Africa: Declaration of Delegates from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi from the 2011 East African Workshop on Cyberspace Security

Africa: Declaration of Delegates from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi from the 2011 East African Workshop on Cyberspace Security http://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/169429.htm

Declaration of Delegates from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi from the 2011 East African Workshop on Cyberspace Security

July 27, 2011

We, the delegates of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, meeting July 25-27, 2011, in Nairobi, Kenya, have enjoyed a full exchange of information on the challenges of cyber and mobile security in the 21st century. It is clear that the Internet, mobile networks, and related information and communications technologies (ICT) have become indispensible tools for governments, businesses, civil society, and individuals across the globe. These technologies have spurred tremendous economic development, increased the free flow of information, and promoted gains in efficiency, productivity and creativity across East Africa.

This dramatic growth requires an increased focus by all users on a wide range of threats such as cybercrime, damage to critical infrastructures, and disruption of communications. Such threats can only be fully addressed by developing a strong culture of cybersecurity, creating robust response capabilities, and enacting appropriate and effective national policies. Protecting our economies and citizens against cyber threats requires strong national and transnational collaboration between governments, businesses and civil society, so that security, economic development and freedom go hand in hand.

Therefore, we, the delegates of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, consistent with Articles 98 and 99 of the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community (EAC) whereby Partner States undertake to cooperate in the establishment and operation of communications infrastructure and the development and deployment of ICT applications and services, and building on the work of the EAC Task Force on Cyberlaws, commit to taking the following steps necessary to develop strong and effective cybersecurity frameworks, including:

*          Developing and promoting a robust culture of cybersecurity that recognizes and effectively responds to the global threats and challenges associated with the Internet and interconnected mobile networks and related technologies, including exchanging cybersecurity best practices and maintaining an open dialogue on the full range of challenges and threats

*          Recognizing that mobile networks and related technologies play a central role in East Africa’s economic development, and should, therefore, be a priority area for cybersecurity efforts,

*          Building on the work of the EAC Cyberlaws Reform Programme and in particular the EAC Framework for Cyberlaws, adopted in May 2010, in which Partner States committed to enact comprehensive cybersecurity legislation, including cybercrime legislation consistent with the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (2001)

*          Strengthening capacity to investigate and prosecute cybercrimes and to assist foreign law enforcement agencies in urgent criminal investigations involving electronic evidence by, inter alia, joining and participating in the 24/7 Cybercrime Network

*          Creating national Computer Emergency Readiness Teams (CERTs) and exchanging best practices on their effective utilization and collaboration

We thank the Governments of the United States and Kenya for their support for this workshop and look forward to our continued partnership

Congressional Testimony by Yamamoto on Global Security in Africa

A good read that sums up well DOS'  take on AFRICOM.


Africa: AFRICOM: Promoting Partnership for Global Security in Africa http://www.state.gov/p/af/rls/rm/2011/169150.htm

Testimony by Don Yamamoto

Washington, DC

July 26, 2011

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Payne, honorable Members of the Committee:

Thank you for inviting me to testify before you today on USG cooperation in Africa since AFRICOM was created. As you know, we are currently witnessing some of the greatest changes on the African continent since the era of independence. These changes present both challenges and opportunities, and since its inception in October 2008, AFRICOM has been a critical partner for the Department of State in addressing conflict and transnational issues across Africa, in addition to the prominent role it has played in traditional military operations, such as the conflict in Libya.

Today I am here to tell you why AFRICOM matters and how we are working together to pursue our common foreign policy objectives. Without effective cooperation within the U.S. Government, we will not be able to address the issues of terrorism, piracy, and conflict in places like Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Before the creation of AFRICOM, the Department of State had to coordinate with three different geographic combatant commands, each of which had varying priorities and security cooperation objectives. The Department of Defense was able to unify these efforts by placing all of the previous areas of responsibility for Africa under one command solely focused on Africa 365 days a year. We have seen how this new focus in places like Liberia can have success in building sustainable, indigenous African security capacity that respects civilian authority and human rights, and contributes meaningfully to economic and social development. Given the important role militaries play in the region, AFRICOM’s work is critical to the success of our Administration's broader efforts to build a more peaceful, prosperous, and democratic Africa.

AFRICOM's previous and first commander, General Kip Ward, used to say that standing up a new combatant command was like trying to build an airplane in flight, and we appreciate that the State Department has been allowed to be part of this process of growth from the beginning. Since its inception, AFRICOM has strived to be a collaborative combatant command with a core function of not just overseeing U.S. forces on the continent, but also preventing and resolving armed conflict through building partner nation capacity. For the past three years, the U.S. Department of State has coordinated and collaborated with AFRICOM as it worked to achieve the Administration’s highest priority goals related to democracy, good governance, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and transnational challenges. President Obama's speech in Accra in July 2009 laid out a clear framework for our Africa policy, and we believe that AFRICOM has played an important supporting role in implementing this framework. It is doing this by supporting efforts to build professional, capable militaries that respect human rights and civilian control, which in turn supports efforts to resolve armed conflicts, address transnational challenges, and safeguard democratic institutions.

AFRICOM has two co-equal deputy commanders – a civilian deputy and a military deputy.  I wonder if they are truly equal?  The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) is a senior U.S. diplomat, and provides direct policy input and advice to the Commander of AFRICOM. The State Department further augments the AFRICOM headquarters staff with a foreign policy advisor and five additional Foreign Service officers, including a senior development advisor provided by USAID who reports directly to General Ham. Most of the other Foreign Service officers in the command have regional responsibilities. Additionally, each of AFRICOM’s component commands also has a Foreign Service officer serving as a foreign policy advisor.

The State Department currently has four other employees seconded to AFRICOM and is in the process of adding five additional officers. Similarly, AFRICOM has significantly expanded the number of DoD personnel who are integrated into embassies across the continent over the past three years. These personnel are valuable members of our country teams, as they provide direct and sustained support for both DOS and DoD-funded activities. AFRICOM has strived to not just do more, but do better in its activities on the continent and these expanded offices of security cooperation have enabled our embassies to increase the quality of our engagement on the continent. Effective collaboration is possible because the Department of State and AFRICOM are imbedded in each other's  organizations. This structure has allowed us to work together effectively on a number of programs over the past three years, and I would like to outline these collaborative efforts for you today. I also want to discuss briefly AFRICOM’s relationship with our partner nations.

The Department of State collaborates with AFRICOM on a long list of issues such as military professionalization; building counterterrorism capacity; disaster management; peacekeeping capacity building; humanitarian operations coordinated with USAID; demining and ammunition handling training; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction; destruction of excess small arms and light weapons and unstable ammunition; reduction of excess and poorly secured man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS); Defense Sector Reform in Liberia, DRC, and South Sudan; counterpiracy activities off the Somali coast; maritime safety and security capacity building; and civil-military cooperation. AFRICOM elements at our embassies implement Department of State-funded Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs, which further U.S. interests in Africa by helping to professionalize African militaries, while also assisting our African partners to be more equipped and trained to work toward common security goals.

In the realm of counterterrorism, AFRICOM plays a critical and central role in both the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT), our primary programs to support the long-term counterterrorism (CT) capacity building of member countries in northwest and East Africa. Both programs are led by State, but are managed in close coordination with DoD and AFRICOM, as well as USAID. DoD launched Operation Enduring Freedom – Trans-Sahara (OEF-TS) in 2007 to support TSCTP programming. OEF-TS adds both funding and essential staff to TSCTP, including military trainers and advisors.

State also collaborates with AFRICOM on a range of transnational issues. We continue to work together to develop U.S. maritime engagement in Africa from one of individual, isolated efforts to a more comprehensive and sustainable approach. Early and close coordination on AFRICOM programs such as the Africa Partnership Station, which State provides funding to support the training of African maritime forces, and Africa Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership, which provides operational support, both contribute to a whole-of-government approach. Nonproliferation and counternarcotics are two other key areas of cooperation.

Recently, DoD began to design and implement cooperative threat reduction programs in East Africa, focused on improving security around sites housing potential biological threats. The AFRICOM Counternarcotics Office has been active in West Africa supporting maritime and airport interdiction efforts and funding the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s and Drug Enforcement Administration’s training activities throughout the region.

If there is a downside to this level of engagement, it is that the large numbers of AFRICOM temporary assignment personnel deploying to the continent often present significant logistical challenges for U.S. Missions, which sometimes find it difficult to maintain full visibility and provide support given their own very limited staffing levels. This large and growing AFRICOM presence and programming in Africa at times risks overwhelming the “soft power” of USAID and State programs and personnel. Additionally, the constant turnover of temporary military personnel working on three and six month rotations can cause significant confusion with both the country team and the host nation if not carefully and managed.

Nonetheless, we will continue to work together and coordinate closely in order to mitigate and manage these challenges. However, the downside of additional DoD personnel on the continent is far outweighed by the positive gains AFRICOM made in the past three years. I can report to you today that cooperation between AFRICOM and our African partners is at an all-time high despite a continuing lingering wariness towards AFRICOM on the part of some African nations. This cooperation begins at the highest levels, where AFRICOM assists the African Union Peace and Security Commission. It continues down through the African Standby Force regional brigades, and ends with extensive partnering at the bilateral level. The capacity that AFRICOM builds at the regional level improves the relationship not just between the United States and the AU, but between the African nations themselves, increasing overall cooperation exponentially. An example of this is AFRICOM’s Exercise African Endeavor, which assists African nations and their regional organizations in communicating with one another over a variety of spectrums, making greater regional cooperation possible. AFRICOM exercises, like Natural Fire in East Africa, bring together biannually forces from Kenya, Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, and the United States to conduct interoperability training in a humanitarian response scenario. These specific examples demonstrate how AFRICOM is increasing cooperation and building trust bilaterally through its interactions with African regional organizations.

Engaging with regional organizations is just one way that AFRICOM is improving cooperation on the continent. Since its inception, AFRICOM has worked in concert with other U.S. Government agencies and international partners to provide effective security engagement through military-to-military programs and activities designed to promote a stable and secure African environment. The Department of State applauds these efforts, and believes that, despite the difficult challenges it has faced, AFRICOM is on a positive trajectory of better cooperation with both other U.S. Government agencies and our partner nations.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions.

State Dept publishes official history of US in Southern Africa (1969-76)!

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa

Who even knew the State Department published these types of things--I sure didn't, until today!  I will definitely file this one away to refer to for a paper in the future.  It's 2.4mb and 790 pages (thank God for the "find" function). 

Africa: Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs Release of Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XXVIII

 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/07/169109.htm

Office of the Spokesperson

Washington, DC

July 26, 2011

The Department of State released today Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa. Additional volumes covering Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa, 1969–1972, are available on the Department of State website. Documentation on U.S. policy towards North Africa, 1973–1976, is scheduled for future publication on the Department of State website.

The volume contains four chapters (entitled Regional Issues, Portuguese Africa, Angola, and Independence Negotiations), each documenting a segment of U.S. policy toward Southern Africa during the presidencies of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. The documentation reveals that both presidents pursued policies designed to maintain stability in the region and to avoid domestic and international criticism of U.S. ties to the white minority regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

The chapter on Regional Issues covers South Africa, which both administrations viewed as a bulwark against Communist expansion in the region. The documents illustrate the tensions between the Nixon administration and the Congressional Black Caucus and between the administration and the Department of State’s Bureau of African Affairs in dealing with South Africa’s apartheid regime. They also show a preference by Nixon and Henry Kissinger to avoid direct involvement in the growing unrest.

The chapter on Portuguese Africa reflects the evolution of U.S. involvement in Angola and Mozambique. Anxious to avoid alienating a key NATO partner, the Nixon administration sought to persuade the Portuguese Government to address the grievances of the black nationalist movements, while quietly granting limited assistance to the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) and National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) leader Holden Roberto. U.S. involvement increased dramatically in January 1975, when Portugal granted independence to its African colonies. Concerns about Soviet expansion and Cuban involvement led the United States to provide covert support to anti-Communist forces in Angola.

The chapter on Angola chronicles the continuation of U.S. support to anti-Communist forces after the Portuguese departed in November 1975. Despite substantial assistance and support from South Africa, Zaire, Zambia, and others, the U.S. was unable to turn the tide in Angola. Congressional passage of the Tunney Amendment in December 1975 cut off aid to Angola and effectively ended U.S. support.

The chapter on independence negotiations chronicles Kissinger’s effort to broker a negotiated settlement to the conflicts in Namibia and Southern Rhodesia.

This volume was compiled and edited by Myra Burton. The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at http://www.history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v28

 http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v28

Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at http://bookstore.gpo.gov/

Starvation, Births, Diamonds and How to Pack Like a Spy: FUUO's recommended daily dosage

Starvation, Births, Diamonds and How to Pack Like a Spy: FUUO's recommended daily dosage

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/reading-lists  Some of these are a bit old (2009) but there are some more recent ones as well.  Regardless of the date, they are a good jumping off point for a wide range of topics and countries.  Sadly, there is not a specific Africa one.  HOWEVER, I have an extensive one here on this blog:  http://fuuo.blogspot.com/p/foreign-area-officer-fao-book-list.html

How to Travel Safely - Tips from a Former Agent.  This is a great little video that highlighted a couple of things I don't always think about when traveling abroad.  Worth the 5 minutes out of your day.  Also, if you are a member of FAOWeb you can access all of STRATFOR's material for free!

http://www.stratfor.com/content/video-travel-safe?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20110714&utm_term=sweekly&utm_content=bluebox&elq=83d7ea8073534425807404526f892de7>

Africa: Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Hearing on Somalia - Assessing the Consequences of the Failed State of Somalia http://www.state.gov/g/prm/rls/rmks/2011/168614.htm

Sudan Updates: Two New Sudans: A Roadmap Forward http://www.state.gov/s/sudan/rem/2011/168657.htm

Better Late than Never: Johnnie Carson's Senate Testimony

As always, when Assistant Secretary writes/speaks I read/listen (and takes lots of notes)!


FY2012 Budget Request for U.S. Policies on Africa
Testimony
Johnnie Carson
Assistant Secretary, Bureau of African Affairs
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on African Affairs

Washington, DC

April 14, 2011

________________________________


I would like to thank you, Chairman Coons, Ranking Member Isakson, and all the members of the Committee for inviting my colleagues and me to testify today on the President’s budget request for sub-Saharan Africa. As this is my first appearance before this Congress, I wish to congratulate you Chairman Coons on your election to the Senate and for assuming the leadership of the African Affairs Subcommittee as a new member. Senator Isakson, congratulations on your reelection and for remaining as the minority leader of the Subcommittee. I greatly appreciate your passion for Africa and commitment to realizing our nation’s goals and interests there.

The President’s FY2012 request for sub-Saharan Africa reflects our core U.S. priorities and interests in Africa. I would like to highlight those priorities, interests, and some of the major policy challenges and opportunities we face on the continent.

We remain committed to five overarching policy priorities: 1) strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law; 2) encouraging long-term development and growth, including food security; 3) enhancing access to quality health care and education; 4) assisting in the prevention, mitigation, and resolution of conflicts; and 5) working with Africans to address transnational challenges, including terrorism, maritime security, climate change, narcotics trafficking, and trafficking in persons.

The FY2012 request of $7.8 billion represents a 10 percent ($732.7 million) overall increase from the FY2010 enacted total of $7.0 billion. This increase is due in large measure to increases requested for each of the Presidential Initiatives. The request for Global Climate Change has increased by 140.9 percent ($73.7 million), Feed the Future by 20 percent ($84.4 million), and Global Health by 12.6 percent ($601.22 million). Our request for discretionary funds to support noninitiative programs is $1.8 billion. They include programs focused on enhancing democracy and governance, economic growth, conflict resolution, and transnational issues.

The United States has many challenges and commitments around the globe, but it is important for us not to lose sight of our growing national interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa is a region where the United States has benefited from longstanding partnerships and friendships and enjoys some of the highest approval ratings in the world. The ties between Americans and Africans are deep and historic.

With few exceptions, Africa is not a place where we see anti-American demonstrations and rhetoric. That is indicative of the prevailing appreciation for our country’s longstanding commitment to democracy and human rights, and for our steadfast support in addressing Africa’s many challenges and during times of trouble. The spread of democracy in Africa over the past two decades and the vibrancy of pro-democracy activism across the continent is further evidence that most Africans share our political values.

In the international arena, we might not see eye-to-eye with Africans on every issue, but, overall, most governments there have been cooperative as we deal with a variety of global challenges such as international terrorism, Iran, and piracy. We saw one recent example of this when Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa voted in support of the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force to avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Libya.  Our economic interests in Africa are clear and compelling.  Approximately 14 percent of U.S. oil imports come from the region, making it a strategic part of our energy security portfolio. Imports from Nigeria alone are about 9 percent of our total oil imports and almost the same volume as those from Saudi Arabia. With promising exploration and development in countries such as Ghana, Uganda, Liberia, and Tanzania, sub-Saharan Africa’s significance for global oil and gas markets will only increase in the coming years. Africa’s enormous share of the world’s mineral reserves is vital for sustaining continued growth of the global economy. And, most importantly, sub-Saharan Africa’s growing population makes it a market where U.S. firms will need to be players if they are to remain globally competitive. The region’s share of the world population today is approximately 12 percent, and it is estimated to grow to 20 percent over the next two decades.

Helping African countries, no matter how small and poor, realize their full potential and succeed as economically viable democracies is in our national interest. If fledgling democracies are allowed to fail and undemocratic regimes are allowed to endure unchallenged, then people will lose confidence in democracy and free market economic principles, and we will find ourselves on the defensive in the global competition for influence and ideas. Many sub-Saharan African countries face enormous challenges to their survival as functioning states, and we must continue to help them meet those challenges so they can better help us as we deal with our own. In the coming years, African cooperation will be increasingly essential in managing a wide range of global issues such as smuggling, piracy, migration, climate change, infectious disease, and food production.

With our limited resources and personnel, we are managing a long list of near and long-term challenges that have a direct impact on U.S. security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests. Nigeria, where I was this past weekend, is in the middle of a tense election process that will have serious repercussions for its near and long-term stability. In Sudan, the six-year-old North-South peace process is at an extremely delicate moment with independence for the South just about three months away. Diplomatic efforts on Darfur are accelerating again, but a solution is still far away. The situation in Somalia remains especially volatile and poses security threats throughout East Africa and in the Indian Ocean. We may also be on the precipice of a humanitarian catastrophe there as food supplies once again run low.

The political crisis in Cote d’Ivoire has escalated into armed conflict and unleashed one of West Africa’s worst humanitarian crises since the Liberian war. The eastern region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) remains highly insecure, especially for women and children. That country is scheduled to have elections in November that will serve as a bellwether for its post-conflict transition. Uganda and its neighbors are struggling to eliminate the Lord’s Resistance Army, which still threaten civilian populations in northern DRC and the Central African Republic. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe and his ruling ZANU-PF party continue to obstruct the democratic process and mismanage the economy, creating a persistent and long-term threat to the country’s overall stability.

Beyond these fast-moving issues which dominate the headlines, our government is trying to address a number of slower moving but nonetheless high-impact challenges. The greatest of these is the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases which have tragic consequences for economic livelihoods and social welfare of Africans across the continent. My colleague, Ambassador Eric Goosby will address this in greater detail. It is estimated that some 22.5 million Africans are living with HIV/AIDS, about two-thirds of the world’s total. Millions more suffer and die regularly from malaria and other debilitating but preventable endemic diseases. Women and children suffer disproportionately.

Although a handful of African countries have demonstrated improved rates of macroeconomic growth compared to previous decades, the overall poverty and social indicators for much of the continent are sobering. Ethiopia’s per capita GDP, for example, is $344. Life expectancy in Nigeria is 48. Basic infrastructure is lacking in many countries struggling to keep up with their growing populations, especially in urban areas. As of last year, Southern Sudan had only 50 kilometers of paved road. And food security remains an ongoing concern across much of the continent.

I have already alluded to some of the many security challenges in Africa. There are others such as the presence of terrorist groups and drug traffickers in the Sahara, and the ascendance of drug trafficking in countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. Our referred approach to all of these challenges is to work through African security and judicial institutions and develop their capacity rather than rely on direct and potentially costly U.S. involvement. This approach may be slow and imperfect, but we believe it is the only truly sustainable one for the African context, and it is the most cost-effective approach for the United States. When Africans take ownership of their own security responsibilities, we are more likely to have the requisite trust and political buy-in of key players than if quick-fix solutions are imposed by outsiders. And this buy-in is what can lead to more durable outcomes.

To put it differently, the more proactive we are in encouraging and supporting African-led security initiatives, the less likely we will need to intervene directly down the road.  Africa’s complex challenges demand considerable time, attention, and resources, but we must also be attentive to the significant gains and progress that have occurred in many countries over the past decade, and ensure they continue. Liberia and Sierra Leone, for example, require our engagement and support to help sustain their largely successful postconflict transitions. Helping Africa’s most democratic countries—such as Senegal, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Tanzania, and South Africa—continue with political and economic reforms is vital for demonstrating the sincerity of our commitment to democracy and encouraging other countries to follow their model. In recent years, regional organizations such as the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, East African Community, and the Southern African Development Community have demonstrated a growing commitment to, for example, censuring unconstitutional seizures of power, promoting economic integration, and addressing regional security problems. It is in our interest to see that these organizations continue to build capacity and become more assertive across the continent.

I have worked on Africa for my entire career of more than forty years, yet, whenever I review the budget numbers, I am still amazed at how our government manages to do so much with so little. Roughly speaking, one can easily fit the landmasses of the United States, China, and Western Europe in sub-Saharan Africa. After Southern Sudan becomes independent in July, sub-Saharan Africa will have 49 states.

We have 44 embassies, 5 consulates, and several regional platforms used by various U.S. Government agencies. Those of you who have been out to the region know most of these missions are thinly staffed with an ambassador and a handful of reporting officers and support personnel.

In closing, I would like to state simply that every dollar we invest in helping Africans to address their problems and better capitalize on their opportunities may not satisfy our high expectations for economic growth, development, health, security, and political stability, but they sure can go a long way in preventing situations from getting worse and costing us even more money down the road. And, as  Ambassador Goosby and my colleagues from USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation will detail in their testimonies, many of our efforts do in fact have a very positive and significant impact on the lives of Africans.

It is through these programs and our vigorous diplomacy that the United States will remain a player in Africa and protect and advance our interests there.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and distinguished Committee members, thank you. I will be happy to address your more specific questions and concerns.

Nigerian Election Remarks by Ass. Secretary Carson

If you don't already subscribe to the State Department's Africa email feeds you should.  When there are events/speeches like this one, they are automatically delivered to your inbox. 

And when it's Ass. Secretary Carson speaking, it is ALWAYS worth your time to listen.   As I have said before: Ass. Sec Carson is one of those rare individuals with whom you feel more intelligent and informed through mere osmosis/proximity.

All bold and italized comments/underlined portions below are my own.  I have emboldened some of Ass. Sec. Carson's comments for emphasis.

The Recent Elections in Nigeria

April 28, 2011

MS. FULTON: Good afternoon and welcome to the Department of State. Very pleased today to have with us Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson to talk about the recent elections in Nigeria. He was on hand to observe personally, so he’ll be able to give you his on-the-ground accounts of the results. So without further ado, Assistant Secretary Carson.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: Thank you very, very much. Glad to be here with you this afternoon to talk a little bit about the recent elections in Nigeria. Nigeria has just completed its most successful elections since its return to multiparty democracy in 1999. Despite some technical imperfections, those elections represent a substantial improvement over the flawed 2007 electoral process. This reverses a downward democratic trajectory and provides the country a solid foundation for strengthening its electoral procedures and democratic institutions in the years to come. The Nigerian people have shown to the world their resilience and will to have their voices heard. These elections were a real opportunity to choose their leaders.

This week, Nigerian voters returned to the polls for the fourth time and final time to select their state assembly members and governors. On April 26th, all but two states held elections. Elections in Kaduna and Bauchi states occurred April 28th to give additional time for security to return to those two areas. International and domestic observers reported the April 26th elections to be generally well organized, albeit with a lower turnout in various locations compared with voter turnout earlier this month.

Following the deplorable post-election violence of the previous week, we are heartened that many Nigerian voters went to the polls to vote in an environmentally – environment largely free of violence. We remain concerned about allegations of fraud and ballot box snatching in various jurisdictions, and we strongly urge Nigerian authorities to investigate and take corrective actions on all of these allegations. We commend the Independent National Electoral Commission and especially its chairman, Professor Jega, and the security services for addressing challenges and improving their efforts with each progressive election.  From everything I hear Professor Jega represents all that is good and holy in Nigeria.

We are confident that INEC leaders will continue to take steps to further improve the electoral process to ensure that some political actors do not divert to their old – revert to their old ways of subverting the will of the Nigerian electorate. We are partners in the international community, and will not hesitate to take appropriate action against individuals of any political party who seek to undermine the integrity of the electoral process, whether at the state, national, or local elections.  Word on the street is that one of the biggest obstacles facing Jega are a few corrupt members on INEC that he doesn't have the power to fire.

Again, we congratulate the people of Nigeria on holding very successful elections. Thank you.

QUESTION: Secretary Carson, two questions. One, the CPC has said that it has evidence of irregularities and that it plans to go to court over those. The fact that Nigerians take their issues to the courts instead of resorting to violence is important and commendable.  So question one is: To what extent do you think that the existing irregularities cast a shadow on President Jonathan’s victory? Second, and in a way the more important question is: To what extent do you think that he is likely to be inclusive going forward so as to help lay to rest or to help unify the country? Would you expect or hope, for example, that when he names a cabinet he will reach out to opposition figures? Can you give us your sense of that?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: I hope that INEC will take seriously all allegations of election irregularity. There is no doubt in my mind that there were some imperfections, some technical problems, and probably some justified cases of rigging. But it is up to the election commission to investigate those. I do not believe that any of the irregularities or technical imperfections undermine the overall outcome of this election and that the elections do reflect the will of a majority of the Nigerian people.

I cannot say what kind of cabinet or government President Jonathan will put in place. But I do note that his vice president is, in fact, a former northern governor and that the constitution does call for the president of the country to select from individual states various cabinet members. I hope that he will act in both a responsible and inclusive manner in the selection of those individuals for his cabinet and that in doing so, he will be reaching out to heal the political divisions that were uncovered during the election process.

MS. FULTON: In the back.

QUESTION: I have a question actually about Sudan. Before we came out here, the Treasury Department pulled the Bank of Khartoum off of the sanctions list, and I wonder if you can explain that move, and then more broadly how Sudan is doing on this roadmap toward normalization with the U.S.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: Let me say that I’m not aware of this recent decision to pull the Bank of Khartoum off the sanctions list, and so I will not comment on that.

With respect to the roadmap, we continue to see progress in the implementation of the roadmap, and we continue to encourage the Government of Sudan to continue to fulfill its obligations that remain under the roadmap. One of the most important aspects of this was the successful referenda election in South Sudan that went from January 9 to 15. That went extraordinarily well. It was largely free of violence – large turnouts, well organized, and reflected the will of the people of the South to secure their independence. We continue to encourage very strongly that the Khartoum government, the NCP, and the Southern Sudanese Government, the SPLM, to work to resolve the remaining key issues that are a part of the conclusion of the CPA. This means resolving the Abyei crisis before July 9 and resolving the issues of oil and wealth-sharing, border demarcation, as well as issues related to citizenship.  Quick, let's all hold our breaths.

QUESTION: Can I follow up on that one? Just to stay with the question of Abyei, President Bashir is quoted today as having said, quote, “If there’s any attempt to secede Abyei within the borders of the new state, we will not recognize the new state,” close quote. What is your response to that, and does that not sort of ratchet up tensions ahead of July?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: Let me just say that those comments are not helpful at all, and they only serve to inflame and heighten tensions. It is important that both sides – those in Khartoum and those in Juba – focus intensely on trying to resolve the key issues that have not been completed under the CPA    (Collective Peace Agreement). Abyei is one of them. This must be done before July 9, and it is important that President Bashir and the President of South Sudan Salva Kiir continue to meet, negotiate to resolve these issues as quickly as possible.

MS. FULTON: Back to Nigeria?

QUESTION: Yeah. Back to Nigeria. How much do you expect these elections in Nigeria to promote efforts towards democracy in the broader region? Can you –

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: I think the success of the Nigerian elections are primarily of importance to the Nigerian people, but they also send a very strong signal across Africa. Nigeria is one of the two most important countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is also the most populous country in Africa with 150 million people. It’s also the second largest Muslim country in Africa after Egypt.

The people of Nigeria have clearly demonstrated a desire to have a democratic government, to participate in democratically-run elections, and I think this reflects a desire of many people across Africa. It also is an indication, too, that if Nigeria, with its large size and population, can, in effect, run and manage successful democratic elections, that it is possible for many of the other smaller states to do so as well. It also indicates that the democratic trajectory not only in Nigeria, but across West Africa has not stalled but continues to rise.

QUESTION: Might you be soft-pedaling the violence a little bit? I’m reading some wire material today about perhaps 500 people killed and Christian churches set afire. And also people from the elections say that they’re very discouraged by this and that they prefer to not have an election if this sort of thing happens. Might you be looking through rose-colored glasses at this sort of thing?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: Absolutely not. But let me first say we deplore the violence that occurred particularly after the conclusion of the presidential elections a week and a half ago. We saw widespread violence throughout much of northern Nigeria. Both the president and the main opposition candidates – both called on their supporters to not support violent activities and to work to restore peace as quickly as possible.

I think that there has been a history of violence associated with Nigerian elections in the past. But in this election, we have clearly seen a much more responsible security force and a security presence in and around the electoral sites. So it’s important that violence not be a part of the democratic process. We deplore it, and I think senior officials in Nigeria have also deplored it as well. We hope that these elections will be a baseline for greater improvement in both their technical procedures as well as in their security as well.

MS. FULTON: Do we have time for maybe one more question?

QUESTION: Can I ask about Uganda? There are reports this morning that a fourth opposition leader has been arrested, and my question is about the U.S. – the Administration’s response. Are we considering any kind of pressure on the Ugandan Government?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: We have seen the reports of the arrest of several former presidential candidates for attempting to carry out peaceful demonstrations in Kampala that were designed to highlight rising oil and food prices. We have also seen with great concern and regret the very serious and apparent mistreatment of one of those candidates, Dr. Besigye. We have expressed our concern about what appears to be harassment of President – of Dr. Besigye. I have, myself, spoken to the Ugandan foreign minister about this and have urged that the Ugandan Government act both in a responsible and civil fashion in dealing with the arrest of individuals attempting to carry out peaceful protests.

QUESTION: When did you speak to the foreign minister about that, and was that specifically about the case that you referenced?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: I spoke to the foreign minister today, and it was specifically concerning the apparent ill treatment of Dr. Besigye as well as the government’s reaction to peaceful protests by others.

QUESTION: And did the foreign minister give you any reason to believe that the government would seek to treat such people better and to show greater respect toward peaceful protesters?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: He did indeed. He said that he hoped that President Museveni would be meeting with the opposition political parties and leaders on Tuesday of next week. I urged political outreach and reconciliation to resolve the differences that the government has with opposition leaders. I also encouraged that there be a scope for civil peaceful protests and that government reaction to those protests should be tempered, responsible, and civil.

MS. FULTON: Okay. And thank you for your time, Assistant Secretary Carson.

QUESTION: Thank you.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY CARSON: Thank you.

 

Counter Piracy Contact Group Minutes

If you click the title of this blog post, you can go to see the full article.  Here are some 'highlights' from the report.

"It is critical that ship owners and operators implement Best Management Practices to discourage attacks and prevent boardings. It is an appropriate step for participating states to consider taking action on the issue of seafarers in captivity."

Counter Piracy Contact Group Confronts Maritime Crime in the Horn of Africa

Fact Sheet

Office of the Spokesman

Washington, DC

March 25, 2011

_______________________________

The United States joined more than 60 nations and international organizations at the United Nations in New York on March 21, 2011, for a meeting of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

In a communiqué following the meeting, the Contact Group called for a renewed international commitment to combating piracy, both at sea and on land in Somalia, through robust and integrated military, law enforcement, and development activities. Among their recommendations, the Contact Group called for:

*     Reinforcing international naval patrols in response to more aggressive and widespread pirate activity in the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean and providing sufficient military capability to sustain counter piracy operations.

*     Expanding the capacity of the international community to prosecute suspected pirates captured at sea, as well as their leaders and financiers, through national prosecutions and innovative additional mechanisms, including the development and sharing of information to counter enabling networks providing arms, equipment, and funding to pirate gangs.

*     Intensifying implementation of a full range of industry-developed self-protection measures by ship owners and operators to prevent pirate attacks and safeguard merchant mariners.

*     Strengthening the capacity of Somalia and other countries in the region to combat piracy on their own, in particular through contributions to the UN Trust Fund Supporting Initiatives of States Countering Piracy off the Coast of Somalia.

"On behalf of the United Nations, the Department of Political Affairs addressed the CGPCS plenary and emphasized the importance of fighting piracy simultaneously on three fronts: deterrence; security and the rule of law; and development."

"The CGPCS noted that the lack of sufficient facilities for incarceration of convicted pirates was one of the most acute issues to be addressed in order to ensure an increased number of prosecutions, including in the region."

"Moving forward, an intersessional working group will address further implementation of BMPs by nations with the potential use of the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code, the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, or other mechanisms. In recognition of further use of armed and unarmed security teams as part vessel defense, a second intersessional group of interested states and NGOs will address the consequences of the use of those teams with a view to examining the feasibility of elaborating guidelines. Conceptual papers will be developed to form the basis of discussion by each of the intersessional groups."