BONUS LINK: My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here.
In the spring and summer of 1994, I was 15 years old and a freshman at Bedford High School in Massachusetts. Searching my memory of that period, I can't recall even a quick polaroid recollection concerning almost a million people's murder.
That spring
I remember working as a bagger at the grocery store on Hanscomb Air Force Base.
I remember fleeing the base theatre with my friend CJ after we lit up cigars during a movie.
I remember the field where I would play soccer by my school.
What I can recall
I close my eyes and I can smell the dusty paper of the grocery bags.
I close my eyes and I can feel my heart racing as we were chased out of the theatre.
I close my eyes and I can see the long and overgrown green grass of the soccer field.
That same spring
Nearly a million people's last breath and smell was rotten and rife with sweat, urine, and blood.
Murderers crushed and ripped apart nearly a million hearts.
Murderers smashed shut nearly a million sets of eyes.
That same spring
Millions of people
knew.
And millions of people did
Nothing.
Today
Today
Today
Today
and everyday
I trudge with the grief of my own ignorance like a iron yoke on the shoulders of my soul.
The Guilt of the Silent: An Analysis of Raoul Peck's Sometimes in April
In 2004’s
Sometimes in April, director Raoul Peck creates a graphically accurate
account of the genocide that began after Hutu extremists and members of the
Presidential Guard shot down a plane carrying Rwandan President Habyarimana and
Burundian President Ntaryimira on 6 April 1994. This event ignited a killing spree that spread from Kigali
throughout the country, claiming the lives of over 800,000 people—507,000 of
them Tutsis (77% of registered Tutsi population),
[i]
in the span of 100 days.
[ii] While the film’s details of these 100
days reflect years of careful research by the director, Peck neglects several
key elements whose inclusion would strengthen his story’s purpose. From the start, the movie falls short
in offering deeper context to the relationship between the Hutus and Tutsis
throughout Rwanda’s history. While
the film captures the inaction of the international community throughout the
genocide well, the director’s decision to ignore the negligence and lethargy of
specific individuals and administrations is a disservice to all those
killed. Lastly, the film fails to
address the significance of current Rwandan President Paul Kagame’s decision to
initiate countrywide
gacaca
“grass courts” in 2001 in the midst of continuing deliberations by the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).
There
is little to criticize, however, in the Peck’s portrayal of the events
occurring in Rwanda during the genocide.
The movie’s action hinges on the relationship between fictional
characters Augustin, a moderate Hutu captain in the Rwandan military (married
to Jeanne, a Tutsi), and his brother Honoré, a popular “Hutu Power” radio DJ
for Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLM). During the genocide, the international community protests
RTLM as “hate” radio; its DJs
regularly list the names and addresses of Tutsis
and moderate Hutus so they can be targeted and killed. As violence erupts, Augustin fears for
his life and that of his family.
After much pleading, he convinces his brother to take his family to the
Hotel Mille Collines where they will be safe, deciding that his brother’s
reputation gives them the best chance to make it through the deadly roadblocks
in the capital city Kigali. After
successfully negotiating a few roadblocks run by civilian militia, Honoré comes
to one run by the military that he is unable to pass or bribe his way
through. Helpless to intervene, he
watches in anguish as Rwandan military soldiers murder his brother’s
family. Honoré sneaks back to the
pit under the cover of night—miraculously finds Jeanne alive, and carries her
to a local church. Jeanne survives
and is later taken by Rwandan soldiers and gang-raped repeatedly. In a fitting piece of justice (
one
based on real events), she grabs a soldier’s grenade and kills herself and a
group of them after a brutal rape session, to include a complicit priest (also
based on real events).
[iii] This narrative draws to a close as the
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by General Paul Kagame, defeats the Rwanda
military and militias, restores order and brings the genocide to an end. The other story told by the film, in
parallel, focuses on Honoré’s trial at the ICTR ten years later, and the two
brothers’ reconciliation. The
director uses their rapprochement to illustrate the complex nature of Rwanda’s
post-genocide growth and progress toward normalcy.
The
film itself begins by tracing the onset of ethnic conflict in Rwanda from the
post-World War II handover of colonial control from Germany to Belgium, noting
that for centuries Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa “shared the same culture, language and
religion.”
[iv]
While it is true that they all shared a common language, Kinyarwanda, whether
all three are part of the same ethnic group is a matter widely debated by
scholars.
[v] Furthermore, this opening statement
paints too rosy a picture, as it fails to acknowledge the Tutsi’s marked
centuries-long subjugation of the Hutus.
While these details do not excuse the genocide, including them would
offer insight into the psyche of the Hutus and the way in which it was
manipulated, ultimately leading to decades of horrific violence. The disagreement among scholars centers
on the argument that a better description of the Hutus and Tutsis is be one of
different ethnic groups living in the same society as part of a feudal or caste
system.
[vi] Regardless of the debate, what is clear
is that they lived in the same region among each other for more than a thousand
years. As different groups
(belonging to different families and following different leaders) settled into
the area, the cattle-herding pastoralists (the Tutsi people) consolidated power
and militarily established a rule (under
mwamis, or kings)
[vii] over the
region, creating an elite class that would evolve over the centuries. Not every cattle-herder was part of the
ruling class, however, and some farmers (Hutus) also rose to prominence
(especially those skilled in battle).
[viii] In general, a Hutu could become a Tutsi
if he bought enough cattle to elevate his social position. Although even if a Tutsi lost all of
his cattle, he would not then become a Hutu. So until the 1800’s, the terms Hutu and Tutsi retained a
degree of fluidity, and people were more apt to define themselves by a specific
region or lineage than by the term
Hutu or
Tutsi.
[ix] It was at the end of the 19
th
century, as society in Rwanda became more developed and complex that a degree
of rigidity emerged in how the ruling class defined itself. The Tutsi ruling
class came to define themselves by their power and wealth (typically measured
by the number of cattle owned). The masses and peasants did not own cattle and
were thus defined as subjects, or Hutus.
[x] It is worthwhile to note, that while
historians typically recount the relationship between ruler and ruled with a
degree of ambivalence, conquest and violence was an essential part of it. In the next century for instance, Hutus
would call for a ban on the
Kalinga,
the royal Tutsi drum decorated with the testicles of defeated Hutu princes.
[xi]
It
is then unfortunate that this consolidation and modernization by the ruling
class coincided with European conquest.
In an effort to maintain control and maximize economic benefit, the
Belgians torqued the system already in place, choosing to conduct official
communication only with the ruling class, this belief stemming from their own
warped ideas about racial superiority.
[xii] This interaction carried over to the
religious side as well until the 1930’s when Flemish priests replaced Belgian
Catholic ones. These typically
poor Flemish priests more closely related to the Hutus economically. So while educational
opportunities came, they were the second tier ones available through the
Catholic church. In contrast,
Tutsis received the superior French education available through the Belgian
government.
[xiii] It is at this point that the film
describes well the racial classification system put in place by Belgium, one
that included identity cards that listed the bearer as “Hutu” or “Tutsi.” In removing any chance for upward
mobility among those ruled (Hutus), the Belgians fostered a growing resentment
that would fester for several decades.
[xiv]
This
bitterness manifested itself in 1959, when Belgium rule ended, and power was
turned over to majority rule. On
28 January 1961, the majority (Hutus) spoke and deposed Tutsi King Kigeli V,
replacing him with Hutu president Grégoire Kayibanda.
[xv]
Over the next several decades, hundreds of thousands of Tutsi would flee the
country; by 1994 it was estimated that there were between 400-700 thousand
Rwandan Tutsis living outside the country.
[xvi] It is this long history that one finds
the
fuel for the fire that became the
genocide.
It
is in his description of the international response to this
fire that Peck falls short. The film’s primary focus for this is through the actions of
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Prudence Bushnell, and
through her efforts to influence the United States to act to intervene. True to the historical record, she is
roundly rebuffed by the administration above her when she tries to motivate
action. The film never names
those squelching her effort, however; nor does it delve into the specific
details of President Clinton’s blind eye.
These details are important because they offer insight into the U.S.
decision-making process and the efficacy of the United Nations. A day after the president’s plane
is shot down, the film shows Bushnell referring to a 9-week-old CIA report that
warned of the potential for widespread violence. Bushnell is reprimanded by an older white gentlemen (one
assumes this to be Secretary of State Warren Christopher) “not to bring up the
CIA report again.”
[xvii] The pacing of the film’s cuts to the
inaction in Washington exacerbates the lack of detail. In offering only infrequent cuts, Peck
fails to tell the viewer the scene’s place in the genocide’s timeline. Thus when the films shows an internal
USG debate via teleconference regarding the possibility of jamming the hate radio stations (a measure deemed “too expensive and illegal”)
[xviii],
the viewer doesn’t know that this debate occurred on or about 5 May, nearly a
month after the killings (roughly 200,000 dead)
[xix]
began.
[xx] Other than a few news clips of State
Department officials playing semantics with the term genocide on Day 65 of the
crisis (620,000 killed),
[xxi]
and a final shot of a nameless White House official thanking Bushnell for her
team’s work on the U.S. belated humanitarian response (which actually aided the
escape of many of the murderers), no other evidence of America’s action is
investigated.
This
omission is unfortunate because there are hundreds of previously classified
documents (all available at the time of the filming) that make it clear that
the U.S. was aware of the slaughter and murder of civilians at the highest
levels, and not only did nothing, but in some cases made efforts to ensure
others did nothing as well. Partly
in response to a request from the Belgian government for “cover’ in their
withdrawal
[xxii], on 15
April (64,000 dead)
[xxiii]
Christopher sent a cable to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. In it he stated the U.S. position that
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) must be withdrawn, an
imperative that would be echoed during a Security Council meeting at which the
Rwandan ambassador was present and able to communicate the information back to
the genocide’s perpetrators.
[xxiv] The Clinton administration, through
National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, continued to receive intelligence
reports on the killing to include a 26 April one stating that at least 100,000
had been killed.
[xxv] Perhaps most damning, however, is a 21
April letter from Rwandan human rights activist Monique Mujawamariya to
President Clinton; in the letter she writes of the genocide occurring and the
dire effect that a UNAMIR drawdown would have.
[xxvi] Clinton had met Mujawamariya the
previous year and when she went missing in Rwanda in early April, finding her
became a central task for his staff.
[xxvii] After she managed to escape Rwanda and
was found, however, her pleas—and her letter, went ignored by the White
House. At the United Nations, the
U.S. continued to stymie efforts to intervene. In a 28 April memo to Madeline Albright from Deputy Political
councilor to the UN John Boardman, he cautions her to remain “mostly in
listening mode… not commit [the] USG to anything.”
[xxviii] Early wording in the same memo makes it
clear that the U.S. was aware of “atrocities” being committed in Rwanda. The ambivalence and impotence of the
White House is best shown in that Rwandan assets in the U.S. were not frozen,
and diplomatic relations with the genocidal government were not cut off until
15 July, 11 days after the genocide’s end.
[xxix] During the films final seconds, the
words, “Of those who watched the genocide unfold and did nothing to stop it, no
one has been charged” appear on the screen. By using these documents, and
countless others available, Peck could have made clear exactly who
those who
watched the genocide unfold were.
Finally,
the film shows both the ICTR, as well as the
gacaca courts taking place in the countryside villages
where the genocide occurred. The
gacaca courts were instituted to address
the backlog of 110,000 alleged genocide perpetrators in 2001.
[xxx] Widely criticized by human rights
activists, the informal courts (led by ‘judges’ with only a modicum of legal
training) were held in the villages where the crimes occurred, and allowed
victims to confront their attackers directly. Peck fails to show these controversies, however; nor does he
show that in some cases the criminal’s confession itself was his only
punishment (in many cases it was a combination of confession and time served).
[xxxi] While the competing ideas of
retribution and justice in post-genocide Rwanda may have been too large a
project to address in an already long (2 hour and 15 minutes) film, the
director could have made clear that the
gacaca courts were a deliberate effort by Tutsi President
Kagame to help rebuild a sense of normalcy and an ability for Rwanda to move
forward.
[xxxii] In one of the most densely populated
countries in Africa,
[xxxiii]
it was clear that Hutus and Tutsi would have to live amongst each other as
their country recovered.
Given
an event as large and complex as the genocide in Rwanda, Peck does an admirable
job in addressing the ways in which the extremist elements of the Hutu military
and political militias took advantage of the Tutsis’ past systemic subjugation
of Hutus. The pervasive power of
this propaganda is well illustrated in the character of hate radio DJ
Honoré. As Peck superbly
captures the graphic and explicit imagery of genocide, he is in his element,
creating scenes that cannot be ignored, nor ever forgotten by the viewer. Thus it is all the more unfortunate
that the film’s beginning words by Martin Luther King Jr., “In the end, we will
remember not the words of our enemies, but the silence of our friends”
[xxxiv]
are not fully honored by naming those silent offenders in the United
States. Perhaps by holding these
mute transgressors accountable, future atrocities can be prevented.
[i.]. Alison
Liebhafsky Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 15.
[ii]. Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda,
“Timeline,” last modified April 1, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ghosts/etc/crontext.html.
[iii].
Sometimes in April, “Director’s Commentary,” directed by Raoul Peck
(2004; HBO Home Video, 2005), DVD.
[v]. Des Forges,
Leave None, 31.
[vi.].
Paul Nugent,
Africa Since Independence: A Comparative History, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 51, 499.
[vii]. Wayne Madsen,
Genocide and Covert
Operations in Africa, 1993-1999, (Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 100.
[viii]. Des Forges,
Leave None, 32.
[xi]. Madsen, Genocide and Covert
Operations, 101.
[xiv]. Sometimes in April, Peck.
[xv]. Madsen, Genocide and Covert
Operations, 103.
[xvi]. Nugent, Africa Since, 451.
[xvii]. Sometimes in April, Peck, 41:08.
[xix]. Frontline, “Timeline.”
[xx]. Frank G. Wisner, “DoD Memo, Rwanda:
Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts,”
The National Security Archive, The Genocide and the US in Rwanda, edited
by William Ferroggiaro, last modified August 20, 2001, http://www.gwu
.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw050594.pdf.
[xxi]. Sometimes in April, Peck, 1:38.
[xxii]. Samantha Powers, “Bystanders to
Genocide,” Atlantic Monthly, September
2001, http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/4571.
[xxiii]. Frontline, “Timeline.”
[xxiv]. Warren Christopher, “Talking Points on
the UNAMIR Withdrawal,” The National Security Archive, The Genocide and the US
in Rwanda, edited by William Ferroggiaro, last modified August 20, 2001,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB53/rw041594.pdf.
[xxv]. Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Report: “Rwanda: Genocide and Partition,” The National Security Archive, The US
and the Genocide and Rwanda, edited by William Ferroggiaro, last modified March
24, 2004, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw23.pdf.
[xxvi].
Monique Mujawamariya, letter to President Clinton, April 21, 1994, The National
Security Archive, The US and the Genocide and Rwanda, edited by William
Ferroggiaro, last modified March 24, 2004
, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/RW47.pdf.
[xxvii]. Powers, “Bystanders to Genocide,” VII.
[xxviii]. John S. Boardman, United Nations Memo
to Ambassador Albright, April 28, 1994, The National Security Archive, The US
and the Genocide and Rwanda, edited by William Ferroggiaro, last modified March
24, 2004, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv
/NSAEBB/NSAEBB117/Rw12.pdf.
[xxix]. Jared Cohen, One Hundred Days of
Silence: American and the Rwanda Genocide,
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefied, 2007), 148.
[xxx]. Nugent, Africa Since, 484.
[xxxi].
Philip Gourevitch, “The Life After: A Reporter at Large,” The New Yorker, May 4, 2009, http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.nps.edu/docview/233155205
/fulltext/134F41AF92127BBFB2B/1?accountid=12702.
[xxxii].
Gourevitch, “The Life After.”
[xxxiii].
Des Forges, Leave None, 31.
[xxxiv].
Sometimes in April, Peck.
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/02/sometimes-in-april-analysis-paper.html
. Having already seen the excellent 
, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 15.
, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 51, 499.
, (Lewiston,
NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999), 100.
