What I Read Last Week: Lonely Rats, the Libya Novel You Never Knew About, BMX in Mada, Blind Hikers and an Age 18 List for Your Kids

The War on Loneliness
A great post related to the exploding heroin addiction problem in the United States.  Turns out addiction is less pronounced and powerful when people are in community.  People crave relationships...we were made for them.

A LIBYAN NOVEL YOU SHOULD READ

It was only recently translated from Italian into English.  It's billed as a multi-generational fictional history of Libya beginning from the 1900s in the vein of the epic The Cairo Trilogy: Palace Walk, Palace of Desire, Sugar Street --one of my favorites.  I just started it and am adding it to my 2015 Reading List.  

A Stage Across the Sea An unjustly-neglected Libyan novelist captured the twisted logic of colonialism, past and present. 
In which a very intelligent writer named Ursula Lindsey lays out exactly why The Confines of the Shadow is such an important book.

DADA | The Malagasy Trialist
Cool little video about a Malagasy stunt bike rider named Dada up in Nosy Be.

The blind hiker who takes on the wilderness
Don't need to say much more than the title.   The hiker described has started a cool charity called The Far Sight Foundation .  He was the first blink hiker to complete the Appalachian Trail--check out his website.

CASH FAMILY “AGE 18 LIST” FOR OUR KIDS
A great post from the Chaplain for Mercy Ships that is here in Madagascar right now.  In it he offers a template to write out your hopes for your children by the time they turn 18.  Working backward from that then gives you an ability to build up those characteristics in your children.

Libya as a Case Study in the Difficulty of Developing a Scratch Democracy

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

          Libya as a Case Study in the Difficulty of Developing a Scratch Democracy

             Owens is clear that there is no reliable method to determine the cost and method by which to create a democracy (there’s not even a prevailing opinion on the matter).  So then perhaps the best solution is to espouse Huntington’s “Peace Among Civilizations;”  it stands to reason that the states best poised to assist a country in transitioning to a democracy would come from within their own civilization.  If one is to accept the claim of Mansfield and Snyder that adolescent or “partial” democracies fight more often (and are a larger threat externally) than stable, mature democracies, then a carefully structured and supported transition is of ultimate importance.  The problem with this rationale emerges when then if there are no (or few) democratic states in that civilization.

            

              An example of this is found in Libya.  This nation stands as a daily study in the difficulty of developing a democracy.  In Libya’s case, completing the first step of instituting a rule of law is a behemoth task, since Gaddafi stifled any and all institutions during his 40-year reign.  That Libya only has existed as a nation for just over 60 years (previous to that it was a federation of three provinces) adds to the difficult undertaking.  Libya’s case is further complicated in that it is not a cohesive nation-state, but rather a coalition (as opposed to a more permanent alliance) of disparate ethnic, tribal and religious groups.  This was evident in the revolution against the Gaddafi regime.  This international effort turned out to be a coalition within a coalition—disparate groups only temporarily cooperating for a common goal. 

Further question for discussion:

If emerging democracies tend to be outwardly aggressive, are they also more likely to be inwardly suppressive (toward minority or disenfranchised groups)?

Libya: A Coalition to What End? and The Struggle of the Suffertocracy

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here.  

Below is a paper I wrote recently on Libya.  The entire paper is embedded below but I've 
also included the first paragraph below.
   
       Of note, this paper includes a term that I coined: suffertocracy.  This is a term where leader-
ship or cabinent members are not selected on merit but on how much they suffered in the struggle for independence or power.  The degree of suffering is equated with level of legitimacy.  The idea of a suffertocracy is not distinctive of the post-conflict Libya but has emerged throughout the history of conflict in Africa.

A Coalition to What End

         In his battle against Italian colonization Libyan freedom fighter Omar Mukhtar declared: “We will not give up, win or die.”[1]  Gaddafi appropriated the national hero’s image and words during his 1969 coup of the Al-Senussi monarchy.  During the revolution, his famous words were borrowed once again, this time by the eastern Benghazi rebels in an effort to show their resolve and mobilize support to overthrow the Gaddafi regime.[2]  These two divergent examples demonstrate the speed with which the revolution exploded and highlight the complexity of the society and culture within the Libyan borders.  The fusing of a strong and motivated citizenry with overwhelming external air support (and covert targeting support) proved to be an arrangement ideally suited to topple the 40-year old Gaddafi regime.  While classified as a success by the international community, it cannot and should not serve as a template for future interventions.  Despite the vigorous debate by groups jockeying for power, the ignition of the revolution was due to Gaddafi’s miscalculations and overreactions as much as anything (or anyone) else. Finally, the young age of the country combined with the youth movement of the revolution were instrumental in its success but may prove fatal in its aftermath. 

---

[1] “Graffiti Art After the Uprising,”  Demotix, News by You, accessed 20 March, 2012, http://www.demotix.com/news/971076/graffiti-art-after-uprising-gheryan.

[2] Manal Omar and Susanne Templehof, “Stakeholders of Libya’s February 17 Revolution,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report, January 2012: 3, http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20300.pdf. 

Link to paper in google docs

What role do tribes play in the revolution in Libya?

15 May Update: I recently wrote a paper on the Libyan Revolution: A Coalition to What End.
       
     So when you go to the link you will have to give them your email address to get the entire article (it's free though).  I would post the whole article here, but STRATFOR (and they put out some GREAT products) might not appreciate it and I won't open that door.  But I will include a couple of tidbits that I gleaned from the article.  This was a great article because I knew nothing about the role of tribal dynamics and came away with a deepened understanding.  And, now when I hear names of tribes which I have no clue about, I have a source document to which I can refer. 

"the foundation of his rule has been maintaining ties between his own tribe and the two largest tribes in the country. "  This is referring to the Qadhafi tribe and the Warfallah and the Magariha

"Libya has an estimated 140 tribes, only about 30 of which are viewed as having any real significance. "

"[three historical zones that make up Libya: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan.]"

"the typical Libyan — a person of mixed Arab-Berber descent " And most Libyans live along the coast.

"Cyrenaica is where the current uprising began in mid-February. "

"Cyrenaica has long being oriented toward Egypt and the eastern Islamic world, with Tripolitania more oriented to the western Islamic world and the Maghreb."

"Tripolitania is the Gadhafi Tribe"

"since the Gadhafi tribe is not especially large, the Libyan leader has been forced to form confederations with others."

"[“Jamahiriya,” a word coined by Gadhafi  and means “state of the masses,” it was to do away with antiquated notions of tribalism and focus on national identity.]"

"[The Warfallah is the largest tribe in Libya. With an estimated 1 million members.  The Gadhafi and Warfallah have blood ties]"

"[On Feb. 20 Warfallah Tribal Elders released a statement in which they condemned Gadhafi]"

 "[The Zuwaya tribe  reportedly controls  the Sarir, Messla and Aquila oil fields.]"

"Two top officials in the regime that come from the Obeidat tribe have made very public defections in recent days: Maj. Gen. Suleiman Mahmud and Maj. Gen. Abdel Fattah Younis]"

"[The Magariha tribe is the second-largest in Libya. The most powerful member of the Magariha tribe is Col. Abdullah al-Sanussi, the head of the Jamahiriya Security Organization (JSO)]"

"[There are prominent Magarihas, however, who are said to have joined forces with the opposition. ]"

"[The Tuaregs, however, matter because of their ability to attack oil and natural gas infrastructure deep in the Libyan desert.]"  This tribe lives entirely in the desert in the Fezzan region.

"[the Tuaregs have a much different culture and history (not to mention language and appearance) from the Arabic peoples along Libya’s coastal regions, as well as the “pure” Arab Bedouins who live in other parts of the Libyan desert. ]"

"[The Toubou more closely resemble sub-Saharan Africans than their countrymen to the north. (Indeed, when reports first emerged about African mercenaries employed by Gadhafi to suppress the uprising, there was some confusion as to whether they might have been Toubou elements of the Libyan military mistaken for foreigners.)]"

"[Gadhafi must ensure that the tribes loyal to him continue to stay loyal and hope that the use of force will help him to overcome the widespread opposition to his rule.]"

Two good articles on Libya and the 'mercenary' issue

        Read these two articles to get a sense of just one slice of the myriad issues at hand in Libya.   I came across these two articles via the always excellent Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS) daily media review (also available en francais).  If you aren't a subscriber already, you should sign up!  You can also follow them on twitter (AfricaACSS).  You're on twitter right?     

Libya: African mercenaries 'immune from prosecution for war crimes'
"The key paragraph said that anyone from a non-ICC country alleged to have committed crimes in Libya would “be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction” of their own country. It was inserted despite Susan Rice, the US ambassador to the UN, saying that all those “who slaughter civilians” would “be held personally accountable”. "  Algeria, Ethiopia and Tunisia are among the countries that aren't part of the ICC court.   This hypothetically means that a mercenary from one of those countries couldn't be tried for their war crimes in the ICC.  Of note, the author points out that the US withdrew from the ICC in 2002 in "an attempt to prevent a precedent that could see Americans prosecuted by the ICC for alleged crimes in other conflicts."  As always, there's more to the issue than a quick superficial article I am sure. 

Gaddafi’s ‘African mercenaries’: Myth or reality?  In juxtaposition to first article the author of this article points out some of the subleties surrounding the term "African mercanaries."  I would add that 10% of Libya's population are immigrants. 
"‘According to a United Nations Human Rights statement – ‘Libya must end its practices of racial discrimination against black Africans, particularly its racial persecution of two million black African migrant workers. There is substantial evidence of Libya’s pattern and practice of racial discrimination against migrant workers’
‘Against such a background it is perhaps reasonable to question the validity of this supposed use of “African” mercenaries by the Gaddafi regime to thwart the efforts of protesters. Given Libya’s relatively large black population, are we to assume or conclude that their presence in Gaddafi’s security forces is that mysterious? If so I wonder why?"
    This article is well worth the time to read since the author has aggregated a number of articles on the issue, including one which speaks to the depth of Libyan influence (largely financial) on the continent of Africa. 

I will leave you with one question that is subject to debate:

What is the difference between a mercenary and private corporate security?

One book that was recommended to me is "Elimination of Mercanarism in Africa: A need for a continental approach" edited by Sabelo Gumedze.  I haven't had the chance to read it, but will be sure to provide a review on the ever expanding FAO Reading List (please let me know if you have suggestions for books I am missing).