What role does ideology play in the establishment of a welfare regime?

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

My complete collection of Grad School Notes can be found here (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing, Islam, Comparative Politics).

In this essay I argue that ideology plays a critical role in the establishment of a welfare regime.  The modern welfare regime is inexorably tied to the ideology of liberalism, in stark contrast to its Marxist roots.  

In addressing the role of ideology within the creation of a welfare regime it is useful to define these terms.  An ideology usually develops when someone makes an observation about a phenomenon in society or history and creates a theory to explain it.  When this theory is transformed and becomes an explanation for everything—usually as a normative mindset—it becomes an ideology.  An ideology asserts that its worldview can explain any problem, conflict  or occurrence.   In its comprehensiveness then it is very useful but logically it can be very circular and unsatisfying.  Ideologies are most often characterized by an -ism (e.g., communism, marxism, objectivism, liberalism, fascism, feminism).  

A welfare regime is a government whose laws and policies seek to provide for some measure of the wealth (in the holistic sense) of the entire people.   Typically the elements of this welfare include shelter, security, education, health care and subsistence.  This idea’s ideological roots harken back to Hobbes’ conception of the social contract—the agreement by which people cede elements of their individual freedom for the good of the whole.  The abdication of rights transforms a person’s natural state from one that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” to one that emerges in concert with a state’s creation.  With only the church and private charities to provide for a population’s welfare prior to the emergence of the welfare state, Hobbes’ description of most people’s lives was an apt one.

The specific ideology that a state embraces plays a pivotal role in the development of its welfare regime.  Today this development is a foregone conclusion as nearly every state is a welfare one in some measure.  There are a plethora of catalysts for this progression but the most fundamental one is that of risk mitigation.  Failing to provide at least a modicum of welfare puts a state at risk for social instability and upheaval (from revolution), international economic decline (from competition) and strategic political decline (from global competitors).  If risk management is the primary influence on a welfare regime, then a state’s interpretation of social justice is an important secondary factor.  

While the modern (post World War II) welfare state is a product of liberalism’s influence on the tension between democracy’s conception of political equality and capitalism’s conception of economic inequality, its true roots are in Marxism.  The normative concept of class equality is a central underlying principle of a welfare regime.  Few states espouse the severe notion of class conflict as a sole driving force anymore but nearly all now recognize the insidious destabilizing effect of chasmic economic and political inequality.  When an ideology eventually disappears (and all do), it does so either because it failed or because everyone ended up believing it.  Whereas an idea like fascism failed, echoes of Marxism live on today.  

The liberalist notion that individual freedoms must be protected is the balancing factor that tempers the excesses of the capitalist market.  As Crepaz points out, this balance manifests uniquely in different states.  Sweden, Germany and the United States all place their baseline level of economic equality at different marks.  The width of an acceptable gap determines the level of welfare provisions by the state.  In these examples the aforementioned circular nature of ideology is instructive as Crepaz shows that even the liberal belief in individual freedom for all becomes tempered when the all includes people deemed to be outsiders.  The evolving notion of liberalism will continue to affect the level of welfare provided as states continue to embrace liberal democracy.  

Why do some scholars view popular sovereignty as the ‘dark side’ of democracy? Are they correct?

In this essay I argue that scholars’ assertions that the majority will of the people is the “dark side” of democracy are not without merit but that overall long-term stability is the most common product of democracy.  The coupling of robust liberalism with democracy serves to mitigate the deleterious effects of popular sovereignty.  

Popular sovereignty is the process by which a government derives its legitimacy from the will of its people.  This process is one indelibly tied to the idea of a democracy—a word whose etymology refers to the notion of the common people (with common used in the inclusive sense of the word) determining and controlling government rule and power.  The will of the people is then determined by elections.  It is from this important step that the roots of the darker side of democracy stem.  Holding elections means people necessarily organizing into groups, thereby mobilizing a population.  Anytime groups are formed, however, people are excluded and this exclusion becomes selective and carries consequences when tied to election results.  The actions that occur following this selective exclusion are the true “dark side” of democracy.  

While the origin of the term is much debated (Alexis de Tocqueville, John Adams, William McKinley have all used it in differing forms), the empirical truth of the “tyranny of the majority” is not.   This phrase points out that majority will should not be equated with moral rectitude.  The history of the United States is instructive as its majority consistently not only excluded, but persecuted, myriad groups of people (e.g., blacks, women, gays and native Americans).  None of this is to argue for dictatorship or authoritarianism; in these systems the will of all people outside the ruler’s inner circle is excluded and the population is left to the “tyranny of a minority.”  

Scholar Jackson-Preece expounds upon democracy’s evil shadow at length as she discusses ethnic cleansing as a ubiquitous tool used in the creation of a plethora of nation-states throughout the 20th century.  Following both world wars, the democratic victors approved and ordered the population transfers of ethnic populations en masse in successful efforts to create homogenous nation-states throughout Europe.  The relationship between holding democratic elections and a peaceful family being ripped from the farm on which their family has lived for generations requires a closer analysis of the true culprit—the process of democratization.  The mobilization associated with elections most often occurs along ethnic lines.  This ethno-nationalism always creates conflicts as groups struggle for power and security.  As Muller shows, the breakup up three massive empires following World War I required the creation of a slew of new nation-states.  The victors (to include President Woodrow Wilson) attempted to do this by realigning borders to ethnic populations (operating under the primordialist assumption that homogenous nation-states were the best solution).  This imperfect and imprecise process in turn created new minorities that needed or were forced to move.  The transfer process (after both world wars) was poorly supervised and even more ineffectively managed at the cost of millions of lives.  It is the burgundy blood of these deaths that color and darken democracy’s underbelly.  

Democracy’s underbelly is no darker, however, than that of any other form of governance.  Winston Churchill captured this sentiment well when he stated, “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.”  While the path to democratization did mean millions of deaths, its end state also produced a remarkable level of overall stability and lasting peace throughout Europe.  It is the process of creating a democracy that one must focus on to prevent a violent and destructive past from reoccurring.  In this process, an emphasis must be placed on establishing the tenets of liberalism.  In most cases this means creating the institutions and regulations (typically through a constitution) to protect the individual freedoms of all a state’s inhabitants.   Only through the injection of robust liberalism into the democratization process can, not only lasting peace and stability be achieved, but also a peaceful and humane transition process.  

AIDS in Africa: A Death Sentence for Whom?

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.
Link to all my grad school notes and papers here.
An essay from my NS3321 US Foreign Policy in Africa class at NPS

In evaluating the design and execution of U.S. foreign policy in Africa with regard to HIV/AIDS, one must consider the United States’ own history that served as the initial motivating factor and which shaped (and continues to shape) the scope of our involvement.  HIV/AIDS erupted and ripped through the United States beginning in the 1980s.  With infections most vocally felt within the urban gay community, an HIV-positive diagnosis equaled a death sentence during the early years.  David France’s documentary “How to Survive a Plague” tells the story the herculean efforts by dedicated activists members of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACTUP) and the Treatment Action Group (TAG) who waged a guerilla campaign of protests and stunts over a decade and a half that forced the U.S. government to acknowledge and address the problem.  The pharmaceutical industry was also a primary target and activists’ lobbying efforts forced the industry to innovate and streamline testing and development processes, as well as pricing.  These men and women (many of them HIV-positive and slowly dying themselves) were directly responsible for the 1996 antiretroviral therapy drugs (ARV) breakthrough that represented a turning point for the pandemic in the United States (Schneider, 7).

These lobbying efforts reaped incredible dividends for the United States—a developed nation with a modern health care system—curbing new HIV infections and enabling near universal treatment for those living with AIDS by the late 90’s.  For most nations in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), however, new infections continued to skyrocket and the majority of those living with HIV/AIDS were unable to get needed treatment.  Of the 33 million HIV infections globally, two-thirds are in SSA (Lyman, 74-5). What are the mechanisms and agencies responsible for U.S. HIV/AIDS policy?  What were the initial policies and goals?  How have these changed since their inception?  In this essay I argue that while morally well intentioned, the U.S. HIV/AIDS policy has been doomed from the start due to mirror-imaging and an ignorance of the reality on the ground in most Africa nations.  I begin by outlining the central actors and their initial policies and goals.  Then I analyze the effectiveness of the design of the myriad programs themselves.  Next, I evaluate the manner in which the U.S. has executed its programs and policies.  Finally, I address the local realities of most African states that stymie the prospect for fiscal independence.

The global effort to fight HIV/AIDS is a dizzying array of agencies, countries, individuals and organizations.  With regard to U.S. policy there are also a plethora of players but the thrust of the American international effort began with President George W. Bush’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2003.  The year prior, the National Security Strategy (NSS) took into account new societal indicators from increasingly accurate and far-reaching data collection agencies and placed an increased emphasis on global health (especially infectious diseases) as a stabilizing factor for partner nations (CFR, 65).  In a marked departure from a U.S. policy that had previously focused on HIV/AIDS prevention since the early 1990’s, 1993’s bipartisan PEPFAR expanded the policy to focus on treatment through a bilateral approach (CFR, 65, 68).  Its immediate focus was to prevent further deaths; in 2004 2.3 million people in SSA died as a result of AIDS (CFR, 66).  Congress originally approved its design as a $15 billion five-year long program that would focus on 23 African states and 3 others outside the continent. PEPFAR’s stated goal was to deliver ARV treatment to two million people (this was 55% of its budget), prevent the infection of seven million more and provide orphan care for 10 million children (CFR, 64-5).  These treatment efforts were helped by former president Clinton’s foundation that negotiated with various pharmaceutical companies to garner agreements to produce generic ARV drugs.  These efforts drove down prices for first-line ARV drugs to just $86 per patient per year (Schneider, 10).  Since its beginning, PEPFAR has greatly expanded.  From 2005 to 2008, the U.S. spent $25 billion, an increase in keeping with a $6 billion increase of U.S. assistance to Africa between 2001 and 2009 (Lyman, 73).  By 2009, PEPFAR had provided treatment for half of the four million who received treatment that year—this still left, however, another six million unable to get any ARV treatment (Lyman, 74-5). 

Six year later, President Obama’s administration passed PEPFAR II which

authorized $48 billion to be spent from the fall of 2009 through the fall of 2014 (Schneider, 2014).  While this is a staggering sum, its efficacy has been stymied in part due to the allocation process, where decisions on its use and implementation are made not by healthcare professionals and scientists but by politicians (i.e., congressmen).  In concert with PEPFAR II, the president established the Global Health Initiative (GHI) that same year in an expansive attempt to tackle the problem of global health.  While PEPFAR falls under its umbrella, GHI’s official purpose is to build up foreign health-care infrastructures and systems so that nations are able to develop their own capacity to provide and care for their populace (Lyman, 77).   Central to this task is eliminating redundancies and ensuring a maximal return for U.S. effort and investment.  It aims to accomplish this through a “whole of government” approach that uses a principals committee composed of the USAID Administrator, the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (who reports directly to the Secretary of State) and the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).  Through this triad, they further consolidate the efforts of NGOs, IGOs and the DoD.

The Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) was created as part of PEPFAR and is today headed by Ambassador Eric Goosby.  He oversees the implementation of PEPFAR and coordinates the U.S. government interaction with the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.  This position also leads the newly created Office of Global Health Diplomacy that supports the goals of the GHI as well as coordination of diplomatic-health efforts at the country team level.

Outside of the direct purview of the U.S. government are two other key players in the effort against HIV/AIDS: the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (Global Fund).  While neither of these are direct instruments of U.S. foreign policy, their funding and efforts are deeply enmeshed with Washington’s.  UNAIDS developed out of the World Health Organization and was created in 1996 to synchronize the global UN efforts against AIDS.  It also aggregates global HIV/AIDS data and assists developing states in implementing sound AIDS policy and strategies (Schneider, 7).   The Global Fund is an international organization launched in 2002 to independently and multilaterally finance the battle against the three aforementioned diseases (CFR, 63-4).   Originally setting out to close the gap in funding needed to effectively combat the three diseases, its function was never that of an implementer but rather a collector and distributer of funding received by states and private donors (Schneider, 8). In 2005, over half of its funding went to Africa and more than half of those funds were appropriated for HIV/AIDS (CFR, 72).  The Fund’s efforts and fundraising are complicated, though, by large principal donors such as the United States (who contributed $1.05 billion in 2010) who must balance its own contributions with its principle bilateral PEPFAR efforts.

The impetus and arc of American policy today largely stems from the 2005 G-8 Summit’s pledge to enable “as close as possible to universal access to treatment for all those who need it by 2010” (Lyman, 80-81).  While this promise by eight of the world’s wealthiest

countries was a morally laudable one, its design also reflected a clear ignorance on their part as to the realities on the ground in most developing states (especially in Africa).  Practically, this commitment meant funding a lifetime of treatments (typically three to four decades for the average 20 or 30 year old Africa AIDS patient).  Ultimately, this idea of universal access may be discarded as impractical with a greater proportion of a finite amount of funding dedicated to prevention (Lyman, 80-81). 

For wealthy nations like the U.S., there was a mirror-imaging assumption that simply pouring more money into SSA could solve the problem as it had done in the U.S.  This was further complicated by a lack of understanding of HIV/AIDS as a disease—this was due to both its recent emergence and to how relatively quickly it was slowed in the United States.  The reality on the ground in SSA was that Africa was not one country but 49 states with separate needs and problems.  In SSA, there were not 49 effective and modern national health care systems.   There were not 49 effective CDCs.  There were not 49 nations with modern transportation systems capable of connecting the country.  There were not 49 states with the medical staff needed to implement and treat millions of AIDS patients.  There were not 49 African presidents who all recognized the importance of preventing and treating HIV/AIDS.  There were not even 23 states (the initial PEPFAR focus) that possessed any of these prerequisites.   This oversight partially came from a lack of any corporate memory within the U.S. of what it takes to perform tasks such as building a national health care system or a CDC—or what its like to live in a state without them.  This same could be said for America’s initial misunderstanding of malaria treatment in Africa. Malaria was highly prevalent throughout the southern United States up until the first half of the 20th century.  American only eradicated malaria in 1949 because as a nation it had industrialized and possessed the government infrastructure necessary to implement a massive three-year DDT campaign through the South.  There are very few fully industrialized nations with similar modern infrastructures in SSA today.   

As expected with a morally admirable but structurally flawed design, the execution of U.S. HIV/AIDS policy in Africa has had its peaks and valleys.  A high point came in 2004, when the U.S., the UK and UNAIDS agreed to work with NGOs and donors to synthesize their efforts through “The Three Ones” policy: one common action framework, one National HIV/AIDS Coordinating Authority and one country-level monitoring and evaluation system (M&E) (CFR, 74).  While this policy and moment is much touted within the websites and documents of most health organizations, it has yet to materialize practically more than eight years later.  A large hurdle to it lies in the capacity of the countries themselves.  A country level M&E system means that there needs to be an effective national AIDS council which can act as a synchronizer for the myriad organizations and bodies within a state.  For many states in Africa this is still an un-scalable hurdle.  Furthermore, there is scant evidence of implementation for the other two principles.

Today there is a common lamentation that decries the deleterious effect of U.S. humanitarian assistance in Africa thus far as an expenditure that has provided little to no political leverage for its investment (Lyman, 75-7).  These critics largely miss the point of the nature of the U.S. commitment.  When poorly understood moral imperatives are intertwined into policy decisions, one cannot expect positive results (Lyman, 83). Disdain for the inability of the State Department to influence political change in Uganda, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia miss the mark from a logical standpoint.  The U.S. commitment to fighting HIV/AIDS in Africa did not begin as a political effort to promote western democratization.  How then can it be evaluated in the same vein?  Furthermore, these

critics ignore longtime U.S. support for other African dictators, such as those in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt.  The point is that one loses credibility when one cherry picks which countries “need” democratization.  Ultimately, those inside the Beltway need to be dissuaded of their assumptions that aid necessarily buys influence, especially aid dedicated to food and medical assistance (i.e., between 80% and 90% of U.S assistance in Africa) (Lyman, 76,83). 

Aside from this perceived lack of return on investment, as a public relations campaign PEPFAR has created a lasting tide of U.S. popularity in Africa (the elite-excepted).  The price of this popularity, however, is likely to be costly (Lyman, 81-82).  In the long-term, if the U.S. (even in concert with the G-8) was able to ensure universal treatment, the practical output of that achievement would mean a century-long fiscal commitment to fund the treatment (Lyman, 82).  Strategies to broaden the number of countries that support programs may certainly lighten the U.S. load but do little to correct a misguided arc.  Strategies and funding must instead focus on health infrastructure development (a central, if underfunded, GHI objective) and reducing redundancies of effort. This seems unlikely, though, with $51 of the $61 billion GHI budget going toward PEPFAR in 2010 (Lyman, 79).  The entire international community involvement must be invited and encouraged under the auspices of an international organization such as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS (Lyman, 84).  A thoughtful and gradual departure from using HIV/AIDS assistance as a hopeful political tool could free valuable U.S. budget dollars to the Global Fund and other endeavors and help break the cycle of aid dependence so prevalent in most African states. 

A large detractor of much of the U.S. progress is that these stated financial aid commitments require a lasting fidelity and longevity over the course of numerous electoral and budgetary cycles—a monumental if not impossible task.  One example of this is President Obama’s pledge to honor the U.S. commitment to bring the number of those receiving ARV treatment in Africa up to four million by 2014.  Such a goal requires yearly increases in budget allocation—increases that weren’t met in 2011 (Lyman, 78).  Practically these inconsistencies damage progress made by organizations on the ground and have trickle down effects on those receiving treatment.  These patients sometimes share their medication with infected family members who are unable to enroll in underfunded local ARV treatment programs (Lyman 78-9).  While morally laudable, these patchwork strategies by infected local citizens only weaken the ARV treatment’s efficacy and put more people at risk for infection (Lyman, 79). 

In countries where U.S. policy has been successful, there have been two key contributing factors: leadership buy-in and government capacity (especially within its health care ministry).  The leadership buy-in needs to occur at both the U.S. Embassy level (i.e., from DOS/USAID down to the Ambassador) and within the country’s political leadership itself (CFR, 66-67).  In South Africa, the missing element for a number of years was the leadership buy-in. It wasn’t until Jacob Zuma took the reins that the government recognized the importance of taking decisive steps to combat new infections and to treat existing ones (Lyman, 79-80).  In most Africa states, however, the enthusiasm of its leaders cannot overcome dilapidated or non-existent health care systems.  These efforts are further hampered by personnel shortages in the health care system that are driven by shortfalls in both retention and recruitment (CFR, 70). 

Overall, the execution of American HIV/AIDS policy is becoming an increasingly precarious balancing act.  Each year an increasing portion of the PEPFAR budget is allocated towards treatment which means that less goes to combatting new infections (Lyman, 79)—this is a trend likely to only increase as lifetime patients develop immune resistance to first-line ARV drugs.  This problem is exacerbated by the inability of African states to pay for HIV/AIDS treatment within their borders. Despite the promises of the 2001 Abuja Declaration, the goal of  

15% of national budgets being dedicated to building capacity within the health sector remain a distant dream for nearly every SSA nation (Schneider, 8). 

From a practical perspective, the prospect of the average citizen in an Africa country being able to afford their own treatment in the foreseeable future is highly unlikely.  In 2011, the GDP Purchasing Power Parity per capita (PPP) of every state in Africa was less than $25,000 with more than 85% of countries coming in below $10,000.  This means that even a yearly treatment cost of $86 (the price in 2007 for the most common ARV combination) is well outside the average family budget (Schneider, 10).  Couple this poverty with a widespread economic disparity (i.e., GINI index rating for the few African states that have a rating) and the likelihood that most Africans living with AIDS will ever be able to afford their own treatment is nil. 

Even in a relatively wealthy country such as South Africa, 50% of its HIV/AIDS funding is externally sourced (Lyman, 79-80).  As countries like South Africa make steps broaden access to treatment, they are forced to cut or freeze funding for other health initiatives.  The commentary of a trio of South African bioethicists carries applicability beyond the borders of their nation:  “It would be medically, politically and morally—and probably—legally—unacceptable for expanded treatment of the HIV population to come at an unacceptable cost to patients who bear the burden of other chronic diseases and health conditions . . .” (Lyman, 80).   The call for universal access as a moral imperative is a slippery slope.  While few would make the emotional argument that a poor man in Senegal does not deserve access to the same second-line ARV as a wealthy one in Chicago—the follow-on reasoning then assumes the same should be said for cancer treatment and costly organ transplants, etc. (Schneider, 4).  Meanwhile, the overwhelming apportionment of humanitarian assistance toward HIV/AIDS the past decade amounts to wealthy states playing God as they decide which diseases and social conditions are the most important.

Today, HIV/AIDS certainly no longer carries a death sentence for those with access to and the means to pay for ARV treatment.  Without a vaccine or cure, however, much is still unknown about the long-term path and associated costs of the disease.  With no official U.S. policy (i.e., funding) focused on finding a cure or vaccine, that “no major viral epidemic [was ever] defeated without a vaccine” must serve as a stark warning for those trying to determine the future of U.S. fiscal support (Lyman, 84).  Even if a vaccine were to be discovered in the near future, the infrastructure does not exist in most Africa states (or the U.S.) to immunize hundreds of millions of adults (Schneider, 2).   In the meantime, with aging patients increasingly requiring second and third-line ARV treatment it is difficult to predict what the coming century will hold.   It is clear, however, that the U.S. must depart from a short-sighted policy that fails to focus on treating both the cause (i.e., prevention and poverty) and the cure (i.e., health care infrastructure).  If the United States does not devise a strategy by which it can withdraw from bilateral commitments that will become increasingly unaffordable in the future, AIDS may end up spelling a death sentence for the nation’s influence and prestige around the globe.

Everything I learned about Achebe in Monterey

I've moved where I track my Africa reads to Beyond Achebe: A Literary Atlas--come check it out and let me know what you think.

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

Here are links to all things Achebe that I posted during Grad School:

Great Medium Post on Yeats' "Second Coming" poem and "Things Fall Apart" title

British and French Legacies in Africa Essay
Nigeria's Promise, Africa's Hope NYT article by Achebe
Arrow of God Discussion Notes and Summary
Things Fall Apart Discussion Notes and Summary
Man of the People Discussion Notes and Summary
Anthills of Savannah Discussion Notes and Summary
No Longer at Ease Discussion Notes and Summary

A young Achebe

Amazigh-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

Amazigh-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

Finally getting around to posting my thesis.  I've posted it as PDF below.

ABSTRACT:

As some of North Africa’s original inhabitants, the indigenous Amazigh population in

Morocco and Algeria has withstood waves of invaders to retain a distinct cultural and

linguistic identity that has persisted within—and despite—nearly fourteen centuries of

Arab rule. The emergence of Morocco and Algeria as modern nation-states following

their independence marked the beginning of an ongoing tension between each state and

its ethnic Amazigh minorities. With one state (i.e., Morocco) more inclusive and

progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e., Algeria), what are the

factors that explain the different outcomes in both states?

This study compares the two movements in Algeria and Morocco by investigating

the relative salience of two central variables—that of each state’s institutions and the

behavior of its movements—on the outcomes for the Amazigh community. The major

finding is that state institutions stand as the most potent variable due to their ability to

channel movement strategies towards either militancy or accommodation. This power is

largely illustrated through Morocco’s reliance on cooptation as an initial response to

expressions of grievance that has produced a milder form of activism. In contrast, Algeria

has defaulted to a more repressive approach (to any dissent) that has produced a strident

activism with radical offshoots. Movement behavior continues to play a secondary role

that largely hinges on its ability to use globalization as an amplifying and mobilizing

instrument for international pressure.

https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B4BE1_xKfeEUTDlQc2c5UHRkVmc/edit?usp=sharing

Imazighen-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

Imazighen-State Relations in Morocco and Algeria

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Research Question

As ancient inhabitants of North Africa, the Berber populace has survived more than a millennium of invasions and myriad regime policies.[1]  Over the centuries their identity has oscillated between a proud ethnic one, a dormant marginalized one, an insular tribal one and one struggling for its voice in society.  Their ability to survive and to maintain a distinct ethnic identity throughout it all has largely been a product of negotiations and interactions with ruling regimes and an ability to balance an ethos of fierce resistance (and independence) with an evolving concept of their own group identity.  These group identities (i.e. the regional Berber tribes unique to Algeria and Morocco) have remained in various degrees of tension with a gradually developing Arab-Islamic identity since the Arab invasion in the 7^th century.   During the battle for colonial independence, the Berbers consistently fought against the French and Spanish occupiers.  After independence, however, these two states each embraced unique forms of government and experienced subsequent, but varied, periods of political instability and violence due to regime changes and rebellion.  Throughout this process, Islamism (i.e. political Islam) developed and emerged as a major movement while a collective national identity superseded the Berber one for several decades.  This substrata Berber identity existed only passively until the rise of identity politics in the 1970’s.  An increasingly mobilized Berber movement would actively pursue language objectives beginning in the 1990’s and continuing into the new century.

In Morocco today the Berber movement remains strong but divided.  King Mohamed’s July 2001 creation of l’Institut Royal de Culture Amazigh (IRCAM) has created a split that still exists today with many members of the Amazigh Cultural Movement (MCA) refusing to participate in what they view as the monarchy’s attempt to co-opt and temper their movement.  Politically, Berber activists have increasingly rejected the loyalist Mouvement Populaire (MP); the most radical activists forming the Parti Democrate Amazigh Marocaine (PDAM) in 2005. This party was eventually banned by the Moroccan judiciary as illegal due to legislative prohibitions on regional or ethnic political parties.[2]  After the widespread protests fueled by the Arab Spring’s success in neighboring Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the movement won recognition of Tamazight as an official language alongside Arabic.  Even this victory remains as subject of controversy with some in the movement lambasting it as only a token concession by the palace and part of a broader (and successful) effort to weaken the February 20^th movement.[3] 

Despite being overwhelmingly concentrated in the Kabylie region of Algeria, the Mouvement Culturel Berbere (MCB) has been consistent in its longtime advocacy for linguistic and cultural recognition of Berbers as a whole versus Kabylia regionally.  This national outlook is not monolithic, though, in 2001 Kabyle singer and activist Ferhat Mehenni created the Movement for the Autonomy of Kabylia (MAK).  The MAK asserts that because the MCB and long-time Berber supported opposition political parties (e.g., Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS) and Rassemblement pour la Culture Democratie (RCD)) have all failed in effecting reform within the Algerian state as a whole, the focus should shift for reform at the regional level.  Based in Paris, however, the MAK remains an outlier, especially due to its pro-Israel stance.  Overall, the Berber movement in Algeria remains hamstrung in its efforts to promote a national agenda by its weak regional political base and geographic seclusion.  The future of the movement may hinge on its ability to leverage its demands for recognition of its cultural and linguistic autonomy with an agreement to cooperate in pursuing burgeoning Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) forces in the mountainous Kabylia regions.[4]

The past 40 years have witnessed considerable struggles for the sizable Berber minority populations in both states.  There is an opportunity to investigate the outcomes of these struggles vis-a-vis the Algerian and Moroccan state policies.  This examination of state-movement relations may explain the two very different outcomes for Berber populations in both states as affected by the state.  With one state (i.e. Morocco) more inclusive and progressive and the other more repressive and exclusionary (i.e. Algeria), what are the factors that explain these different outcomes?   Since the awakening of a Berber identity in the late 1970’s through the Arab Spring to 2012, has one factor been most influential and emerged most consistently, or are the explanations specific to time and state?   This thesis aims to identify the factors that influence Algerian and Moroccan state interactions with their Berber minority populations.

---

[1] Mordechai Nisan, Minorities in the Middle East : A History of Struggle and Self-Expression, Vol. Second Edition (Jefferson, N.C: McFarland, 2002), 54.

[2] Michael J. Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 220-222.

[3] “North Africa’s Berbers Get Boost from Arab Spring,” The Cortez Journal (May 5, 2012).

[4] Ibid., 223-225.