FAO Quotables

"But being right, even morally right, isn't everything. It is also important to be competent, to be consistent, and to be knowledgeable. It's important for your soldiers and diplomats to speak the language of the people you want to influence. It's important to understand the ethnic and tribal divisions of the place you hope to assist."
-Anne Applebaum

Showing posts with label summary. Show all posts
Showing posts with label summary. Show all posts

Friday, January 18, 2013

Notes on Herbst' States and Power in Africa

Need book recommendations? Check out all 301 (and counting) books that I've read at Dad's Bookshelf.

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

BONUS LINK: My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here.

Book Cover

Jeffrey Herbst, States and Power in Africa

By the way--legit deal here below for college students--just in time for the holiday season!

Join Amazon Student FREE Two-Day Shipping for College Students

Summary

Herbst argues that African leaders (pre, during, and post-colonization) have all faced similar issues when attempting to rule and have often come to the same conclusions on how to solve their problems. He compares the formation of African states to Europe. He claims that the consolidation of power over distance, as the dependent variable, is affected by the costs of extending power, the nature of boundaries, and the nature of the state system. These 3 factors matter in every period.

He wants to be a thicker structuralist. If everyone makes the same choices due to environment—then what’s the point of examining individuals though. While Herbst says he’s not geographically deterministic—he kind of is as he goes on.

Introduction

  • Failure of African states to consolidate authority has resulted in civil wars, refugees, and dysfunctional policies by leaders
  • International society still assumes that all African countries can control all of their territory. Control = infrastructure + loyalty

Chapter 1 - The Challenge of State-Building in Africa

  • It was difficult to project power due to low population densities in SSA
  • Ecological conditions didn't support large concentrations of people (only 8% of SSA is tropical. Geography controls population density
  • Difficult to project thru highly differentiated environmental zones (coastal, forest, savannah, near-desert, etc.)
  • Costly to project power due to the same reason above. The wheel was introduced in northern Africa during ancient times and abandoned because the terrain and distances could not be supported with the necessary roads.
  • While European nations competed for territory, Africans had plenty of land that did not propagate conflict. Threat of war in Europe allowed leaders to place emphasis on controlling remote areas and borders -- Africa did not have this problem or reason to control its territories. Primary object was to capture people and treasure, not land which was available to all. Land was the constant—population was the variable.
  • Colonizers were not interested in duplicating European power infrastructure that bound city to hinterland; Colonial capitals located on the coast to serve logistical and health needs of colonizers.
  • Few roads or telephones in hinterland outside of extracting goods.
  • Nationalist politics in the 50s and 60s were very much urban affairs.
  • After independence, independent countries still had projection problems
    • Peasants desired to maintain their own decisions about their lives
    • Long economic crisis since late 70s
    • 69% of population still live in rural areas
    • OAU

Chapter 2 - Power and Space in Precolonial Africa

**His nuance in his definition of a state is important—control over a population instead of borders

  • Non-territorial nature of power
  • African farmers depended on rain-fed agriculture and invested little in a particular piece of land; Few pieces of land were valuable or worth a great price to defend.
  • People were not controlled by territory claims and could escape from rulers rather than fight them.
  • Pre-colonial Africa societies unbundled ownership and control of land.
  • Political control had to be earned through loyalty, coercion, and creation of infrastructure because it was too easy for people to just leave.
  • Roads were vital to exercising formal authority; allow troop movement, access, etc.
  • More cultural diversity due to constrained broadcasting of power

Detriments of Power

  • Often not worth the price of fighting to defend outlying lands.
  • Empires were seen as radiating from the capital cities, decreasing as distance increased. Some power extended great distance. On the village level, it may not extend past the individual village.
  • Centralization of power stayed in capitals since weapons could only be accessed by central state trade with Europeans.
  • Benefits of state were shared. If not, people would leave.

Buffer mechanisms to keep people in place were not in place in Africa. No set of norms to control inflows of people were established and no official currency (to maintain physical presence) existed.

Shared sovereignty and multiple state forms due to:

  • physical geography was daunting
  • states had few ways of mediating flow of people or money
  • state system permitted hinterlands to break away or govern themselves

Discussion Points

How and why colonial state is organized the way it is?

How’s it different and how’s it the same? What are the implications?

He emphasizes borders despite their artificiality. Clearly colonial state is the basis for today (example of coastal capital cities). State system that evolved end up being cooperative instead of competitive.

Chapter 3 - The Europeans and the African Problem

  • System of boundaries and frontiers were created, based on mines and cash crops. Infrastructure still determines patterns of trade.
  • Some say rule was limited, others say it was heavy. Numbers of colonizers would lead to believe that their power was limited.
  • Overwhelming motivation for colonizers was economic.
  • Before 1885, Europeans extended no further than the coast. Even after colonization, Iliffe says that Africa was not central to European economies.
  • Europeans were quick to partition Africa, but ambivalent about ruling it. Costs were high and probability of reward was low.
  • Boundaries were created with little information on geography, people, etc.
  • Berlin Conference stressed the minimal obligations of African colonizers over territories.
  • Conference did not mention hinterlands. Hinterland theory was developed that said that an indefinite amount of interior land was available to the colonizer. This was abandoned and found unworkable.
  • Colonization happened on the cheap with little obligation to control territory. It was easy to conquer African polities and charter companies were often used to do the conquering.
  • With few white settlers, the security of each state was slow to expand.
  • African colonizers often made their own decisions, outside the control of France, Britain, etc.
  • Neither Direct or Indirect Rule was from a preconceived theory, but based on the individual political setup of each country. Herbst indicates that indirect rule was more successful at projecting power by strengthening the existing African mechanism.
  • Protest migrations were common in Africa, especially West Africa. Borders were too weak to stop the movement of people.
  • WWII stopped the expansion of administrative systems and afterwards, Europeans were reconstructing themselves and didn't have the money to put into Africa.
  • Boundaries were most consequential part of colonial state. European rulers were free of competition from other imperial states. They could establish admin structures at their own pace.
  • Lack of war/conflict formed Africa much differently than the great conflicts that shaped Europe.

Chapter 4 - The Political Kingdom in Independent Africa

  • African decided to retain the colonial map - wars were too expensive and would diminish the power of the ruler over its people. Also, obtaining land was not a priority as it was in Europe.
  • Nationalists supported nation-states and the United Nations would only deal with nation-states. The option of returning to pre-colonial systems were no longer feasible.
  • Few attempts to move capitals or to change the political systems from colonial times (outside of changing the names of organizations)
  • OAU respected sovereignty of states and considered the Biafra War in Nigeria an internal affair.
  • Africans had to develop set of rules on who was in charge of the state. OAU determined that if a government was at least in control of the capital city, it was sovereign.
    • This allowed governments to concern themselves less with control/power projection into hinterlands.
  • The lack of war affected African states finances. Wars usually place pressure on leaders to find new and more regular sources of income, as well as make citizens more likely to allow increased taxation. This did not happen in Africa.
  • Direct Taxation, a way of consolidating power, was difficult due to:
    • low densities of population in hinterlands.
    • gov'ts had little incentive due to foreign aid
    • the system of direct taxation is expensive
  • Indirect taxation through consumable goods were easier and less transparent for the gov't.
  • Nationalism, another way to consolidate power, was not strong. Wars, like in Europe, were not present to bind African nations. Also, the lack of roads and too many languages separated groups within African countries.
  • African gov'ts wasted large amounts of money, possibly reducing nationalism.

Result: power was expressed post-colonialism as it was pre-colonialism, through concentric circles of authority. States had to control their political cores with varying reach being that.

Questions / Points to Ponder

  • Herbst admits/explains that African and European nations evolved much differently and that Africa can be compared to Latin America easier...but continues to compare Africa and Europe - Why??
  • Does the lack of state projection into the entirety of its territory really influence illegal activities, etc.? Is it really a problem, or just an inconvenience? Did it / does it happen the same in the U.S. or abroad...or is it unique to Africa?
  • Could the OAUs declaration of 'if the gov't controls the capital city, it is sovereign' been a contributor to African coups??
  • * Colonial experience as a prisoner’s dilemma where everyone ends up cooperating. Borders eliminate friction points. The fundamental WHY of colonialism is the BoP in Europe.

They’ve inherited a set of ideas—they know its about economic development. Nationalism = anti-colonialism. After that, the public appeal was based upon benefits. But the government could deliver on social services without resources (taxes).

“The Geographic and Demographic Challenges to African States” (Pt. 2) – States and Power in Africa (pp. 139-271)

TAKE-AWAY:

Herbst focuses on one of the most central issues of modern African state building, artificial political barriers paralyzing natural (true) state consolidation and subsequent healthy economic growth. What was thought a good idea at the time, the Berlin Conference set in motion the largest political stagnation in modern history. It is only after we understand the true parameters of political population control measures that we will be able to do less to interfere with the development of The Continent.

Part Three: National Design and Domestic Politics (Cont.)

Ch. 5 - National Design and the Broadcasting of Power (Longest and most important Ch.)

Abstract:

Population distribution is a critical challenge for African state building. Size and shape of nations impacts power consolidation. Specific sizes and shape are not important. Population distribution over that space is most critical. Gottmann stated, “it is the organization of a territory by its population that counts more than any other feature of it.” Pre-colonial populations decided boundaries and today boundaries define a people. (REF. POPULATION DISTRO. MAPS)

*Rise of patronage networks puts money further going in the wrong direction

*Power is grounded in the capital city (physically), and especially the palace/presidential building. All you need to maintain power is control on capital. Thus the resources and social services are centered in the capital.

CONCEPT OUTLINE:

  1. Size and shapes of African countries as related to political challenges that state-makers confront.
    1. Five-category classification: areas with population densities distributed in 1/5 percentiles.
    2. Three general categories of countries.
      1. Difficult geography.
        1. Exceptionally difficult to consolidate power.
        2. These countries are, with one exception, large (among the top fifteen by size) and have areas of high population density.
        3. Distances and the geographic distinctness of different groups leads to the finding that African countries experience extreme levels of ethnic fragmentation.
        4. African states with difficult geographies face the continual problem of large numbers of outlying groups that are spatially distinct and mobile.
        5. Some are “rim-land” country: the major population concentrations are found in its border regions while its interior is relatively empty.
        6. Sudan, Ethiopia, DROC
      2. Hinterland.
        1. High and medium population density (by national standards) that are in relatively small areas of the country - then there are vast hinterlands where few people live.
        2. Chad (the fourth largest in Africa), Mali (sixth), Mauritania (seventh), and Niger (third).
      3. Favorable Geography.
        1. Highest concentration of power is found in one area, usually around the capital. Population densities lower as distance from the capital increases.
          1. Are small.
          2. Ex: Botswana (ranked seventeenth in size), Burkina Faso (twenty-second), Central African Republic (fifteenth), Eritrea (twenty-ninth), Gabon (twenty-third).
  2. Smaller states have fewer political challenges consolidating state power.
    1. Size not same barrier to state control.
      1. Extending authority in some large states may be easier than their size suggests (depends on population distribution).
    2. Lacking external threat, power will be broadcast somewhat like pre-colonial period.
      1. Addis rule: Control strong at political core, radiating out with decreasing authority.
    3. Today territorial boundaries are fixed.
      1. Countries with either very large territories and/or difficult population distributions find it exceptionally hard to consolidate authority.
      2. Large country size sufficient reason for control failure unless the population is not distributed to the hinterland.
  3. Consolidation of authority still related to accurate state understanding of the ramifications in the national structural design.

*His population density charts are flawed because they aren’t anchored to an absolute density—its each country’s density—therefore you can’t compare the country’s to each other.

*THESIS: What are roads and small airports used for in Africa today? How is this affected by mobile technology? How does this affect the reach of the government? His argument may be logically sound but there is no evidence presented.

Ch. 6 - Chiefs, States, and the Land

Abstract:

African states have a difficulty in projecting power over distance establishes the relationship between state authority and local leadership. Local elites’ power is connected to their control of land, separate from the state. States seek change in property rights to disempower local elites. The reality of governing in the hinterlands has had limited success in usurping local control of land without pragmatic compromises.

*Mamdani book: Citizen and Subject: chiefs were so corrupted by colonial power of the state that they just became an extension of that state.

*Ability of state to function as a state (through laws and taxes and enforcement of those rules) is undermined by chiefs (or anyone other than state) that control access to land.

*Private land rights (or state owned) give state power to control people.

State subverts locals completely when they lease out land

CONCEPT OUTLINE:

  1. Reform of land tenure difficult with how Africa states artificially evolved.
    1. Requires large administrative presence in rural areas.
      1. Nuanced policies.
      2. Significant resources.
    2. African states do not have strong networks in rural areas.
      1. Use blunt instruments of power.
      2. Poor treasury limits.
    3. Difficult for African countries to diminish the power of local authorities by changing patterns of land allocation.
    4. Long-term African countries probably will develop land markets undermine traditional practices.
    5. Politics between the state and traditional leaders.
      1. Neither treads on the other’s turf.
    6. Conventional wisdom on land tenure favors incremental measures.
      1. States are not capable of doing more.
  2. Ownership and control of the land separated between chiefs and states.
    1. Owns land, local elites control its allocation on a day-to-day basis.
    2. States with tough geographies most problems with the chiefs.

Part Four: Boundaries and Power

Ch. 7 - The Coin of the African Realm

Abstract:

West African capitals established international and regional economies soon after independence. But respective currencies did not consolidate state power. Independent valuation of W. African currency led to a series of disastrous decisions that severely weakened the states. When states gave up currency control they became stronger.

CONCEPT OUTLINE:

  1. After independence:
    1. African state officials corruptly controlled the money supply.
    2. Anglophone countries had disastrous exchange rate policies that diminished state authority.
    3. Business was a big loser when local authorities had maximum discretion.
    4. Independence changed everything in terms of the relationship between foreign companies and African governments.
    5. Adoption of African currencies in the 1960s was disastrous.

Control of currency was instrumentalized (but not to bring in rural population) to distribute benefits to urban elite and patronage networks—instead of state building and economic development. The West African countries didn’t have the ability to define their country by their currency but they were also (maybe) more stable. Author doesn’t make these points very directly though.

Ch. 8 - The Politics of Migration and Citizenship

Abstract:

There are fundamental changes in African migration patterns. People are migrating toward the centers of political power. Simultaneously, the development of citizenship laws through which people are defined by a geographically defined polity resulting in patterns of migration and dynamics of citizenship laws affect and reflect the states consolidated power. Citizenship laws project immobile citizen identities on migrant populations. African boundaries fundamentally changed the nature of population movements across the continent. Surprisingly, citizenship is often greater than ethnic group bonds separated by borders. African countries need to exploit this phenomenon to establish strong national bonds. Otherwise, a critical opportunity is lost.

CONCEPT OUTLINE:

  1. States did not consolidate their rule over their territory and the populations are migrating toward the centers of political power.
    1. Weak boundaries are hard to prevent outside intervention.
      1. Did not consolidate authority in the outlying areas.
    2. The lax boundaries changed migrant’s calculations regarding the benefits of their exit.
    3. Some countries will benefit from the migration more than others.
    4. Countries with most difficult political geographies worst border control.
      1. Physical and legal infrastructures unable to match respective changes in migration.

This is beginning to be an issue. Access to land and other benefits becoming more relatively important. So far this has just been a political issue (to disqualify competing candidates). Recently a big issue in CI since all the arable land is used up.

Conclusion

If you accept his argument—the incentives that decision makers make (thick struct) are not directing them toward state building because of high cost of projecting power (substitute potential access to money via foreign AID vs. taxation), borders continue to be recognized (territory not threatened), internal sovereignty is eroded (much more internal intervention). These are all disincentives to state building—so we (intl community) need to change these incentives. Cost of projecting can’t be directly affected aside from pulling aid and making collection of taxes more important. One could create a new international norm that says sovereign states must act like it—if we decertified Somalia then Somaliland could be recognized.

How do we distribute AID—shift to NGOs—but this hasn’t been very effective—NGOs have been usurping sovereignty from government. Can AID can be only given to reforming governments—or given to develop specific institutions like taxation. (Could AID be matched to tax revenues collected by the government?)

Friday, January 4, 2013

Grad School Notes Collection (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing)

Need book recommendations? Check out all 301 (and counting) books that I've read at Dad's Bookshelf.

All of my Africa fiction reads are at Beyond Achebe: A Literary Atlas--come check it out and let me know what you think.

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

Grad School Notes Collection (Africa, IR, Ethnic Conflict, Economics, Writing, Islam, Comparative Politics)

Below are the links to all the notes I have previously published here on FUUO. They are organized into a few areas: Africa, IR, Islam

AFRICA:

Notes (Discussion) Iliffe’s Africans: The History of a Continent
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/02/notes-of-iliffes-africans-history-of.html

Notes (Extensive) on Iliffe's Africans
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/grad-schol-extensive-notes-on-iliffes.html

Notes (Partial) on Paul Nugent’s Africa Since Independence
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/07/grad-school-partial-notes-on-paul.html

Notes and Summary: Achebe's Arrow of God
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/07/grad-school-notes-and-summary-on.html

Notes (Discussion) and Summary: Achebe's Arrow of God
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/01/arrow-of-god-notes.html

Notes (Discussion) and Summary Anthills of the Savannah
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/04/anthills-of-savannah-discussion-notes.html

Notes (Discussion) and Summary: Achebe's Man of the People
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/02/disclaimer-these-are-my-notes-that-i.html

Notes (Discussion) and Summary: Achebe's No Longer At Ease
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/02/no-longer-at-ease-notes.html

Notes (Discussion) and Summary: Achebe's Things Fall Apart
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/01/things-fall-apart-notes.html

Notes on Rye Barcott's It Happened on the Way to War
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/07/notes-on-barcotts-it-happened-on-way-to.html

Notes/Summary (Partial) on Getting Somalia Wrong: Faith, War, and Hope in a Shattered State by Mary Harper (her blog is GREAT)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/12/gettingsomaliawrong.notes.summary.maryharper.html

Notes on Hartley's The Zanzibar Chest
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/11/thezanzibarchest.aidenhartley.summary.review.notes.html

Notes on Democratization in Africa (Ottaway, Joseph, Bratton & Walle)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/11/democratization.africa.huntingtonisandiot.html

Notes on African Judicial Systems (Akech, Von Doepp, Suberu)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/11/african.judiciary.akech.vondoepp.suberu.notessummary.html

Notes on Clientelist State-Society Relations (Barkan, Fatton, Pitcher et al)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/11/clientstatesociety.barkan.fatton.pitcher.sparknotes.html

Notes on African Elections as Vehicles for Change by Nic Cheeseman
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/10/alternation.africa.politics.elections.cliffnotes.fao.html

Notes on Patrimonialism in Africa (Theobald, Bach, Pitcher and Moran)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/10/patrimonialism.africa.bach.theobald.pitcher.sparknotes.html

Notes (Brief) and Discussion Questions on Bradbury's Becoming Somaliland
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/10/bradbury-becomingsomaliland-sparknotes.html

Notes (Partial) on Gallab's The First Islamist Republic
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/10/sudan-islamistrepublic-gallab-sparknotes.html

Notes (Brief) on O'Kane and Hepner's Biopolitics, Militarism, and Development: Eritrea in the Twenty-first Century
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/09/biopoliticsertireasomaliaokane.html

Notes for Debate Arguing that Counter-Piracy HAS been effective in the Horn of Africa
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/06/counter-piracy-has-been-effective-in.html

Paper on Libyan Coalition/Intervention
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/04/libya-coalition-to-what-end-and.html

Paper reviewing and analyzing "Sometimes in April"
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/03/i-wrote-earlier-footnoted-version-of.html

Paper (Average Grade) on British and French Colonial Legacies in West Africa
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/07/essay-on-british-and-french-legacies-in.html

Paper on the Unexpected Pattern of Democratization in Africa
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/10/the-pattern-of-democratization-in-africa.html

Paper on Copts in Egypt: A Wedding Feast for Copts and Christians
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/09/copticchristianegyptembassycairo.html

Poem: The Guilt of the Silent: An Analysis of Raoul Peck's "Sometimes in April"
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/02/guilt-of-silent-analysis-of-raoul-pecks.html

Endnotes for Sometimes in April/Rwanda Genocide Analysis Paper
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/02/sometimes-in-april-analysis-paper.html

EVENTS:

Notes from 2010 Maritime Safety and Security Conference "African Maritime Interests: Security and Development" Plenary Session 1
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/10/mss-conference-african-maritime.html

Notes from MSS Conference Speech by Ambassador Huddleston Speech
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/10/mss-conference-ambassador-huddleston.html

Notes from MSS Conference Speech by Ambassador Carson
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/10/mss-conference-speech-by-ambassador.html

MSS Conference Keynote Speech by AU Deputy Chairman Dr. Mwencha
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/10/mss-conference-keynote-speech-by-au.html

Notes on Senator Isakson's Speech at SAIS on 31 March 2011
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/04/senator-isaksons-speech-at-sais-from-31.html

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

Notes for entire IR Course
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/09/entire-notes-for-grad-school.html

Notes for Chapter 12 from Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Challenges of Our Time
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/notes-on-force-and-statecraft-chapter-12.html

Notes on Selected Chapters of Force and Statecraft by Lauren, Craig and George

http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/notes-on-selected-chapters-of-force-and.html

Notes (1st four chapters) on Nye's Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History (7th Edition)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/notes-on-nyes-understanding.html

Notes on Power and Levels of Analysis
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/ir-notes-on-power-and-levels-of-analysis.html

Notes on Mearsheimer and Walt's "An Unnecessary War"
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/notes-on-mearsheimer-and-walts.html

Notes on Stephen Walt's The Relationship between theory and policy in IR, 2005
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/notes-on-relationship-between-theory.html

Notes on Stephen Walt's "IR: One World, Many Theories" (1998)
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2012/08/notes-on-stephen-walts-ir-one-world.html

Paragraph on Libya as a Case Study in Developing a Democracy from Scratch

Monday, November 19, 2012

My Complete Notes on Hartley's "The Zanzibar Chest"

Notes on The Zanzibar Chest by Aidan Hartley

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 



I've embedded my complete notes below.  Previously all of these notes had been spread out over 15 posts or so.

From time to time, God causes men to be born—and thou art one of them—who have a lust to go
abroad at the risk of their lives and discover news—today it may be of far-off things, tomorrow of
some hidden mountain, and the next day of some nearby men who have done a foolishness against
the state. These souls are very few; and of these few, not more than ten are of the best.
-Kim

I love Hartley’s opening quote. If there were ever an engraving to be mounted on the wall of my
hypothetical office it would be this . Part of the path to achievement is often began just by the act
of writing your goal down: to be one of the ‘ten best’ FAOs, foreign policy experts, africanists.

 

LINKS:
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/09/africa-book-recommendation-zanzibar.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/following-adm-stavridis-advice-on.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chronicles-continues.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_10.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continues.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_11.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/01/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_13.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_17.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_19.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/02/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continues.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/03/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/03/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue_22.html
http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2011/05/zanzibar-chest-chronicles-continue.html

Wednesday, August 29, 2012

"Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy" Congressional Research Service Report

 I love these reports--always great summaries and good starting points for understanding issues.

"If voters approve a constitution in a national referendum, then new elections are to be held by mid-2013, bringing a nearly two-year transition process to a close."

 "As of August 2012, USG has provided more than $200 million in assistance to Libya since their 2011 uprising."

"Libya: Transition and U.S. Policy" Congressional Research Service Report by Christopher Blanchard

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

Grad School Notes and Summary on Force and Statecraft (Chapter 12)

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Considerations - Ethical questions as fulcrum of transnational impact
            What is the legacy of the ethics of state sovereignty?
            Do transnational realities create cosmopolitan ethics?

Ethics and International Politics
Definition: “Judgments about human relations made on the basis of normative standards.”
- 3 standards:
            Limits on behavior
            Cognizance of consequences
            Responsibility for conduct
- Problem of the absence of ethical agreement
            F and S: state ‘realities’ vs. religious ‘aspirations’—deep historical roots
            But: enduring, transcendent & universal principles’ can be seen in many formulations other than religion
            For example: human security and human rights
           
- Theme throughout chapter: Can ends justify means?

- Full Challenge: reconciliation of should and can (ends and means), given uncertain outcomes
            Niebur: politics ‘where conscience and power meet’
            Problem of determining ethical action in conditions of uncertainty

- Raison d’etat as an ethics of state responsibility
            Prudence as restraint (vs. ends justify means)
            Maybe: challenge is not state vs. ethics but state based ethics vs. non state based   ethics.
            *Ends are results of the means (constructivist)

- Principle of non-agression
- Flip side is inviolability of sovereignty
            Ethical goal of delegitimating
- Concomitant criteria of jus in bello (justice in war)
            Protection of innocents
            Proportionality
            Basic of Geneva Protocol, CWC, landmine ban
            Presnece of norm despite absence of enforcement
- Jus in bello in the nuclear age: problems of deterrence
            oppositie of protection of the innocents
            absence of control or proportionality
- Jus ad bellum in a transnational world
            anticipatory self-defense in the age of terrorism
            human rights, humanitarian intervention
            distributive justice and migrations
            environmental issues
- Root of the problem: conflict of ethical foundations
            Hoffman: duties beyond borders, to individuals
            National security vs. human security
            State security vs. cosmopolitan security

*WRT enforcement of ethics—the realists would say that the strong do what they can on the basis of their might.  The strong set the norms. 







Tuesday, February 14, 2012

Grad School Discussion Notes and Summary: Achebe's Man of the People

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Book Cover

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

BONUS LINK: My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here.

All Things Achebe--The Complete Notes Collection

DISCLAIMER: These are my notes that I created from reading the novel and from classroom discussion. Generally speaking, the chapter-by-chapter summaries are my own; however, the other parts of the posts are what I hope are an amelioration of the classroom discussion.

A Man of the People: Notes and Discussion from Class

This novel takes place in 1964 and examines the institutions of Nigeria. Coming out of colonial times, the people have no sense of taxes or being taxed, especially the farmers (because the tax is just being wrapped into the purchase price). Originally published in 1966, during which there were two coups in Nigeria. The first coup ended the first republic. After these two coups Achebe went to Biafra to join their independence movement. When Biafra lost that bid, Achebe headed to the US for an extended period.

Without understanding that Chief Nanga is a man of the people, the story does not work. In the novel, it’s the people that drive the action. It’s important that Nanga is the only character that talks to the people. Odili never talks to the people in the same manner. Even at Odili’s rally, it’s Maxwell who speaks, and he still doesn’t speak to them in the way Nanga does (paragraph’s ideas mainly attributed to prof).

From: http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/biafra.htm

Questions and Discussion Points

- How sympathetic is Achebe’s hero? Achebe portrays Odili as symbolic of the next generation. It’s important to note that Achebe writes in the first person, a departure from his previous novels.

- How do women in this book represent society at large?

Edna is a pawn and passive figure—the least of the actors.

Elsie shows a keen lack of fidelity.

Eunice symbolizes accountability, which is what you want in a nation.

Akilo is educated but also a prostitute.

Mrs. Nanga: what’s the deal with her Adam’s apple?

*In the novel, women go along with objectification. If they symbolize society at large, they are treated as objects that don’t care that that is the way they are treated.

- Where did lack of selflessness come from? Who’s to blame for this endemic corruption? Achebe blames it on the scale of largesse—in the nation/state there’s no ownership (like that exists at the village level). Before independence stealing was fine because it was from the White man, but now it’s stealing from the people?

- How is religion replaced by materialism in the novel?

- Examine the inversion of education’s importance.

- Could Chief Koko’s overreaction (when he thinks that he’s been poisoned) be a dig at the alarmist nature of that region by Achebe?

- Examine how he uses different women in the novel:

- Examine the theme of infidelity among men and women. Does this transfer to a lack of fidelity in society at large?

- Jalio is Soyinka (Sho-yeen-kah). How does this idea fit into the novel’s meaning? Incidentally, read some of this man’s poetry! It’s essential.

http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/07/african-diaspora-film-festival-this.html

http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/06/potw-in-small-hours-by-wole-soyinka.html

http://fuuo.blogspot.com/2010/09/soyinka-forms-new-political-party-in.html

- The novel offers Achebe’s commentary on education—they purge the western-educated ministers at the beginning and voice a disdain for their education abroad. The action highlights this competition, as well as the inability of society to hold anyone accountable, because they don’t understand how their country fits into the larger global context.

- Examine the roles played by fathers in the novel.

Chapter 1

Chief Nanga (Minister of Culture) comes to his hometown (village) of Anata. He is “a man of the people.” Background on his rise to power. He recognizes and remembers Odili, who is a teacher in the village. He invites him to come stay with him in the city. The corruption and the politics are introduced.

- Would a sensible man “spit out a juicy morsel that good fortune placed in his mouth.”

- Showing tip of tongue to sky to swear oath?

Chapter 2

Background on Odili and Elsie, his friend with benefits. Also meet his friend Andrew. Odili is firm in his aspirations and his work to keep his actions ‘clean.’ He will not stoop to cronyism to get the scholarship to London that he desires. There is a universal disdain among politicians for education abroad, however Nanga still looks forward to his upcoming honorary law degree from a small college in the US.

- Objectification and devaluation of women shown in anecdotes.

Chapter 3

Odili goes to Nanga’s and is welcomed warmly. Background on Odili’s father, a district interpreter—a powerful and hated man with five wives and 35 children. Odili’s mother died giving birth to him—there’s shame associated with this. Odili and Nanga visit Chief Koko, who handles education abroad, but they don’t get a chance to discuss the scholarship.

- After independence the value of education becomes inverted. Proximity to power is most important.

- Corruption feeds and multiplies bureaucracy and vice versa.

- OHMS, which the elite don’t use. (Our Home Made Stuff)

- The gap between power and previous life is so huge that it feeds corruption.

Chapter 4

Mrs. Nanga gets ready to leave with the children to visit her village, which they do at least once a year. Americans John and Jean stop by. Jean flirts shamelessly with Nanga while her husband highbrows it with Odili. Jean and John work in public relations for Nigeria in their efforts with the U.S.

- Good details about racism and lynching in the US to contrast with Nigeria’s problems.

Chapter 5

Odili goes to Jean’s party and ends up sleeping with her. He finds that he doesn’t really like her but asks to see her again. For Americans, Africans are a novelty, one that they hold apart and distinct from the ‘blacks’ back home. At the dinner party, Odili has a good time. Nanga never ends up going because Mrs. Akilo arrives at his home—we find out later that he sleeps with her.

- Shaking the fist is a sign of great honour and respect.

Chapter 6

Odili visits Elsie and sets up a date. He takes Nanga’s Cadillac which impresses her. They all go together to a book exhibition to hear Nanga speak.

- Objectification of women again.

- Jalio wrote fictional Song of the Blackbird.

Chapter 7

Nanga makes a good speech and they return home. He comments that he likes Jalio after he sees various ambassadors fawning over the author. They eat dinner and Nanga has sex with Elsie! Odili loses it when he hears them (she is screaming Odili’s name in a perverse twist) and leaves the house at 4AM. He comes back in the morning and curses out Nanga and heads to Maxwell’s.

- A dash is a small loan or bribe—this destigmatizes corruption—it’s just a small quick thing after all.

Chapter 8

Odili plots revenge against Nanga. Maxwell holds a meeting of the Common People’s Convention (CPC). While the party has Communist undertones, Maxwell is quick to reject that label. He reveals that the CPC has an inside man in the current government.

- All the politicians care for are women, cars, landed property. It’s like a rap video today. Case in point:

- Some in the older generation wish the white man had never left.

“It is only when you are close to a man that you can begin to smell his breath.”

Chapter 9

Odili goes back to Anata and we hear the story of Josiah, the bar-owner who took too much. Odili visits Mrs. Nanga and gets Edna’s location and then visits her, saying that Nanga sent him to inquire after her mother (who is in the hospital). He gives Edna a lift to the hospital on his bike but also crashes it, humorously.

- No greater condemnation: taking things till at last the owner (the people) notice.

Chapter 10

At Christmas, details of major corruption (more than their fair share) break out in the media concerning the current government. The CPC has Odili run against Nanga. Odili implores Edna not to marry Nanga! Odili meets a lot of opposition in his campaign. It’s important that he rejects Josiah’s offer of support.

- Now we see a dash of a four-story home!

- We also see that the wooden masks are now a game played by drunkards and children.

- We see Odili enjoying the fear in another person—enjoying power.

- Whereas a telegram might take 3 days to reach the country, rumour took a day or less.

Chapter 11

Odili gets bodyguards as the campaign gets vicious. Through it all, he pines for Edna (probably more than he cares about the CPC). Nanga approaches Odili’s father and tries to buy off Odili with 250 pounds and a two-year scholarship. Odili firmly rejects this.

- “Eating the hills like yam”

Chapter 12

Maxwell arrives from the city with his CPC staff to drum up support for Odili. Maxwell admits he took a bribe similar to the one offered to Odili; however, he insists that the bribe carries no weight and he just did it to take the money. When Odili approaches Edna, she angrily dismisses him. When the POP finds out that Odili’s father indirectly supported his son’s campaigning, they nearly jail him and levy convenient overdue taxes against him. Odili’s home village loses their pipes for supporting him. Odili writes off Edna.

Chapter 13

In disguise, Odili goes to Nanga’s campaign meeting. Josiah sees him though and calls him out. Odili is beaten severely, with only Edna vainly trying to help. He wakes up in the hospital and ends up winning Edna. A military coup occurs in the country, overthrowing the government and suddenly Max is a martyr and a hero.

- Corruption equated with “a warrior eating the reward of his courage” at throwing the white man out.

- The people had nothing to do with the fall of government—it was unruly mobs and private armies.

- “But in the affairs of the nation there was no owner, the laws of the village became powerless.”

- You’ve lived a good life when someone will shoot your murderer without expecting anything in return.