Clientelist-State-Society Relations
Below are my class notes on the following three articles:
Legislators, Elections, andPolitical Linkage by Joel Barkan
Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal by Robert Fatton Jr.
Rethinking Patrimonialism andNeopatrimonialism in Africa (144-156) by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston
Legislators, Elections, andPolitical Linkage by Joel Barkan
SUMMARY: The
legislative and electoral processes in Kenya and Tanzania have survived and are
based on the relationship between the citizens of the periphery and the center
of the political systems. This is a
post-colonial phenomenon. More the
modernization model (but really in the
rational choice camp)—these are the mechanisms that the states connects to
society—and the mechanism that gives the (rural) society some voice. Rural constituent expectations are low which
helps—their representatives don’t have to deliver too much (monetarily). Doesn’t address resource extraction.
• Brit
parliamentary and electoral institutions were transferred to Kenya &
Tanzania - the Westminster model
• Result
of '57 to '63 elections:
• Emergence
of single party
• Transfer
of power to govern & granting independence
• Emergence
of political structure responsive to local interests instead of nat'l interests
• Because
political control was by single group, the process of competition, mutual
criticism, and bargaining between gov't and opposition parties was never
established
• Legislature
was not important for public policy making & electoral process did not
provide voters a choice of policy alternatives, but a choice btwn governing
elites.
The Legislative
Process as Political Linkage
• Legislators
(MPs = Members of Parliament) are of more importance than legislature
• Linkages
between gov't and society are necessary for communication and exchange of
resources.
• Legislators
in Kenya & Tanzania are 'agents of the center' - facilitate the center's
penetration and control of the periphery rather than for connecting periphery
to the center. They are
recruited/evaluated by the center and are not responsible for the local people
they are assigned to serve.
• Legislative
process is not as a member of the Nat'l Assembly, but as lobbyists on their
constituents' behalf the senior bureaucrats of ministries that run programs in
their constituents' areas.
• Linkage
role based upon:
- Capacity of individual legislators to engage in
entrepreneurial activities to make successful
links
- Amount of access each legislator has
•
The role of the nat'l political party & ideological
goals it is committed to.
•
Posture of the civil service toward legislators
•
Nature of the electoral process
The Propensity of
Legislators to be Linkers
• Success
depends on their willingness to go out & organize members of their
constituencies into political base whose support is valued by the center...and
to mediate reciprocal demands of constituents and center.
• MPs
must balance the creation of political base with parliamentary combat; must do
the former if they want to remain in office, but must also do the latter well
to provide constituent resources to also stay in office.
• An
increasing proportion of MPs have shifted their attention to constituency
service and other linkage activites
Access to Resources
• The
challenge for MPs to organize and link projects to the center is gaining access
• Kenya
encourages linking activities on the part of its MPs, but Tanzania did not.
• Challenge
for MP is to create political base that is enough for the regime to value and
coopt, but not so large for it to fear.
• Kenyan
system - MPs make direct claims on the ministers and asst ministers.
• Kenya
had four tiered system of informal, personal relationships: president, cabinet
ministers (ethnic/regional leaders), asst ministers (future regional leaders),
backbenchers (constituency leaders), and tribal elders/businessmen (local
notables)
• Tanzanian
legislators are highly restricted and the opportunities for obtaining resources
are few. Creation/establishment of
linkages from the periphery to the center are limited because privileged access
they might have to the center are cut off.
Legislators and
Parties
• Kenya
- MPs are the leading political figures in their constituencies and are
unencumbered by party org's beyond their control
• Tanzania
- Legislators must work within an elaborate and centralized party structure where
they have minimal influence and org doesn't parallel the constituencies they
have been elected to represent.
Legislators have not been able to develop personal machines independent
of party control.
Legislators and the
Electoral Process
• Process
in both countries is to recruit new individuals into the present ruling elite,
promote other individuals, and to renew legitimacy of elite and its mode of
governance in the minds of the electorate.
• Elections
are a series of local contests to select representatives of the periphery to
lobby at the center. Concerned about
local (not national) issues; ideology rarely discussed.
• Voters
know their MP as what he has and has not done to further interest of local
community.
• Victorious
candidates are better educated, earn higher incomes, and are much less likely
to be farmers. Access to top decision
makers is the name of the game.
• Cleavage
btwn backbenchers and frontbenchers in Kenya is much less pronounced than in
Tanzania, because KANU (in Kenya) has withered from disuse and TANU (in
Tanzania) is very restrictive.
• Both
Tanzania and Kenya produce more representatives than leaders.
Clientelism and Patronage in Senegal by Robert Fatton Jr.
SUMMARY: The
patron/client relationship is not a substitute for class analysis. President reaches out directly to Marabouts
(vs. the MPs doing this in Kenya).
Because of his broader approach he could show that when the state is
able to adjust peanut prices to extract a large indirect tax (because the
farmers have to eat the difference) with the support of Marabouts.
While the
system described by Barkan may appear to be representative—it really is
cementing a ruling elite class. More
dependency theory which is a bit dated.
Class formation point is an important one but perhaps overstated.
In East
Asia, economic success and industrialization is being traced back to
patrimonialism and clientilism.
• Patron/client
relationships have been called the national disease of Senegal. However, it also assures social stability,
aids in distribution of political spoils, and assures a degree of popular
participation. It provides some
political order.
• Patron/client
are marked by reciprocity / affection, and personal / diffuse linkages rather
than class power and control
• Patron/client
have reinforced the existing structures of wealth and privilege, and have
served the interests of the ruling class.
• The
more the state and the party penetrated society, the more they enhanced the
value of clientelism and patronage.
• Distribution
of spoils, jobs, and promotion in politics fragmented the Senegalese ruling
class into clans and factions. It is
inherently hierarchic, exploitative, and corrupt.
• The
system is a flawed reciprocity since it unilaterally benefits the patron. The patron can command the obedience of those
whose survival depends on the access of the resources.
•
• In
Senegal, the marabouts (heads of major Islamic brotherhoods) enjoyed autonomy
and have always been religious and political actors in the clientelist system
• They
are in intermediary positions between the center and their periphery (taalibe),
who represent free labor in peanut farms.
• Marabouts
became clients in patron colonial state.
Now are involved in mutually supportive and beneficial relations with
the state. Marabouts represent
transmission belt btwn urban center and agricultural periphery.
•
Peanut products accounted for 40 to 50% of Senegalese
exports.
• Patron/client
are coercive dependence, not ties of genuine reciprocity. Yet, this dependence has not yet generated
resistance.
• Factionalism
is inherent as clients are prepared to shift their allegiances to the highest
bidder.
• Urban
loyalties rest on self-interest, not on principles of the collective good.
• Senegal
had adopted industrial strategy based on export promotion, not internal
consumption.
• Patron/client
was modernized to support penetration of external economic forces and
institutions.
• Tri-partism
in '76 from the Union Progressiste Senegalaise (UPS) attempted to modify
patron/client relationships. Clientelist
forces were not eliminated, but persisted.
Rethinking Patrimonialism andNeopatrimonialism in Africa (144-156) by Pitcher, Moran and Johnston
SUMMARY: Botswana has
a successful neopatrimonial system intertwined with their democracy that has
been highly functional. Some point to
the fact, however, that their success was more due to that they were a
protectorate instead of a territory and because they were such a small, closely
connected elite and this made accountability easier.
• Use
personal power and reciprocities to solidify legitimacy as "open elite
democracy"; brings traditional loyalties into the public arena
• Has
fostered stability and growth - and has also resisted challenges to the
nation's economic inequalities.
• Tribal
groups, called Kgotlas, were groups of men who built consensus behind tribal
chief decisions. These groups became the
core leadership for the state, were legitimate, and did not have to
significantly change their system. The Bechuanaland
Democratic Party (BDP) brought together tribal chiefs and kgotlas into its
base.
• BDP
has multistranded ties and loyalties that have sustained it in a modern state.
OVERALL:
Patrimononialism is a
form of authority which is different from clientilism.
Neopatrimonialism—an office isn’t literally sold. Informal ownership.
Both forms of authority within the state.
*Anytime you have patrons that are more powerful than
clients you have clientilism—which can exist outside the state. Anytime it happens inside the state though
you have neopatrimonialism OR massive corruption (i.e., it’s not
legitimate).
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