Is nationalism a social movement?

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

My complete collection of Grad School Notes can be found here (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing, Islam, Comparative Politics).

To address whether or not nationalism is a social movement requires the examination of both terms’ definition in detail.  In this essay I argue that while nationalism generally meets many of the tenets of a social movement, its categorization as one depends on which theory of the origins of nationalism to which one ascribes.

Connor notes that most scholars define a nation as a group of people that share a common language, geographic territory or religion.  A primordialist would expand upon this definition and assert that nations are defined by groups of people that have the perception (if not the genetic reality) of “shared blood.”  In the majority of cases, these groups of similar people can also be called ethnicities.  When formal boundaries are drawn for a given ethnicity—this is effectively politics—a nation is created.  This process of creating a border and seeking self-determination by a mobilized common group of people is nationalism.  It nearly always involves conflict with another group.  Muller notes that most Americans are far more familiar with civic nationalism (i.e., a common geographic territorial identity as the definition of a nation) despite the fact that ethnic nationalism has been a far more prevalent occurrence globally, as well as throughout most of the United States’ own history.

A social movement is a group of people that band together with a specific goal (e.g., autonomy, equal rights) and a collective identity (e.g., Mormon, Black, Gay).  They occur most often when there is not a political or institutional means by which they can solve their grievances.  A group’s collective identity is important because one of the primary goals of a social movement is to push that identity to the forefront of the political establishment.   In parallel with their efforts for recognition and a public platform, their overall goals emerge as an organic product of their identity.  The process of mobilization itself is paramount as it is typically characterized by initial steps to raise public awareness of the problem (e.g., media, letter-writing campaigns, social media) and then by steps intended to provoke corrective action by a government (e.g., public demonstrations, strikes, marches, boycotts).  Typically successful social movements are nonviolent, especially when they aim to effect regime change.  Efforts to topple a regime qualify as social movements when there are no established mechanisms to change a state’s leadership (i.e., under a dictatorship or authoritarian regime).  Sharp successfully argues for a nonviolent strategy to overthrow a recalcitrant regime in his seminal work From Dictatorship to Democracy, a book that has become a playbook for social movements globally.  By espousing nonviolence, social movements avoid playing to a government’s strength—its monopoly on force.  Through defiance and disobedience—coupled with an overarching grand strategy—movements can provide the necessary pressure to achieve their goals.

The process of an ethnic group mobilizing for the common goal of their own nation certainly meets the cursory definitions of a social movement.  It often stands a separate, however, for several reasons.  Namely, the gap occurs because of the many competing theories for why nationalism occurs.  The primordialist explanation asserts nationalism occurs in an ancient, timeless plane that emerges out of fixed unchanging identities.  This slow and organic process does not match the mobilization elements and speed of a social movement.  The structuralist believes that the state makes the nation and that nationalism emerges as a product of modernity.  This idea of nationalism as a product of an environment ignores the role of people so crucial to a social movement.  Only the instrumentalist explanation matches the categorization of nationalism as a social movement.  Instrumentalists believe that the choices of people matter and that nationalism is a dynamic process that can occur quickly.  Ultimately, all three theories on the origins of nationalism have merit and can be substantiated empirically at various points in history.  The process of identifying the instances when nationalism was a social movement proves useful as it highlights the cases where a group did affect, promote and establish their own identity and nation.

What role does ideology play in the establishment of a welfare regime?

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

My complete collection of Grad School Notes can be found here (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing, Islam, Comparative Politics).

In this essay I argue that ideology plays a critical role in the establishment of a welfare regime.  The modern welfare regime is inexorably tied to the ideology of liberalism, in stark contrast to its Marxist roots.  

In addressing the role of ideology within the creation of a welfare regime it is useful to define these terms.  An ideology usually develops when someone makes an observation about a phenomenon in society or history and creates a theory to explain it.  When this theory is transformed and becomes an explanation for everything—usually as a normative mindset—it becomes an ideology.  An ideology asserts that its worldview can explain any problem, conflict  or occurrence.   In its comprehensiveness then it is very useful but logically it can be very circular and unsatisfying.  Ideologies are most often characterized by an -ism (e.g., communism, marxism, objectivism, liberalism, fascism, feminism).  

A welfare regime is a government whose laws and policies seek to provide for some measure of the wealth (in the holistic sense) of the entire people.   Typically the elements of this welfare include shelter, security, education, health care and subsistence.  This idea’s ideological roots harken back to Hobbes’ conception of the social contract—the agreement by which people cede elements of their individual freedom for the good of the whole.  The abdication of rights transforms a person’s natural state from one that is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” to one that emerges in concert with a state’s creation.  With only the church and private charities to provide for a population’s welfare prior to the emergence of the welfare state, Hobbes’ description of most people’s lives was an apt one.

The specific ideology that a state embraces plays a pivotal role in the development of its welfare regime.  Today this development is a foregone conclusion as nearly every state is a welfare one in some measure.  There are a plethora of catalysts for this progression but the most fundamental one is that of risk mitigation.  Failing to provide at least a modicum of welfare puts a state at risk for social instability and upheaval (from revolution), international economic decline (from competition) and strategic political decline (from global competitors).  If risk management is the primary influence on a welfare regime, then a state’s interpretation of social justice is an important secondary factor.  

While the modern (post World War II) welfare state is a product of liberalism’s influence on the tension between democracy’s conception of political equality and capitalism’s conception of economic inequality, its true roots are in Marxism.  The normative concept of class equality is a central underlying principle of a welfare regime.  Few states espouse the severe notion of class conflict as a sole driving force anymore but nearly all now recognize the insidious destabilizing effect of chasmic economic and political inequality.  When an ideology eventually disappears (and all do), it does so either because it failed or because everyone ended up believing it.  Whereas an idea like fascism failed, echoes of Marxism live on today.  

The liberalist notion that individual freedoms must be protected is the balancing factor that tempers the excesses of the capitalist market.  As Crepaz points out, this balance manifests uniquely in different states.  Sweden, Germany and the United States all place their baseline level of economic equality at different marks.  The width of an acceptable gap determines the level of welfare provisions by the state.  In these examples the aforementioned circular nature of ideology is instructive as Crepaz shows that even the liberal belief in individual freedom for all becomes tempered when the all includes people deemed to be outsiders.  The evolving notion of liberalism will continue to affect the level of welfare provided as states continue to embrace liberal democracy.  

Why do some scholars view popular sovereignty as the ‘dark side’ of democracy? Are they correct?

In this essay I argue that scholars’ assertions that the majority will of the people is the “dark side” of democracy are not without merit but that overall long-term stability is the most common product of democracy.  The coupling of robust liberalism with democracy serves to mitigate the deleterious effects of popular sovereignty.  

Popular sovereignty is the process by which a government derives its legitimacy from the will of its people.  This process is one indelibly tied to the idea of a democracy—a word whose etymology refers to the notion of the common people (with common used in the inclusive sense of the word) determining and controlling government rule and power.  The will of the people is then determined by elections.  It is from this important step that the roots of the darker side of democracy stem.  Holding elections means people necessarily organizing into groups, thereby mobilizing a population.  Anytime groups are formed, however, people are excluded and this exclusion becomes selective and carries consequences when tied to election results.  The actions that occur following this selective exclusion are the true “dark side” of democracy.  

While the origin of the term is much debated (Alexis de Tocqueville, John Adams, William McKinley have all used it in differing forms), the empirical truth of the “tyranny of the majority” is not.   This phrase points out that majority will should not be equated with moral rectitude.  The history of the United States is instructive as its majority consistently not only excluded, but persecuted, myriad groups of people (e.g., blacks, women, gays and native Americans).  None of this is to argue for dictatorship or authoritarianism; in these systems the will of all people outside the ruler’s inner circle is excluded and the population is left to the “tyranny of a minority.”  

Scholar Jackson-Preece expounds upon democracy’s evil shadow at length as she discusses ethnic cleansing as a ubiquitous tool used in the creation of a plethora of nation-states throughout the 20th century.  Following both world wars, the democratic victors approved and ordered the population transfers of ethnic populations en masse in successful efforts to create homogenous nation-states throughout Europe.  The relationship between holding democratic elections and a peaceful family being ripped from the farm on which their family has lived for generations requires a closer analysis of the true culprit—the process of democratization.  The mobilization associated with elections most often occurs along ethnic lines.  This ethno-nationalism always creates conflicts as groups struggle for power and security.  As Muller shows, the breakup up three massive empires following World War I required the creation of a slew of new nation-states.  The victors (to include President Woodrow Wilson) attempted to do this by realigning borders to ethnic populations (operating under the primordialist assumption that homogenous nation-states were the best solution).  This imperfect and imprecise process in turn created new minorities that needed or were forced to move.  The transfer process (after both world wars) was poorly supervised and even more ineffectively managed at the cost of millions of lives.  It is the burgundy blood of these deaths that color and darken democracy’s underbelly.  

Democracy’s underbelly is no darker, however, than that of any other form of governance.  Winston Churchill captured this sentiment well when he stated, “democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others.”  While the path to democratization did mean millions of deaths, its end state also produced a remarkable level of overall stability and lasting peace throughout Europe.  It is the process of creating a democracy that one must focus on to prevent a violent and destructive past from reoccurring.  In this process, an emphasis must be placed on establishing the tenets of liberalism.  In most cases this means creating the institutions and regulations (typically through a constitution) to protect the individual freedoms of all a state’s inhabitants.   Only through the injection of robust liberalism into the democratization process can, not only lasting peace and stability be achieved, but also a peaceful and humane transition process.  

Theory of Relative Political Deprivation--Connor--Grad School Notes

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Grad School Notes on: 

“From a Theory of Relative Economic Deprivation (RED) Towards a Theory of Relative Political Deprivation”  by Walker Connor (2001)

Relative Deprivation is the experience of believing that you are denied something to which you are entitled.

In this reading Connor takes case with popular assertion that economic inequality (or the perception on inequality) drives ethno-national conflict.  The point on perception is important because whether or not an imbalance exists, if a group believes one exists they can infuse this incendiary belief into any economic data (rather than vice versa).

He points out that you have this inequality in every country and in every region due to the wide disparity in development.  He goes on to say, “defining ethno-national conflict in terms of economic inequality is a bit like defining them in terms of exygen: where you find the one, you can be reasonable certain of finding the other” (115).

Normally the charges of inequality are based upon intra-state situations because “economies are generally construed to be state-wide enterprises.”  But this does not mean that the government itself is necessarily targeting specific ethno-national groups for discrimination.  You have even greater disparities in the global economy that isn’t controlled by a central government.  (116).  There’s also evidence of politically dominant ethnic groups that are less well-off than other groups in their country. 

Empirical Problems with RED:

Quebec and Maine Illustration.   Both states have comparable median family incomes.  Quebec is actually a little better off.  However, the Parti Quebecois points to disparities with Ontario and states they would be better off alone.  Despite a similar plight, Mainers don’t advocate to leave the Union—they acknowledge geography as the culprit—not a government conspiracy (117).

RED also does not account for conflict that stems from economically advantage ethnic groups.  Ex.  Basques and Catalans resent poor Castilians.

RED would also mean that if you closed the gap, tensions should lessen, but there is empirical evidence that this is not always the case (118).

Also many examples of groups pursuing nationalistic behavior despite an awareness it will damage their economic standing (RED): Quebecois in 60’s and 70’s, resistance of Baltic socialist republics of Soviet investment capital, overwhelming West German sentiment to unify with East Germany despite assurances they would incur great economic hardship (119-20).

What Role does RED play then?

There is better evidence to suggest that RED as a catalyst (or exacerbator) for ethno-national action/tensions, rather than a necessary precondition for those actions/tensions.

Other catalysts: Large influx of outsiders into an ethnic homeland (influx of European Jews into Israel really set off the conflict following WWII), destruction of symbolic artifcacts/buildings are two examples.  The point being that just about anything could end up being a catalyst (121).

Connor’s Solution?  Relative Political Deprivation (RPD)

Ethno-nationalist people living in their homeland resent being ruled by non-members.  “The right of national self-determination”  is a phrase that has become commonplace.

This idea does not equal separatism, rather it means people want to be given the choice to decide for themselves if they should secede.  Most often they choose not to—instead, they just want some meaningful measure of autonomy (such has been the case for Quebec). 

Even among separatist-leaning groups, they still also espouse affection for their state.  The state has many mechanism to build this good will—namely through education.  (122-124).

Example: Switzerland is multi-ethnic democracy that is decentralized through a confederal cantonal structure.  Other European states have responded to ethno-national tensions through similar political devolution.

Example:  Ethiopia’s 1991 constitution federalized the state by ethnic groups in its regions and has 13 official religions. 

Obstacles to Alleviation:

Because autonomy has so many variations, its implementation is problematic and requires periodic alteration/continuous negotiation.   This whole process must derive its legitimacy from recognition that the problem is a political NOT economic one (124).

European Integration:

Example of EU integration that is supported by many minorities since it lessens the power of a state to which they don’t hold as much affection for and also increases their ability to associate with their ethnic brethren that are often right across their state’s border (Alsatians and Germans for example) (126).

Connor speaks at length about the process surrounding the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.  His main points are:

- A group’s sense of RPD is not trumped just because of common economic institutions

- EU integration does not mean that economic concerns trump political ones without qualification.  Political integration has been elite-driven (128-129).

This is the great debate: will growing economic integration lead to a recession of nationalism? 

Communist Manifesto said yes but since it was written we have seen, and continue to see, and ebb and flow of nationalism despite globalization (130).

Grad School Notes on Social Theory and Comparative Politics (CP) by Mark Lichbach

Social Theory and Comparative Politics (CP)

Mark Lichbach

Introduction

- Author seeks to address the state of theory in comparative politics today because he doesn’t believe it’s taken seriously anymore

- Unfortunately today CP focuses on solving real-world questions and is driven by problems

            “One can’t begin inquiry with evidence derived from and used to test theory; one             must begin with theoretically embedded observations.”

- author seeks to advance theory in CP in the following 3 ways:

            1. Recognize 3 ideal-type research traditions: rationalists, culturalist, structuralist

            2.  Set dialogue among schools within historical context of social theory’s             development

            3. Set dialogue among schools within historical situation seen by comparativists             today

-“We cannot remain theoretically challenged . . . and actually solve substantive problems” (241)

- Ultimately the author seeks a balance between between those asking the questions and those appreciating the answers

Section 1: Three Exemplars

*Bates, Scott and Skocpol are 3 examples of specific research schools:

Bates: Rational/social choice study of  how interests produce the dialectic of reason and rationality in Kenya’s political economy

Scott: Culturalists/interpretivist of how communities and identities make up the dialectic in Malaysia’s class relations

Skocpol: Structuralist/institutionalist of how social forces drive dialectic in the French/Russian/Chinese revolutions

*These 3 school can not only coexist, but the debate between the three can lead to better research and “inquiry”

Section 2: The Three Research Schools

*Good Table comparing the 3 on p. 245

Ontology (what is assumed about the nature of existence with regards to entities and and their properties):

Rationalist- how actors employ reason to satisfy their interests

Culturalist- what are the rules that make up individual and group identities

Structuralist- what are the relations between actors in context of institutions

Methodology:

Rationalist- comparative static experiments that link structure to action

Culturalist- gaining interpretive understanding through case studies (mostly)

Structuralist- study historical dynamics of real social types

Comparison

Rationalist- Generalize

Culturalist: Particularize

Structuralist: Typologize through classification, morphology and dynamics

Lacunae (addressing missing gaps and understanding cultural differences)

Rationalist: sacrifice the subject and surrender the self, undoing the community and unmasking the collectivity (materialism)

Culturalist: do not try to separate the material from the ideal because they assume that material must always be interpreted in terms of the ideal (idealism)

Structuralist:  structure is fate, leading to historical fatalism and determinism

Subtraditions

Rationalists:

            Thin: pure intentionalists—reason is cause of action; human nature rationalists

            Thick:  more structured—conditions are both causes and effects;social situation             rationalists

Culturalists:

            Thin: Survey researchers; actors make culturally informed choices

            Thick: examine the decision rules behind choice and how actors are formed by             culture

Structuralists:

            Thin: Materialists; actors aren’t as important and don’t have much freedom to             choose; substructure drives superstructure

            Thick: examine materially driven dynamics of structures of collective action and             social norms

Section 3: The Social Embedded Unit Act

- How do you marry these three schools?  How’s it been attempted historically

- All three approaches can be linked back to Parson’s “unit act” and Weber’s “paradox of modernity”

- All acts are social embedded

- three layers follow:

*See figure 1 on page 262 for an illustration

Inner of Individual Layer

- desires and beliefs direct action

The Middle or Collective Layer

- cultural norms and environmental conditions affect social action

The Outside or Research Community Layer

- Experts in:

Action (rationalists): individual choice and social action

Norms (culturalists): individual desires and cultural norms

Conditions (Structuralists): individual beliefs and environmental conditions

The Connection Among the Layers

- The value in combining all three approaches is that they can address gaps in each other

- looking at these connections forces comparativists to confront the nature of the competing paradigms and the structure-action, social order-social change, and nominalism-realsim debates. 

- Socially embedded unit act helps clarify these enduring issues

Section 4: Max Weber, Modernity, and Comparative Politics Today

- Modernity involved the growth of reason that culminated in a series of macro changes involving the rationalization of social structure

-Weber (as a rationalist): warns of the political consequences of this modernity.  Examines status groups and social classes with material interests to explore unintended negative consequences of reason

- Weber (as a culturalist) explores paradox of modern rationality’s origins: irrational quest for meaning and salvation helped create rational individuals and institutions of modern world.  Examines religious ethics and normative orders to explore the irrationality that drove the rationality that turned irrational (wow, what an awful writer)

- Weber (as a structuralist): studies the way institutional dynamics of state and society cage individuals in the dialectic of reason and irrationality.  Examines patterns of stratification and systems of domination to explore institutional logics of the forces that operate behind the backs of reasoning and nonrational individuals.

* All three schools offer a critical look at the central problem of modernity

Section 5: Conclusion

Author’s 4-part thesis on improving State of Theory in Comparative Politics (273-4)

            1. Theory in this field is more than a “messy center”

            2. Embrace “creative confrontations” in the defined research communities; this             will yield deepened theoretical understanding

            3. Contemporary comparativists must appreciate the historical context of social             theory’s development

            4.  Critical thought on the challenges of modernity show significance of             rationalist, culturalist and structuralist thought.  

Why are democratic regimes as weak as they are?

- Presidents are self interested (individual)

- why are there so many of them in Africa compared to Europe; so what are the conditions that cause these? 

- What kinds of factors seem to matter, and how do they matter in relation to each other.

DISCUSSION NOTES:

Triangle:

- professors are often thick structuralist while Military is culturalist

Cultural approach- big in 50/60’s and is now coming back in vogue.  Not as cultural anymore; focus on social capital. 

Structuralist- structure of the state and its impact on the individual.  SO what’s the best strategy for individuals to maximize power

Example:  Culturalist would say we need to understand Afghan culture to understand the individual and their decisions

*So questions is what do they two have to do with each other?  A communal culture will resist government actions and influence into their personal life.    It will also place an emphasis on investment in community around themselves.  Ultimately, institutions will be affected to conform to culture.  

*Question comes down to where do you start—with the institutions or the culture?  The stronger corner will affect the other one more.

*Weakness of culturalist approach is that it’s not quantifiable or provable? 

- Whether or not you are culturalist or structuralist, you are eventually going to get pulled down to the rationalist corner of the individual’s desire for security. 

Critics:

- Rationalist camp is typically called “rational choice”  (Rat choice: people treated like rats in a maze)

- Structuralist say that people don’t matter (there’s no personal decision-making)