Building a Highway Infrastructure in Africa

Building a Highway Infrastructure in Africa

   We are reading Herbst' States and Power in Africa for a grad school class and the author has a chapter that does a poor job of examining the road networks (or lack thereof) in Africa.  This 2006 report does a great job of investigating the highway infrastructure (and potential) in Africa.  There's a powerpoint and a report at the link below.  The next step in this line of thought would be to connect the highway infrastructure development to the needed port infrastructure development.

Time to Build a Trans-Africa Road Network: New Analysis of the Costs and Benefits, and Preliminary Suggestions on How the Donors Could Make it Happen

I've listened to the guy who chaired the event lecture and he's a sharp and dynamic speaker (Todd Moss)--you should follow him on twitter (@toddjmoss).

http://www.cgdev.org/content/calendar/detail/6483/
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/event%20docs/Trans-African%20Network%20-%20for%20distribution.ppt

Is the UN Charter Relevant in the Twitterific Age of Intervention?

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Is the UN Charter Relevant in the Twitterific Age of Intervention?

            Both liberals and realists would agree that there are scenarios that call for or require intervention in the internal affairs of other sovereign states.  Speaking on the idea of collective global security Kofi Annan said, “In our globalized world, the threats we face are interconnected . . . whatever threatens one threatens all.” (Lauren, Craig, George, 272).  Annan overreaches in his statement and it is in the application of the limitations and requirements for intervention that realists and liberals disagree today.  It is only in the reconciliation of realist and liberal approaches that a system balancing restraint and freedom can not only be developed, but most importantly applied.  Most notably the international community set out to do just this after World War II with the United Nations (UN) Charter.  While well intentioned, this system has not changed in concert with advances in technology or with the shift in the international balance of relative power. 

            A key feature of the Westphalian Order, still largely in place today, is the mutual respect for sovereignty among nation states.  Although this respect is lessening, most states feel obliged to provide a modicum of international legal justification before interfering in another state’s domestic affairs and even name interventions with this in mind.  The U.S. dubbed their invasion of Panama, “Operation JUST CAUSE.”  Realists focus on the autonomy, power, and security of sovereign state actors and are invested in the modern state system and thus have a higher bar.  Nevertheless, one could see realist support for the U.S. intervention in Pakistan in defense of Afghan sovereignty and the aforementioned invasion of Panama based on the threat to the U.S. of Noriega’s facilitating drug running into the United States.  The liberal viewpoint, with its focus on the interdependence of not only state actors, but also organizations and institutions, and the promotion of human rights, provides to a large measure the basis for the recent series of “humanitarian interventions” such as the 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and its most recent involvement in the Libyan Civil War.  

            Thus a realist might also favor intervention when it contributes to the international balance of power and order.  Although there was an obvious ideological component to the U.S. policy of containment during the Cold War, each side viewed challenges to its sphere of influence as a zero-sum game exemplified by the 1983 U.S.-led invasion of Grenada in response to what was viewed as the Soviet-backed, Cuban militarization of the island.  A liberal might demand intervention in the same situation but for very different reasons—namely because the intervention would enable the independence of the people and the government (Nye, 169). 

            Although imperfect in design and often execution, the UN Charter represents a pragmatic reconciliation of the realist and liberal approaches and more importantly, addresses both the limitations and obligations of states in intervention.  The UN Charter sought to provide a structure to address, evaluate and ratify (when applicable) calls for intervention.  Specifically, Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) does provide a single standard.  Article 39 states: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The Security Council has a vested interest in maintaining international balance of power, and the UN provides the framework for nations to make decisions together.  This framework and Chapter VII mandate does not encompass intervening actions like public appeals by government leaders or officials.  Nye describes this wide range of possible actions that build from words to steel (Nye, 166-7).  When “steel” is needed, Article 43 obligates all UN members to contribute as required, but sets a limit on this contribution by including those members in UNSC’s decisions and by allowing them to bring any economic problems to the UNSC as well.  Although the charter has no real enforcement mechanism for states that refuse to participate, the Charter is an improvement over the legal framework of the League of Nations—as it better balances national sovereignty with international legal obligations (and includes the U.S. as a member).  Finally the charter is clear that nothing “shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence” (UN Charter, Article 51).  This charter has been criticized, however, for taking too soft an approach to human rights in favor of sovereign ones (Lauren, Craig and George, 76).

            Although the Charter limits U.N.-approved or sponsored intervention with fairly clear criteria, these criteria have been more broadly applied during the late two decades.  Of late, the UN’s loose interpretation of threats to “international peace and security” raises the question of inconsistency. Why did it condone interventions in Iraq and Libya, but does not intervene in China’s violent suppression of public dissent?  This, of course, stems from China’s veto power on the UN Security Council.  One contributing factor may be the 24-hour news cycle for which a closed society like China’s is less vulnerable.  Today it is public opinion, forged by the continual bombardment of images and information, which creates the impetus for action more so than any rigorous evaluative series.

            Without a standard interpretation of Article 39, the UN must create a framework of evaluation for intervention.  First and foremost, the tripwire to intervene must be when the internal threatens the external—when the abuses occurring within a country affect the peace and security of the international community.  It is at this juncture that the obligation must be separated from the limitation.  The international community must agree to intervene but must embrace Huntington and ensure that the intervention itself is regionally led.  The application of sub-state theory is applicable here; those countries in  their region can better understand their culture (strategic and otherwise), and are in the best position to use soft power to affect change.  That soft power traditionally has not been systematically applied in this manner is perhaps why its effectiveness has been limited (Nye, 63-4).  This regional intervention combines the liberals’ focus on interdependence with the realists’ need for power and security. 

            Although flawed and in need of an update to reflect the modern international system, the provisions on intervention in the UN Charter provide satisfactory resolution to the tension between obligations and standards, or limits, on intervention.  The Charter uses a liberal lens to promote international peace and security while providing a realist mechanism to implement said peace and security throughout the globe.  Once must question, though, whether the current trend toward humanitarian intervention can be sustained.  As an increasing number of nations such as Mexico show signs of devolving into failed states, the international community will continue to be challenged to set boundaries on and provide justification for intervening in what were considered until recently, purely domestic issues within sovereign states.  The challenge is for the standards and means of intervention to fully evolve with technology and the role of transparency.  While certain factors like human nature remain timeless, the 24-hour news cycle is already quickly morphing into the 1,440 minutes (and one day the 86,400 seconds) news cycle with a real-time global flow of news and reporting.  The world must not pay mere lip service to former Secretary General Daj Hammarskjöld’s comment that the “United Nations reflects both aspiration and a falling short of aspiration.  But the constant struggle to close the gap . . . makes the difference between civilization and chaos.” (Lauren, Craig, and George, 129).  The struggle in this case must be to keep pace with an increasingly interdependent world and to intervene consistently and only when required. 

 Bibliography

Would You Buy Tickets to Concert of Democracies?

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 

Concert of Democracies as the Answer to the Impotent UN

           Kant held that a “perpetual peace” could only be reached after a long period of attempts and failure, but emphasized that once realized, it would solidify global  “republican freedom” (Doyle in Betts, 140).  Fukuyama held the global triumph of liberal democracy as the evolutionary embodiment of perfection in international relations (Fukuyama in Betts, 7).  The idea of a “Concert of Democracies (COD)” stand as Ikenberry and Slaughter’s answer, marriage and implementer of Kant’s and Fukuyama’s philosophical thesis.  The authors charge that ultimately U.S. Strategy is to guard its citizens and culture by ensuring safety within its borders, a thriving international economy, and a non-combative cooperative global security environment.  (Ikenberry and Slaughter in Betts, 625).   The COD achieves this strategy by bolstering security cooperation between liberal democracies of the world, effectively creating the framework to codify and implement the “democratic peace” (I and S in Betts, 627).   While Ikenberry and Slaughter’s COD theoretically appears to be viable solution, in execution it could potentially isolate and enervate non-democratic allies, worsen the already questionable efficacy of the United Nations (UN), and discount the critical and rising global role of non-state actors.           

            The merits of a COD fall into the realm of the benefits of collective strength and security.  This concert has already been done on a small scale with alliance building in the past.  There are many examples, most notably President Bush Sr’s first Gulf War coalition.  Although not composed entirely of democracies, the UN Security Council acted to ensure a collective security through a collective response (Lauren, Craig and George, 84).  The unanimity of the Western democracies and Japan acting in concert generated a moral certainty that contributed to the ability of states such as Syria and Egypt to send large combat units in support of alliance efforts.  Additionally, the effect on public opinion in democracies of an awareness that like political entities share a common cause cannot be underestimated in facilitating long-term support for a policy or course of action. 

            One drawback of such a concert is that it serves to isolate non-democratic allies needlessly. While there are few, if any, instances where China and Russia would be offended not to be included in such a concert, there are allies that might take offense. 

Morocco is one of America’s oldest allies but is certainly no democracy (although their diplomatic corps would argue otherwise)—this speaks to a major uncertainty—who makes the cut?  While Ikenberry and Slaughter state that membership will be “self-selective,” this is not always possible.  In making the cut you are unnecessarily excluding potential partners with shared interests, but without liberal democratic forms of government.  Perhaps the biggest drawback to a COD is that typically it will react slowly to a crisis in an effort solidify broad support among its fellow democratic states.  This sluggish response time only allows a crisis to worsen—and could costs lives.  Furthermore the susceptibilities of a COD to the vagaries of public opinion make the execution and sustainment of any decision difficult.  This stands in stark contrast to an authoritarian state that is less constrained and can make quick and unanimous decisions—this is especial problematic because they are the COD’s likely antagonists.  A less evident drawback is that smaller democratic partners may have a disproportionate voice in the course of the concert because of the negative perception that could result if the COD appears to fracture.  It is also dangerous to assume that simply because a nation is a liberal democracy means that they share our same core interests.  This can lead to the U.S. needlessly entangled with nations that possess divergent goals.

            Perhaps the largest uncertainty lies with the United Nations (UN).  Despite Ikenberry and Slaughter’s assertions to the contrary, the COD cannot coexist with the UN—at least not with the U.S. as a member of both organizations.  The success of the COD can only be inversely related to that of the UN.  This means that where the nations of the COD rise, the rest of the world falls.  Furthermore, a realist who espouses the temporality of democracies would have major issues with this concert because it unabashedly espouses the liberal democratic system as the ultimate evolutionary state of the global system.  They might further counter such a plan by echoing Lord Palmerston’s sentiment that “[there are] no eternal allies or perpetual enemies . . . only [national] interests” (Nye, 66).   Finally, conflicts that may require interaction with or intervention by the COD will increasingly involve non-state actors and there is considerable ambiguity with how the COD would interact with them.  These non-state actors include ethnic groups, rebel militias, and multinational corporations, all whose core interests may be asynchronous or non-tangential to the values of liberal democracies. Finally, the COD discounts the role of the most important non-state actor, the economy.  The rise in importance of the global economy as an institution/non-state actor rivals that of many nations that would join this concert.  This rationale is in accord with Fukuyama’s assertion that nations that have achieved their “end of history” (aka liberal democracies) will focus more closely on economic relationships than political and strategic ones. (Fukuyama in Betts, 15). 

            Ultimately, one must demand: to what end?  Realists might criticize that such a concert’s merits or detractors are irrelevant—what matters is the existing balance of power and how such a concert might affect it.  The alienation of non-democratic allies and the debasement of the UN’s efficacy would not only throw the realists’ balance of power into disarray but could end up stunting the spread of liberal democracies.  A COD likely will not make the world free from war, but perhaps may make the world more prone to “just wars.”  It remains to be seen if the COD could be the progression (or perfection) of Kant’s “perpetual peace (Doyle in Betts, 140).  To even have a chance for success the COD cannot coexist with the UN but must supplant them—a herculean—if not impossible, task.  Ikenberry and Slaughter would revel in Doyle’s assertion that “we are lovers of glory,” (Doyle, in Betts, 139), in the case of a concert of democracies, the liberal democracies of the world would be reveling too much in the glory of their “righteousness.”

 Bibliography

Grad School Notes on Social Theory and Comparative Politics (CP) by Mark Lichbach

Social Theory and Comparative Politics (CP)

Mark Lichbach

Introduction

- Author seeks to address the state of theory in comparative politics today because he doesn’t believe it’s taken seriously anymore

- Unfortunately today CP focuses on solving real-world questions and is driven by problems

            “One can’t begin inquiry with evidence derived from and used to test theory; one             must begin with theoretically embedded observations.”

- author seeks to advance theory in CP in the following 3 ways:

            1. Recognize 3 ideal-type research traditions: rationalists, culturalist, structuralist

            2.  Set dialogue among schools within historical context of social theory’s             development

            3. Set dialogue among schools within historical situation seen by comparativists             today

-“We cannot remain theoretically challenged . . . and actually solve substantive problems” (241)

- Ultimately the author seeks a balance between between those asking the questions and those appreciating the answers

Section 1: Three Exemplars

*Bates, Scott and Skocpol are 3 examples of specific research schools:

Bates: Rational/social choice study of  how interests produce the dialectic of reason and rationality in Kenya’s political economy

Scott: Culturalists/interpretivist of how communities and identities make up the dialectic in Malaysia’s class relations

Skocpol: Structuralist/institutionalist of how social forces drive dialectic in the French/Russian/Chinese revolutions

*These 3 school can not only coexist, but the debate between the three can lead to better research and “inquiry”

Section 2: The Three Research Schools

*Good Table comparing the 3 on p. 245

Ontology (what is assumed about the nature of existence with regards to entities and and their properties):

Rationalist- how actors employ reason to satisfy their interests

Culturalist- what are the rules that make up individual and group identities

Structuralist- what are the relations between actors in context of institutions

Methodology:

Rationalist- comparative static experiments that link structure to action

Culturalist- gaining interpretive understanding through case studies (mostly)

Structuralist- study historical dynamics of real social types

Comparison

Rationalist- Generalize

Culturalist: Particularize

Structuralist: Typologize through classification, morphology and dynamics

Lacunae (addressing missing gaps and understanding cultural differences)

Rationalist: sacrifice the subject and surrender the self, undoing the community and unmasking the collectivity (materialism)

Culturalist: do not try to separate the material from the ideal because they assume that material must always be interpreted in terms of the ideal (idealism)

Structuralist:  structure is fate, leading to historical fatalism and determinism

Subtraditions

Rationalists:

            Thin: pure intentionalists—reason is cause of action; human nature rationalists

            Thick:  more structured—conditions are both causes and effects;social situation             rationalists

Culturalists:

            Thin: Survey researchers; actors make culturally informed choices

            Thick: examine the decision rules behind choice and how actors are formed by             culture

Structuralists:

            Thin: Materialists; actors aren’t as important and don’t have much freedom to             choose; substructure drives superstructure

            Thick: examine materially driven dynamics of structures of collective action and             social norms

Section 3: The Social Embedded Unit Act

- How do you marry these three schools?  How’s it been attempted historically

- All three approaches can be linked back to Parson’s “unit act” and Weber’s “paradox of modernity”

- All acts are social embedded

- three layers follow:

*See figure 1 on page 262 for an illustration

Inner of Individual Layer

- desires and beliefs direct action

The Middle or Collective Layer

- cultural norms and environmental conditions affect social action

The Outside or Research Community Layer

- Experts in:

Action (rationalists): individual choice and social action

Norms (culturalists): individual desires and cultural norms

Conditions (Structuralists): individual beliefs and environmental conditions

The Connection Among the Layers

- The value in combining all three approaches is that they can address gaps in each other

- looking at these connections forces comparativists to confront the nature of the competing paradigms and the structure-action, social order-social change, and nominalism-realsim debates. 

- Socially embedded unit act helps clarify these enduring issues

Section 4: Max Weber, Modernity, and Comparative Politics Today

- Modernity involved the growth of reason that culminated in a series of macro changes involving the rationalization of social structure

-Weber (as a rationalist): warns of the political consequences of this modernity.  Examines status groups and social classes with material interests to explore unintended negative consequences of reason

- Weber (as a culturalist) explores paradox of modern rationality’s origins: irrational quest for meaning and salvation helped create rational individuals and institutions of modern world.  Examines religious ethics and normative orders to explore the irrationality that drove the rationality that turned irrational (wow, what an awful writer)

- Weber (as a structuralist): studies the way institutional dynamics of state and society cage individuals in the dialectic of reason and irrationality.  Examines patterns of stratification and systems of domination to explore institutional logics of the forces that operate behind the backs of reasoning and nonrational individuals.

* All three schools offer a critical look at the central problem of modernity

Section 5: Conclusion

Author’s 4-part thesis on improving State of Theory in Comparative Politics (273-4)

            1. Theory in this field is more than a “messy center”

            2. Embrace “creative confrontations” in the defined research communities; this             will yield deepened theoretical understanding

            3. Contemporary comparativists must appreciate the historical context of social             theory’s development

            4.  Critical thought on the challenges of modernity show significance of             rationalist, culturalist and structuralist thought.  

Why are democratic regimes as weak as they are?

- Presidents are self interested (individual)

- why are there so many of them in Africa compared to Europe; so what are the conditions that cause these? 

- What kinds of factors seem to matter, and how do they matter in relation to each other.

DISCUSSION NOTES:

Triangle:

- professors are often thick structuralist while Military is culturalist

Cultural approach- big in 50/60’s and is now coming back in vogue.  Not as cultural anymore; focus on social capital. 

Structuralist- structure of the state and its impact on the individual.  SO what’s the best strategy for individuals to maximize power

Example:  Culturalist would say we need to understand Afghan culture to understand the individual and their decisions

*So questions is what do they two have to do with each other?  A communal culture will resist government actions and influence into their personal life.    It will also place an emphasis on investment in community around themselves.  Ultimately, institutions will be affected to conform to culture.  

*Question comes down to where do you start—with the institutions or the culture?  The stronger corner will affect the other one more.

*Weakness of culturalist approach is that it’s not quantifiable or provable? 

- Whether or not you are culturalist or structuralist, you are eventually going to get pulled down to the rationalist corner of the individual’s desire for security. 

Critics:

- Rationalist camp is typically called “rational choice”  (Rat choice: people treated like rats in a maze)

- Structuralist say that people don’t matter (there’s no personal decision-making) 

African Security Conference Assesses the 3 D's in Austin

Wish I could go to this conference!

EVOLVING DYNAMICS OF SECURITY IN AFRICA:

ASSESSING DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT, AND DEFENSE RESPONSES

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

8am to 5pm

Bass Lecture Hall, LBJ School of Public Affairs

University of Texas at Austin

Austin, Texas

The Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, the U.S. Africa Command, the U.S. Army Senior Service College Fellowship Program, and the University of Texas College of Liberal Arts will host a full-day conference examining the evolving dynamics of security in Africa. The conference brings together policymakers, practitioners, military personnel, and scholars to share the latest research and policy options on issues impacting African and global security.

8:00am REGISTRATION AND LIGHT BREAKFAST 

8:30am INTRODUCTION 

* Dr. Francis J. Gavin, Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law

* LTG (r) Joseph Yakovac, U.S. Army Senior Service College Fellowship Program

8:45am KEYNOTE: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE U.S. MILITARY IN AFRICA 

* Ambassador J. Anthony Holmes, Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities, U.S. Africa Command

9:30am TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS IN TRANSITION: NEW PATTERNS AND TRIGGERS OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE

How are historical patterns and hot spots for conflict and violent extremism changing in Africa, and how do these trends interact with new security threats like climate change? How are conflict dynamics, drivers, and contagion patterns changing in recent years? 

* LTC Liam Collins, Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy at West Point (moderator)

* Dr. Clionadh Raleigh, Trinity College Dublin; CCAPS Program

* Dr. Idean Salehyan, University of North Texas; CCAPS Program

* Brian Levey, Strategic Analysis Enterprises; Violent Intranational Political Conflict & Terrorism Lab, College of William & Mary

11:00am EMERGING SECURITY THREATS: TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES FROM CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMANITARIAN CRISES

How are climate change, migration, and other transnational issues impacting African and global security in new ways? Where are pandemics and humanitarian crises affecting security most acutely in Africa? 

* Dr. Joshua Busby, LBJ School of Public Affairs; CCAPS Program

* Jeffrey Stark, Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability

* Dr. Andrew Githeko, Kenya Medical Research Institute

12:30pm LUNCH

1:30pm CASE STUDIES IN EFFECTIVE APPROACHES: SUPPORTING NATIONAL RESPONSES

What are the substantive and institutional requirements for security in these sectors in Africa? What are the roles and responsibilities of U.S. and African military, government, and nongovernmental actors in addressing these security issues? Where are there new opportunities to support national responses on these security issues through diplomacy, development, and defense channels? 

* Dr. Terrence Chapman, University of Texas at Austin (moderator)

* Michael Casciaro, U.S. Africa Command

* Andrew Bruzewicz, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

* Jenny Frankel-Reed, U.S. Agency for International Development

3:00pm CASE STUDIES IN EFFECTIVE APPROACHES: FOSTERING REGIONAL RESPONSES

Where are there new opportunities for regional responses to address security issues through diplomacy, development, and defense channels? 

* Paul Bartel, U.S. State Department

* U.S. Africa Command panelist to be confirmed

* Dr. Michael Findley, Brigham Young University; CCAPS Program

* Maxime Nzita Nganga, Greater Virunga Transboundary Collaboration

4:30pm LESSONS LEARNED AND NEXT STEPS

How can research at civilian and military education institutions inform the changing intelligence, strategic, and operational needs of the U.S. government and military in Africa? 

* Dr. Kent Butts, U.S. Army War College; CCAPS Advisory Board

5:00pm RECEPTION

Additional invited panelists to be confirmed.

Registration

Advance registration is required and space is limited, so please register today <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=m10491648&si=z499101730&pc=i2002&ei=f2258683&b=y> . There is no registration fee.

More Information

For questions or more details regarding the conference, please contact Dominique Thuot, CCAPS Program Coordinator, at dominique.t@austin.utexas.edu <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=u10796927&si=z499101730&pc=92003&ei=f2258683&b=y> .

About the Co-Hosts

The Climate Change and African Political Stability Program <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=g9363384&si=z499101730&pc=j2004&ei=f2258683&b=y>  is a five-year research program at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas at Austin, conducted in partnership with the College of William and Mary, Trinity College Dublin, and University of North Texas. CCAPS analyzes how climate change, conflict, governance, and aid intersect to impact African and global security. CCAPS is funded by the U.S. Department of Defense's Minerva Initiative <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=k12510949&si=z499101730&pc=k2005&ei=f2258683&b=y> .

The United States Africa Command <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=612510950&si=z499101730&pc=l2006&ei=f2258683&b=y> , also known as U.S. AFRICOM, is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). As one of six that are regionally focused, it is devoted solely to Africa. U.S. AFRICOM is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for U.S. military relations with 54 African countries. U.S. AFRICOM is committed to supporting U.S. government objectives through the delivery and sustainment of effective security cooperation programs that assist African nations build their security capacity to enable them to better provide for their own defense.

The U.S. Army Senior Service College Fellowship Program, a partnership of the United States Army and the University of Texas at Austin since 1992, is a one-year resident fellowship for Army colonels. Military participants attend UT in lieu of The Senior Service College (Army War College) resident program at Carlisle Barracks, PA and receive the award of Military Education Level One (the highest level of formal military education). Through access to the world-class educational assets of a top tier university, selected officers prepare to meet the demands of strategic thinking and senior level leadership that will be required of them as they lead the Army into the future. 

The College of Liberal Arts <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=g12510951&si=z499101730&pc=m2007&ei=f2258683&b=y>  is the largest school at the University of Texas at Austin, offering more than 55 majors through 21 academic departments and two-dozen centers and institutes. The school is committed to the idea that understanding history, society and culture helps students better understand - and, ultimately, thrive in - the world beyond campus.

2315 Red River Street, Austin, Texas 78712

512-471-6267 phone | 512-471-6961 Fax

ccaps@strausscenter.org <http://link.ixs1.net/s/lt?id=m10491648&si=z499101730&pc=j2013&ei=f2258683&b=y>  | ccaps.strausscenter.org 

Grad School Discussion Notes and Summary: Achebe's Anthills of the Savannah

IMPORTANT NOTE: DON'T CHEAT. DON'T PLAGIARIZE. Notes and Papers are shared here for reference and for studying. Footnote as appropriate.

BONUS LINK:  My entire (so far) grad school notes collection can be found here. 
All Things Achebe--The Complete Notes Collection

Anthills of the Savannah Discussion Notes and Summary 

DISCLAIMER:  These are my notes that I created from reading the novel and from classroom discussion.  Generally speaking, the chapter by chapter summaries are my own, however, the other parts of the posts are what I hope are an amelioration of the classroom discussion.

Discussion Points/Observations:

- The role of women; they are still representing society. 

- Parallel to Achebe’s role as minister of info for Biafra

- Rural and urban.  From the 60’s to 80’s, the state has pulled back from trying to connect to the urban areas. 

-  Achebe’s central characters always die.  Their struggle is more important than their life—they inspire people. 

- Failure of ruling class to connect to the majority (which is the poor)—All there is is struggle—there’s no solution. 

- This is the first novel where there aren’t any conflicts between father and sons—no generational conflict like his other novels. 

- In this novel, the rural comes to the city in contrast to previous novels where it’s the opposite.

- Sam motivated by fear and translates this fear to his treatment of his cabinet—effectively immobilizing them.  And he seeks to mimic the elderly state heads that he sees as the OAU. 

- Irony that Achebe writes a novel about the disconnect between the elite and the poor masses at such a level that it is not accessible by those same masses because of the higher intellectual level at which it is written. 

- Beatrice to Elewa to Agatha: bridges of connection

- Older Abazonian man’s speech is a throwback to Achebe’s prior novels (and a breath of fresh air).  This man is wise but has no power.  The importance of being seen to have fought, but more important for there to be a record of it.   Wallace Steven’s quote is applicable here: “The Solider is poor without the poet’s lines.” 

- Naming ceremony as a birth of nationalism, where everyone is present (from all aspect of society) and bonding over a common cultural heritage but torquing it to reflect a new reality.  Showing that all the value systems can coexist—whereas peers couldn’t. Abdul is present, supposed to be spying on them, but has instead joined them.   So you have all slices of society present.

- All the books have an older character (the uncle here) that acknowledges that the times are changing and everyone has to adapt.

- Is Luxurious a character?  What does the bus represent?

- Fragility of military regime.  When do they ‘cross the line?’  For Ikem, it’s when they arrest the elder.  But it’s the students’ reaction to the regicide article in the Gazette that really sparks the movement. 

Link for further study:

http://www.swans.com/library/art9/lproy10.html

"Nations were fostered as much by structures as by laws and revolutions. These structures where they exist now are the pride of their nations. But everyone forgets that they were not erected by democratically-elected Prime Ministers but very frequently by rather unattractive, bloodthirsty medieval tyrants. The cathedrals of Europe, the Taj Mahal of India, the pyramids of Egypt and the stone towers of Zimbabwe were all raised on the backs of serfs, starving peasants and slaves. Our present rulers in Africa are in every sense late-flowering medieval monarchs, even the Marxists among them. Do you remember Mazrui calling Nkrumah a Stalinist Czar? Perhaps our leaders have to be that way. Perhaps they may even need to be that way."

Literary Criticism:

http://echeruo.syr.edu/BIODATA/Achebe's%20Anthills.htm

http://www.ipl.org/div/litcrit/bin/litcrit.out.pl?ti=ant-387

Interesting Thesis on the role of Pidgin in Achebe’s novels:

http://www.nlc-bnc.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape15/PQDD_0004/MQ35839.pdf