '76 from the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) attempted to modify patron/client relationships.  Clientelist forces were not eliminated, but persisted.

Rethinking Patrimonialism andNeopatrimonialism in Africa (144-156) by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston

SUMMARY: Botswana has a successful neopatrimonial system intertwined with their democracy that has been highly functional.  Some point to the fact, however, that their success was more due to that they were a protectorate instead of a territory and because they were such a small, closely connected elite and this made accountability easier.

•    Use personal power and reciprocities to solidify legitimacy as "open elite democracy"; brings traditional loyalties into the public arena

•    Has fostered stability and growth - and has also resisted challenges to the nation's economic inequalities.

•    Tribal groups, called Kgotlas, were groups of men who built consensus behind tribal chief decisions.  These groups became the core leadership for the state, were legitimate, and did not have to significantly change their system.  The Bechuanaland Democratic Party (BDP) brought together tribal chiefs and kgotlas into its base.

•    BDP has multistranded ties and loyalties that have sustained it in a modern state.

OVERALL:

Patrimononialism is a form of authority which is different from clientilism. 

Neopatrimonialism—an office isn’t literally sold.  Informal ownership. 

Both forms of authority within the state.

*Anytime you have patrons that are more powerful than clients you have clientilism—which can exist outside the state.  Anytime it happens inside the state though you have neopatrimonialism OR massive corruption (i.e., it’s not legitimate).