Daily reading for foreign affairs afficionados with an emphasis on the culture and literature of Africa and poetry in general. Also, a repository of musings from life in the PGON (Pentagon) and as a post-grad student. Most of my book reviews are now over at www.kruzoo.blogspot.com
"But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist." -Anne Applebaum
Thursday, November 1, 2012
Clientelist State-Society Relations Notes (Barkan, Fatton, Pitcher et al)
BONUS LINK: My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here.
Below are my class notes on the following three articles:
legislative and electoral processes in Kenya and Tanzania have survived and are
based on the relationship between the citizens of the periphery and the center
of the political systems. This is a
post-colonial phenomenon. More the
modernization model (but really in the
rational choice camp)—these are the mechanisms that the states connects to
society—and the mechanism that gives the (rural) society some voice. Rural constituent expectations are low which
helps—their representatives don’t have to deliver too much (monetarily). Doesn’t address resource extraction.
parliamentary and electoral institutions were transferred to Kenya &
Tanzania - the Westminster model
of '57 to '63 elections:
of single party
of power to govern & granting independence
of political structure responsive to local interests instead of nat'l interests
political control was by single group, the process of competition, mutual
criticism, and bargaining between gov't and opposition parties was never
was not important for public policy making & electoral process did not
provide voters a choice of policy alternatives, but a choice btwn governing
Process as Political Linkage
(MPs = Members of Parliament) are of more importance than legislature
betweengov't and society are necessary for communication and exchange of
in Kenya & Tanzania are 'agents of the center' - facilitate the center's
penetration and control of the periphery rather than for connecting periphery
to the center. They are
recruited/evaluated by the center and are not responsible for the local people
they are assigned to serve.
process is not as a member of the Nat'l Assembly, but as lobbyists on their
constituents' behalf the senior bureaucrats of ministries that run programs in
their constituents' areas.
role based upon:
- Capacity of individual legislators to engage in
entrepreneurial activities to make successful
- Amount of access each legislator has
•The role of the nat'l political party & ideological
goals it is committed to.
•Posture of the civil service toward legislators
•Nature of the electoral process
The Propensity of
Legislators to be Linkers
depends on their willingness to go out & organize members of their
constituencies into political base whose support is valued by the center...and
to mediate reciprocal demands of constituents and center.
must balance the creation of political base with parliamentary combat; must do
the former if they want to remain in office, but must also do the latter well
to provide constituent resources to also stay in office.
increasing proportion of MPs have shifted their attention to constituency
service and other linkage activites
Access to Resources
challenge for MPs to organize and link projects to the center is gaining access
encourages linking activities on the part of its MPs, but Tanzania did not.
for MP is to create political base that is enough for the regime to value and
coopt, but not so large for it to fear.
system - MPs make direct claims on the ministers and asst ministers.
had four tiered system of informal, personal relationships: president, cabinet
ministers (ethnic/regional leaders), asst ministers (future regional leaders),
backbenchers (constituency leaders), and tribal elders/businessmen (local
legislators are highly restricted and the opportunities for obtaining resources
are few. Creation/establishment of
linkages from the periphery to the center are limited because privileged access
they might have to the center are cut off.
- MPs are the leading political figures in their constituencies and are
unencumbered by party org's beyond their control
- Legislators must work within an elaborate and centralized party structure where
they have minimal influence and org doesn't parallel the constituencies they
have been elected to represent.
Legislators have not been able to develop personal machines independent
of party control.
Legislators and the
in both countries is to recruit new individuals into the present ruling elite,
promote other individuals, and to renew legitimacy of elite and its mode of
governance in the minds of the electorate.
are a series of local contests to select representatives of the periphery to
lobby at the center. Concerned about
local (not national) issues; ideology rarely discussed.
know their MP as what he has and has not done to further interest of local
candidates are better educated, earn higher incomes, and are much less likely
to be farmers. Access to top decision
makers is the name of the game.
btwn backbenchers and frontbenchers in Kenya is much less pronounced than in
Tanzania, because KANU (in Kenya) has withered from disuse and TANU (in
Tanzania) is very restrictive.
Tanzania and Kenya produce more representatives than leaders.
patron/client relationship is not a substitute for class analysis. President reaches out directly to Marabouts
(vs. the MPs doing this in Kenya).
Because of his broader approach he could show that when the state is
able to adjust peanut prices to extract a large indirect tax (because the
farmers have to eat the difference) with the support of Marabouts.
system described by Barkan may appear to be representative—it really is
cementing a ruling elite class. More
dependency theory which is a bit dated.
Class formation point is an important one but perhaps overstated.
Asia, economic success and industrialization is being traced back to
patrimonialism and clientilism.
relationships have been called the national disease of Senegal. However, it also assures social stability,
aids in distribution of political spoils, and assures a degree of popular
participation. It provides some
are marked by reciprocity / affection, and personal / diffuse linkages rather
than class power and control
have reinforced the existing structures of wealth and privilege, and have
served the interests of the ruling class.
more the state and the party penetrated society, the more they enhanced the
value of clientelism and patronage.
of spoils, jobs, and promotion in politics fragmented the Senegalese ruling
class into clans and factions. It is
inherently hierarchic, exploitative, and corrupt.
system is a flawed reciprocity since it unilaterally benefits the patron. The patron can command the obedience of those
whose survival depends on the access of the resources.
Senegal, the marabouts (heads of major Islamic brotherhoods) enjoyed autonomy
and have always been religious and political actors in the clientelist system
are in intermediary positions between the center and their periphery (taalibe),
who represent free labor in peanut farms.
became clients in patron colonial state.
Now are involved in mutually supportive and beneficial relations with
the state. Marabouts represent
transmission belt btwn urban center and agricultural periphery.
•Peanut products accounted for 40 to 50% of Senegalese
are coercive dependence, not ties of genuine reciprocity. Yet, this dependence has not yet generated
is inherent as clients are prepared to shift their allegiances to the highest
loyalties rest on self-interest, not on principles of the collective good.
had adopted industrial strategy based on export promotion, not internal
was modernized to support penetration of external economic forces and
in '76 from the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) attempted to modify
patron/client relationships. Clientelist
forces were not eliminated, but persisted.
SUMMARY: Botswana has
a successful neopatrimonial system intertwined with their democracy that has
been highly functional. Some point to
the fact, however, that their success was more due to that they were a
protectorate instead of a territory and because they were such a small, closely
connected elite and this made accountability easier.
personal power and reciprocities to solidify legitimacy as "open elite
democracy"; brings traditional loyalties into the public arena
fostered stability and growth - and has also resisted challenges to the
nation's economic inequalities.
groups, called Kgotlas, were groups of men who built consensus behind tribal
chief decisions. These groups became the
core leadership for the state, were legitimate, and did not have to
significantly change their system. The Bechuanaland
Democratic Party (BDP) brought together tribal chiefs and kgotlas into its
has multistranded ties and loyalties that have sustained it in a modern state.
Patrimononialism is a
form of authority which is different from clientilism.
*Anytime you have patrons that are more powerful than
clients you have clientilism—which can exist outside the state. Anytime it happens inside the state though
you have neopatrimonialism OR massive corruption (i.e., it’s not